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ABSTRACT 
False eyewitness identifications as well as erroneous judgments of 
identification decisions in court have been shown to contribute to wrongful 
convictions in many criminal cases (e.g., Garrett, 2008, 2011, 2012). The 
present dissertation reports three experiments, which were aimed to 
investigate a new system variable (Wells, 1978) to increase identification 
accuracy (Experiment 1) as well as to analyze fact finders’ judgmental 
processes when evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision 
(Experiments 2 and 3).  
In Experiment 1, potentially beneficial effects of re-reading one’s own 
person description prior to the identification task were examined (cf. Cutler, 
Penrod, O’Rourke, & Martens, 1986; Sporer, 2007). Moreover, description 
effects on identification accuracy were investigated under more realistic 
retention intervals, expecting a verbal facilitation effect instead of verbal 
overshadowing (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Participants watched 
a video film (1) without describing the perpetrator (no description control 
group), (2) with describing the perpetrator or (3) with describing and re-
reading their own description prior to the identification task. Two days or five 
weeks later all participants were asked to identify the perpetrator in a target-
absent or target-present lineup. As predicted from a context reinstatement 
framework, results revealed higher identification accuracy after re-reading 
compared to the control group. This result was replicated using a second 
target and corroborated by several small meta-analyses of similar studies (k 
= 4). Moreover, there was a tendency for a verbal facilitation effect with the 
likelihood of a correct identification decision being almost three times higher 
when the perpetrator was described compared to the control condition. 
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In Experiment 2, the Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956, 1965) 
was applied to the evaluation of eyewitness identifications (for the first time 
to our knowledge). To explain observers’ judgment accuracies when 
evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision it was examined (1) 
which cues observers use to evaluate an identification decision (”subjective 
utilities”), (2) how they interpret and weight these cues, and (3) if these cues 
as perceived by observers are indeed related to identification accuracy 
("ecological validities"). Study 1 presented participant-observers with literal 
transcripts of 48 choosers’ identification decisions, whereas Study 2 used 
the original videotapes. A “think-aloud” method was applied to make 
discriminating cues more salient to observers, which was compared to 
retrospective reasoning protocols. Both studies demonstrated that observers 
tended to overestimate cue discriminability and used these cues as 
indicators of identification accuracy independently of type of decision 
protocol. However, when videotaped think-aloud protocols were evaluated 
discriminating cues were visible to observers resulting in a high 
correspondence between subjective utilities and ecological validities. 
Advantages of think-aloud methods and videotapes to increase fact finders’ 
judgment accuracy when evaluating identification decisions are discussed. 
In Experiment 3, persuasive effects of more peripheral, indirect 
measures (i.e., perceived witness speech style and attributed witness traits) 
and ratings of different person and event description qualities on observers' 
judgments were investigated. Although none of these cues was a valid 
indicator of objective identification accuracy, observer judgments were 
related to several description qualities and perceived witness confidence. 
Persuasive effects of speech style characteristics depended on the 
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presentation of additional descriptions, that is, only when identification 
statements were presented alone did ratings affect observer judgments. 
To conclude, this dissertation suggests re-reading one’s own person 
descriptions as a promising approach to increase identification accuracy. As 
it is common police practice to ask eyewitnesses for a description of the 
perpetrator, re-reading one’s description is an easily applicable system 
variable that does not require any additional procedures, training, or 
resources. In contrast to former research (Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990), describing a perpetrator does not seem to impair 
identification performance under more realistic conditions. Thus, differences 
in description effects due to experimental procedures used are discussed. 
Considering fact finders' judgmental processes when evaluating the 
accuracy of an identification decision, the present studies demonstrated that 
original videotaped or transcribed identification statements indeed contain 
some valid indicators of identification accuracy that are perceivable and 
usable by observers. Especially the application of videotaped think-aloud 
protocols seems to be fruitful to make valid cues more salient to observers. 
However, future researchers are encouraged to test and optimize these 
instructions for the evaluation of identification decisions. Moreover, the 
Brunswikian lens model framework offers an appropriate method to contrast 
relationships between empirically valid and intuitively used cues. Thus, to 
increase fact finders’ judgment accuracy, the model further allows 
recommendations for an appropriate weighting of information contained in 
identification protocols. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the pace of DNA exonerations has grown across the country in 
recent years, wrongful convictions have revealed disturbing fissures 
and trends in our criminal justice system. Together, these cases show 
us how the criminal justice system is broken--and how urgently it 
needs to be fixed. (Innocence Project, retrieved from 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction, 
February 13, 2016). 
 
According to the American Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org), an organization aiming to exonerate wrongfully 
convicted individuals through DNA testing, false eyewitness identifications 
are one of the major causes that contributed to wrongful convictions in more 
than 70% of cases (beside other factors; see also Garrett, 2008, 2011, 
2012).  
A popular case describes the wrongful identification of Ronald Cotton, 
a 22-year old, black man, who was accused of having raped a female 
student, Jennifer Thompson, at night in her apartment in July 1984. Three 
days after the rape Jennifer Thompson identified Ronald Cotton in a photo 
lineup. It is reported that she carefully studied each lineup picture and it took 
her up to five minutes to make her choice. Some days later, a live lineup was 
conducted, and again, Jennifer Thompson identified Ronald Cotton. She 
reported of having been 100 percent sure that she had identified the right 
man. Moreover, the police officers reinforced her by saying that she 
identified the same person as in the photo lineup, which made her 
inappropriately confident of having identified her true rapist. Consequently, in 
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January 1985, she identified Ronald Cotton in court a third time. The jury 
believed her testimony and judged her identification decision to be accurate. 
Thus, Ronald Cotton was found guilty and sentenced for life and 50 years. 
However, after having served two years in prison, Ronald Cotton’s new 
inmate, Bobby Poole, admitted the crime Cotton was convicted for. 
Consequently, Cotton’s advocates requested a new trial, but even at this 
moment Jennifer Thompson did not recognize her true rapist. She was still 
convinced that Ronald Cotton raped her and thus Ronald Cotton was 
convicted a second time for life and another 54 years.  
Seven years later, in 1995, Ronald Cotton was exonerated through 
DNA testing and Bobby Poole was convicted instead. He was cleared of all 
charges, however, he had served 10.5 years in prison while being innocent 
(for a detailed case description see, Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 
2009; www.pickingcottonbook.com). 
A careful examination of this and similar other cases demonstrates 
the powerful consequences that may follow a wrongful identification. To date 
337 individuals were exonerated successfully by the Innocence Project after 
having served an average number of 14 years in prison 
(www.innocenceproject.org). However, not only a misidentification per se, 
but also the incorrect evaluation of an identification decision in court may 
cause a wrongful conviction (cf. Garrett, 2011, 2012). When it comes to a 
trial, fact finders (i.e., police officers, jurors, lay judges or judges) have to 
evaluate the accuracy of an eyewitness’s identification decision to arrive at 
their verdicts. This is problematic especially when the identification decision 
is the only or one of the major sources of evidence, and thus has a high 
relevance for the following verdict. 
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In the present dissertation, factors are addressed that are supposed 
to increase the probability of witnesses making a correct identification 
decision (Experiment 1). Second, to contribute to the prevention of 
erroneous judgments in court, fact finders’ evaluation and decision 
processes when judging the accuracy of an identification decision are 
analyzed in detail (Experiments 2 and 3). 
How To Obtain Correct Identifications? 
When a crime is observed, it is common police practice to first ask the 
eyewitness for a detailed description of the incident, the crime scene and the 
perpetrator’s physical appearance. When a suspect is made out, 
eyewitnesses usually are asked to identify the person in a lineup. As the 
police commonly do not know the perpetrator who committed the crime, an 
identification procedure is conducted to examine if the suspect indeed is the 
perpetrator. The eyewitness is confronted either with a live lineup or a photo 
array, containing the suspect next to several innocent foils. Objectively, the 
suspect may (target-presence: TP) or may not be the perpetrator (target-
absence: TA). In contrast to real life situations, in experimental investigations 
the perpetrator is known and thus target-presence can be controlled. To 
mitigate a witness’s expectation that the perpetrator indeed is in the lineup 
and only has to be selected (e.g., this is what Jennifer Thompson thought), 
the eyewitness should be made aware of the possibility that the perpetrator 
might not be present in the lineup. 
To construct a fair lineup, that is, a lineup that does not increase the 
suspect’s probability of being misidentified, it is important that the foils 
generally match the suspect’s physical appearance (e.g., they should have 
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the same height, stature, skin and eye color). Based on the “match-to-
description” method described by Luus and Wells (1991), the suspect as 
well as the selected foils should also match the witness’s description of the 
perpetrator. Thus, ideally all lineup members should show all of the 
described features to prevent witnesses of making a positive identification 
simply based on the presence of one outstanding feature. As an example, a 
witness might remember the perpetrator’s dark brown eyes, but only two 
persons in the lineup match to this description. Consequently, the witness 
probably will choose between these two without considering the other lineup 
members. Thus, the lineup is biased. 
Finally, eyewitnesses have the opportunity to make a positive 
identification (choosers), that is, to pick one lineup member that is identified 
as the perpetrator. On the other hand, they may reject the lineup, that is, 
they do not choose any of the lineup members (nonchoosers). The possible 
results of an identification procedure are displayed in Table 1 (cf. Sporer & 
Sauerland, 2008; Wells, 1993). 
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Table 1 
Possible Outcomes of an Identification Procedure 
  Witness Response 
Target-
presence 
No Identification 
"Nonchoosers" 
Positive Identification 
"Choosers" 
Target-absent 
(TA) 
Correct  
rejection 
False identification 
(false alarm) 
Foil 
identification a 
Target-present 
(TP) 
False  
rejection 
Correct 
identification 
(hit) 
Foil 
identification a 
Note. a As there is only one suspect per lineup and all foils are known to be 
innocent a foil identification always reflects an incorrect identification 
decision. In many studies foil identifications are also treated as false 
identifications (cf. Sauerland & Sporer, 2008). 
 
Since many years researchers have investigated factors that affect 
identification accuracy (for a review see National Academy of Sciences, 
2014; Wells & Olson, 2003) and concluded that eyewitness testimonies and 
especially identifications are highly error-prone. Wells (1978) proposed a 
distinction between two areas of applied eyewitness research focusing on 
system and estimator variables. System variables are modifiable in the 
criminal justice system and thus can be controlled and used to increase 
identification accuracy (e.g., interrogation techniques, foil selection and 
lineup presentation mode). In contrast, estimator variables cannot be 
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controlled by the criminal justice system and have to be estimated 
retrospectively. These estimations refer to the situational witnessing 
conditions (e.g., lighting, distance, duration of the crime, weapon presence) 
as well as to characteristics of the witness (e.g., age, emotional state, 
attention focus and expertise) and the target (e.g., distinctiveness, ethnic 
group).  
According to Sporer (2007a, 2008) system- and estimator variables 
affect eyewitness testimony in different phases of information processing 
reaching from perception and retention to a final recall or recognition phase 
(see also Sporer & Sauerland, 2008). First, eyewitnesses perceive external 
crime relevant information in a specific situation (e.g., after a party on the 
street at night) and in a specific internal context (e.g., intoxicated and highly 
emotional). Then, they have to keep the information in mind for an 
indeterminate time, in which they may be influenced by post-event 
information (e.g., suggestions, media influence) until they need to retrieve it 
in another specific internal state and situational context (e.g., at the police 
station). 
In the individual case, the knowledge about system and estimator 
variables serves to assess the probability of a correct identification 
retrospectively. Moreover, certain assessment variables can be used to 
postdict the accuracy of an identification decision (Sporer, 1993). However, 
to directly increase the number of correct identifications, and more 
importantly, to reduce the number of false identifications, modifications of 
system variables should be considered in criminal proceedings in line with 
significant research findings (e.g., National Academy of Sciences, 2014; 
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Wells & Olson, 2003; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, 
1998). 
Experiment 1: Re-reading person descriptions as system 
variable to increase identification performance? 
The first experiment examines the potentially facilitating role of re-
reading one’s own person description prior to the identification task as a 
system variable to increase identification accuracy (cf. Cutler, Penrod, 
O’Rourke, & Martens, 1986; Sporer, 2007b). It is assumed that re-reading 
one’s own person description might serve as a self-generated retrieval cue 
(cf. Mäntylä, 1986), which mentally reinstates the perceptual context, in 
which the original stimulus face was encoded. Based on an associative 
network perspective (Anderson, 1983) a stimulus is never stored in memory 
alone. If one information unit in memory is activated, activation is assumed 
to spread along the associative network, and thus related information units 
are activated as well. Consequently, the presentation of contextual cues is 
supposed to facilitate the recall of the target face. 
These assumptions contrast former work on the verbal 
overshadowing effect (VOE: Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990) demonstrating an overall negative effect of giving person 
descriptions on identification accuracy. However, the VOE seems to be 
restricted to certain experimental conditions and thus has not been 
unconditionally replicable (e.g., Meissner, Brigham, & Kelley, 2001; 
Sauerland, Holub, & Sporer, 2008). With more realistic experimental 
conditions the effect disappeared or even tended to be reversed, for 
example, when a longer delay (> 20 minutes) between the description and 
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the identification task was embedded (Finger & Pezdek, 1999; Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). Based on Paivio’s (1971) dual process theory and Craik 
and Lockhart’s (1972) levels-of-processing account, in the present 
experiment facilitating description effects on identification accuracy were 
expected using more realistic retention intervals. 
How To Judge Identification Accuracy? 
Sporer (2007a, 2008) proposed an integrative model of eyewitness 
testimony (Figure 1) to explain how fact finders evaluate an identification 
decision. In this model three levels of eyewitness research are distinguished. 
At the bottom there is the information processing level addressing factors 
that affect eyewitness testimony during perception, retention and retrieval 
(i.e., estimator and system variables described above).  
At the meta-memory level witnesses’ evaluations of their own memory 
processes are focused. For example, these evaluations include the witness’s 
perceived ease of retrieval resulting in a subjective confidence rating that the 
recalled information is correct. Meta-memory judgments may be expressed 
either verbally (e.g., “I am absolutely sure! He is the perpetrator!”) and/or 
through nonverbal behaviors (e.g., in terms of signs of nervousness or 
gestures) and paraverbal cues (e.g., in terms of response latencies or 
certain speech characteristics like hedges and hesitations). Moreover, 
witnesses may be asked to evaluate the decision strategies (cf. Dunning & 
Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; Wells, 1984) they have applied to 
make an identification decision.  
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Figure 1. Integrative model of eyewitness testimony and its evaluation 
(Sporer, 2008). 
 
Many researchers have extensively investigated the “postdictive” 
value of different meta-memory judgments so far, demonstrating reliable 
relationships between identification accuracy and the witness’s confidence, 
response latency at the identification and self-reported decision processes. 
At least for choosers, reliable associations were observed (e.g., decision 
processes: Dunning & Stern, 1994; Ross, Benton, McDonnell, Metzger, & 
Silver, 2007; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Wells, 1984; response latency: 
Brewer, Caon, Todd, & Weber, 2006; Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Sporer, 
1992, 1993, 1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004; 
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Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 
2015). 
At the judgmental level, interpersonal memory judgments are made, 
and thus, fact finders’ judgmental processes when evaluating the accuracy 
of an eyewitness’s memory are investigated. To make these judgments, fact 
finders rely on observable witness behaviors and the witness’s report of the 
event itself, but also take witnessing conditions at the perception, retention 
and retrieval stage into account. Fact finders also use witnesses’ meta-
memory statements as assessment variables (cf. Sporer, 1993; Sporer & 
Sauerland, 2008) to evaluate the witness’s memory (Sporer, 2007a). For 
example, a notable body of research has demonstrated that observers 
heavily rely on the witness’s confidence when they were asked to judge the 
accuracy of an identification decision (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; 
Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).  
However, judgments are also influenced by fact finders’ common 
sense beliefs about eyewitness testimony and their knowledge about 
estimator and system variables that were supposed to be influential in a 
specific case (for a review see Boyce, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007; Leippe, 
1994). This is problematic to the extent that several studies have shown that 
fact finders only have a poor knowledge about factors affecting identification 
accuracy (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; 
Desmarais & Read, 2011; Wise & Safer, 2004). For example, it seems to be 
common sense to intuitively assume that police officers are “better 
eyewitnesses” than laypersons (Yarmey, 1986). Consequently, police 
officers receive higher credibility ratings in court and their testimonies are 
rated more favorably (Linz et al., 1982, as cited in Penrod, 1983; Yarmey, 
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1986; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). However, and this is important, research 
results are largely heterogeneous and do not support such a clear police 
officers’ memory advantage (for an own experimental study on this topic see 
Kaminski & Sporer, 2016; for meta-analytic results see Sporer, Zimmerman, 
& Kaminski, in preparation).  
With regard to these inappropriate beliefs it is not surprising that 
observers often showed only poor judgment accuracies, which were 
comparable to a chance level of 50%, when they were asked to evaluate the 
accuracy of an identification decision (e.g., Beaudry, Lindsay, Leach, 
Mansour, Bertrand, & Kalmet, 2015; Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Lindsay et 
al., 1981; Wells et al., 1979).  
As an explanation for these poor judgment accuracies, it is assumed 
that observers (1) might not be sensitive to cues that indeed are associated 
with identification accuracy (i.e., they did not use them to make their 
judgments at all), (2) give these cues an inappropriate weight (i.e., they 
under- or overestimate cue discriminability), and/or (3) they use wrong cues 
to make their judgments (i.e., cues that are not valid indicators of 
identification accuracy; cf. validity-intuition model: Leippe, 1994; see also 
Semmler, Brewer, Bradfield Douglass, 2012).  
Thus, to increase fact finders’ judgment accuracies, it is necessary to 
investigate observers’ judgmental processes in more detail. Two 
experimental studies were conducted to investigate (1) which cues 
observers use to evaluate identification accuracy, (2) how they weight them 
and (3) if these cues indeed are valid indicators of identification accuracy. 
Therefore, the Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956, 1965) was adapted 
to judgments of identification decisions for the first time. In this model, 
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ecological validities, that is, relationships between certain eyewitness 
characteristics and objective identification accuracy, and subjective utilities, 
that is, relationships between these characteristics and observer judgments, 
are contrasted. High correspondences between ecological validities and 
subjective utilities reflect an appropriate use of the investigated 
characteristics, which should result in increased judgment accuracy. 
Experiment 2: Discriminating between correct and incorrect 
eyewitness identifications: The use of appropriate cues. 
 Many studies demonstrated reliable relationships between 
identification accuracy and different meta-memory variables (e.g., Dunning & 
Stern, 1994; Sporer et al., 1995; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994). As correct and 
incorrect identifications can be discriminated by taking the witness’s 
confidence, response latencies and self-reported decision processes into 
account, in the present experiment it was investigated if observers were 
sensitive to these relationships, too. Observers were presented with a 
positive eyewitness identification statement and had to evaluate its 
accuracy. Instead of presenting observers with witnesses’ explicit self-
reports, observers had to rate the witnesses’ perceptual basis, confidence, 
response latency, and decision processes based on their subjective 
impression of the witness and his/her testimony. To make witnesses’ meta-
memory thoughts and decision processes more apparent for observers, 
think-aloud protocols (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993) were used and compared 
to the use of retrospective reasoning statements.  
Two studies were conducted presenting the identification decision as 
literal transcripts (Study 1) or as videotapes (Study 2). Videotapes of the 
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original identification decision were expected to facilitate observers’ 
evaluations by presenting more peripheral witness characteristics that are 
not observable or less salient in written transcripts (e.g., nonverbal and 
paraverbal behaviors, response latencies; cf. Elaboration Likelihood Model: 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Leippe, 1994). It was hypothesized that think-aloud 
protocols as well as the use of videotapes would increase cue 
discriminability as well as observers’ ability to discriminate between correct 
and incorrect identifications. As a result higher correspondences between 
ecological validities and subjective utilities were expected under these 
conditions. 
Experiment 3: Evaluating eyewitness identification decisions by 
indirect measures. 
In a third experiment, persuasive effects of different indirect measures 
on observer judgments as well as their objective relationships with 
identification accuracy were investigated. Based on dual-process models of 
persuasion (e.g., Elaboration Likelihood Model: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) it 
was assumed that not only content-related aspects of a memory message 
influence fact finders’ judgments, but also more peripheral witness 
characteristics. Thus, this study focused on the witness’s speech style (i.e., 
powerless vs. powerful speech: Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 1978; 
O’Barr, 1982) and several attributed witness traits (cf. Witness Credibility 
Scale: Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010), which are assumed to convey an 
impression of the overall witness’s confidence and memory accuracy, and 
thus are assumed to affect observers’ judgments. 
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Based on the US Supreme Courts recommendation (Neil vs. Biggers, 
1972) to use person description quality to assess the accuracy of an 
identification decision (see also the criteria used by the German Supreme 
Court: Sporer & Cutler, 2003) and based on heuristic decision rules like "the 
more arguments the better" (cf. Elaboration Likelihood Model: Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) persuasive effects of different, easily accessible person 
and event description qualities on observer judgments were investigated in 
this study as well. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The Verbal Facilitation Effect: Re-Reading Person Descriptions as a 
System Variable to Improve Identification Performance 
Appropriate arrangements must be made to make sure, before 
witnesses attend the identification parade, they are not able to (...) 
see, or be reminded of, any photograph or description of the suspect 
or be given any other indication as to the suspect's identity. (Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, Code D, p. 53) 
 
When a crime is reported to the police, a common practice is to ask 
the victim or witnesses for a description of the perpetrator. Most descriptions 
contain references to some aspect of the physical appearance of the 
perpetrator, that usually are not very distinctive, as well as vague estimates 
of age, height and weight. Among these attributes, the face is the most 
useful part of the body when trying to identify a person. However, our 
vocabulary for describing physical attributes of a face is rather limited (cf. 
Sporer, 1989). Moreover, research has shown that faces are best encoded 
configurally or holistically (Ellis, 1984; Tanaka & Farah, 2003), whereas 
giving a description requires accessing the memory of the face by its 
individual features (e.g., Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; see Meissner, 
Sporer, & Schooler, 2007). Thus, on the one hand, obtaining a useful 
description from a witness can be quite difficult (Fahsing, Ask, & Granhag, 
2004; Lindsay, Martin, & Webber, 1994; Shepherd, Davies, & Ellis, 1981), 
while on the other hand being indispensable for furthering the criminal 
investigation (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Wells & Olson, 2003). In most cases person 
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descriptions precede a later person identification task. Moreover, the US 
Supreme Court recommended considering the accuracy of person 
descriptions when evaluating the reliability of an identification decision (Neil 
vs. Biggers, 1972). 
Due to the practical importance of person identifications, research has 
focused on the relationships between quantitative and qualitative description 
measures and identification performance by investigating the postdictive 
value of person descriptions to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
identification decisions (see the meta-analysis by Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, 
2008). Other researchers have focused on the impairing effects that giving a 
description can have on a future identification decision ( Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990; see also Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
In contrast, in the present study special emphasis was placed on the 
potentially beneficial effect of giving a person description on lineup 
identification accuracy (verbal facilitation), while ensuring the study's 
ecological validity. Furthermore, we employ person descriptions as a system 
variable to improve identification performance (Wells, 1978). Specifically, 
descriptions were treated and used as self-generated retrieval cues by 
allowing witnesses to re-read their own descriptions prior to the identification 
task, thus reinstating the previous retrieval context. 
Description Effects: Verbal Overshadowing and Verbal Facilitation 
A description given by a witness can be helpful in finding a suspect. 
But what if the very act of describing the perpetrator impaired a witness's 
ability to later identify him or her? Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) 
found that exactly this might be the case. In their Experiment 1, participants 
who had been encouraged to give a detailed description of the perpetrator's 
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face for five minutes performed significantly worse (decrease of 25%) in an 
immediately following target-present identification task than participants in 
the control condition who did not give a description, an effect the authors 
termed verbal overshadowing (VOE). Recently, Alogna et al. (2014) 
conducted a registered replication report of Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler's (1990) original experiment , including 22 studies.1 The results 
supported a robust and consistent VOE with an average difference of 16% 
between a verbal description condition and a control condition. 
However, note that encouraging participants to describe a face for 
five minutes may place undue emphasis on verbalization, thus provoking 
potentially misleading descriptors. In a recent study from our laboratory (N = 
197) the description of faces, body and clothing lasted on average only Mdn 
= 34 seconds (inter-quartile range = 26 seconds). In an archival analysis of 
person descriptions in criminal cases, only 2.88 face descriptors were 
mentioned (Sporer, 1996). Hence, we wonder why participant-witnesses are 
encouraged to describe a face for five minutes? 
Since Schooler and Engstler-Schooler's (1990) original work, quite a 
few studies have been conducted on the verbal overshadowing effect, some 
replicating (e.g., Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; MacLin, 2002; Smith & Flowe, 
2014; Sporer, 1989), others failing to replicate or even demonstrating a 
reversal of the effect (e.g., Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2005, 2006; Chance & 
                     
1 Sample sizes of Alogna et al.'s (2014) two replication studies varied due to 
an error in the initial experimental protocol. The replication of the traditional verbal 
overshadowing condition (cf. Experiment 1, Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) 
was conducted as a follow-up experiment and consequently only 22 of the initially 
participating 31 laboratories completed this experiment. 
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Goldstein, 1976; Itoh, 2005; Kitagami, Sato, & Yoshikawa, 2002; McKelvie, 
1976; Meissner, Brigham, & Kelley, 2001; Read, 1979; Sauerland, Holub, & 
Sporer, 2008; Yu & Geiselman, 1993). A major restriction of past studies 
showing a VOE is that in most of the experiments no or only very short 
delays of a few minutes were inserted between the description and the 
identification task. In contrast, in real world cases, a description-identification 
interval of several days, or even weeks or months is more likely to occur (cf. 
the median delay of 13 to 14 days in a recent field study by Wells, Steblay, 
and Dysart, 2015). If, however, a delay was inserted between the description 
and the recognition task, the negative effects of verbalization disappeared in 
most studies (e.g., Yu & Geiselman, 1993; see the meta-analysis by 
Meissner & Brigham, 2001; an exception is Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 
1990, Experiment 5). In a direct test of this argument by Finger and Pezdek 
(1999), the VOE disappeared when an interval of 24 minutes or one hour, 
respectively, was inserted between description and recognition task. 
Similarly, in Alogna et al.'s (2014) replication report, the VOE was much 
smaller (4%) when an interval of 20 minutes was used. 
These findings were supported in the meta-analysis by Meissner and 
Brigham (2001). The VOE occurred in studies in which the identification task 
immediately (Zr = -0.16), or with a short delay (Zr = -0.13) followed the 
verbalization task. Differences were marginally significant in the opposite 
direction in studies employing a delay of more than 30 minutes (Zr = 0.07), 
suggesting a verbal facilitation effect (VFE). 
Facilitative effects of verbalization on recognition performance can be 
explained by Paivio's (1971) dual process theory of encoding and Craik and 
Lockhart's (1972) levels-of-processing account. Both accounts share the 
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assumption that multimodal (verbal and visual) and thus deeper encoding 
(e.g., by adding self-generated semantic associations while describing the 
face) should result in a retrieval benefit for the encoded stimulus. As memory 
strength decreases with time (Ebbinghaus, 1913; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996), 
we assume that an early first recall, that is, describing the face soon after the 
witnessed event, leads to a deeper level of processing and elaboration, and 
thus, consolidates the recalled information into memory and reduces the 
amount of forgetting (e.g., Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998; see also Hope, 
Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011). Moreover, in terms of an associative network 
perspective, an early recall increases the activation level of the recalled 
items and strengthens the associations between them (Anderson, 1983). 
Thus, new retrieval routes are produced and related concepts are activated 
that later can serve as additional retrieval cues. Consequently, later recall 
attempts are facilitated. 
These assumptions are in line with learning studies investigating the 
beneficial effect of an early memory test prior to the final memory task, 
called the testing effect.2 A retrieval-induced facilitation of material related to 
the tested material is observed when early testing activities are included 
compared to no-testing control groups (for a review see McDermott, Arnold, 
& Nelson, 2014; Karpicke & Grimaldi, 2012; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), 
especially with longer delays (e.g., Butler & Roediger, 2007; Chan, 2009). 
Extrapolating from this literature, one would also expect a (stronger) VFE 
after longer description-identification delays. 
                     
2 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer to direct us to pointing out the 
testing effect as a possible explanation for our results. 
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Indeed, several studies have shown a beneficial effect of verbalization 
on later face recognition. For example, Sporer (1988) exposed participants 
to pairs of faces for 10 s and told them afterwards, which of the two they 
were to commit to memory. In one group, participants were telephoned and 
read their own descriptions to visually rehearse these faces. At a final 
recognition test, the verbally described and rehearsed faces showed a 
12.5% advantage compared to the nonrehearsed faces. It appears that the 
description fostered the original memory trace. However, most of these 
studies used old-new recognition paradigms with multiple faces to be 
described and remembered (e.g., Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2005, 2006; Brown, 
Gehrke, & Lloyd-Jones, 2010; Wickham & Lander, 2008). But most of them 
did not include realistic post-description delays or used target-present 
lineups only (e.g., LaPaglia & Chan, 2012). Thus, the main goals of the 
present study were to investigate description effects using an eyewitness 
identification paradigm using (1) realistic description instructions (2) longer 
description-identification delays and (3) both target-present and target-
absent lineups. 
Context Reinstatement 
From an associative network perspective (Anderson, 1983), a to-be-
remembered stimulus is never encoded into memory alone. Accordingly, a 
variety of environmental, emotional, and other contextual information of the 
episode in which the stimulus was encountered is encoded in an associative 
network into which the to-be-remembered stimulus is embedded (Bower, 
1981). If a later memory search fails to activate the direct path to the 
stimulus node, alternative routes can be primed by using contextual cues, 
making it more likely for the stimulus node to be activated and the required 
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information to be recalled. This effect was termed context reinstatement 
effect. 
In an eyewitness identification study by Cutler, Penrod, and Martens 
(1987) a context reinstatement interview was used, consisting of Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon, and Holland's (1985) "mnemonic instructions", pictures 
of the location and the victim of the incident, and a review of the original 
description. They found that when the perpetrator was disguised, the context 
reinstatement interview significantly improved identification performance 
(51% vs. 29%, d = 0.49, OR = 2.43)3, whereas it had no significant effect if 
the perpetrator was non-disguised (47% vs. 57%, d = -0.22, OR = 0.67). 
Beneficial effects of context reinstatement procedures on identification 
accuracy were observed in a field experiment by Krafka and Penrod (1985) 
and a staged event study by Malpass and Devine (1981) when target-
present lineups were used (both with ORs greater than 2.00). 
In an early meta-analysis of both facial recognition and lineup 
identification studies, Shapiro and Penrod (1986) reported a large beneficial 
effect of context reinstatement on hits (d = 1.91, k = 23), but also a smaller 
increase in false alarms (d = -0.44, k = 18). Recently, Wong and Read 
(2011) similarly reported a significant positive effect of context reinstatement 
on the hit rate in target-present lineups (OR = 3.12), but a nonsignificant 
effect on the false alarm rate when the target was absent (OR = 1.84). 
                     
3 Odds ratios (OR) > 1 illustrate higher observed frequencies for the 
context reinstatement condition compared to a particular control group. Odds 
Ratios for the results of Cutler et al.'s (1987) and Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke, and 
Martens' (1986) studies were converted from the reported d values (for the exact 
formulae, see Borenstein, 2009). 
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Consequently, there is a need to develop a method of context reinstatement 
that will increase hit rates without increasing false identifications. 
Context Reinstatement by Re-Reading one's own Descriptions 
Based on the expected facilitating effect of person descriptions on 
identification accuracy, the question arises whether one could even further 
increase this positive effect. Hence, we propose that person descriptions be 
used as a form of context reinstatement as a simple system variable to 
further improve identification accuracy. 
Cutler, Penrod, O'Rourke, and Martens (1986) attempted to 
unconfound different context reinstatement procedures and observed that 
re-reading one's own description of the target and the event was the only 
context variable yielding significant effects on identification accuracy. 
However, beneficial effects of re-reading were present only under certain 
circumstances, viz., under less optimal retrieval conditions. When the target 
was absent in the lineup, re-reading had a positive effect (control: 60% vs. 
re-reading: 74% correct rejections, d = 0.30, OR = 1.72), whereas with 
target-present lineups it had a negative effect (control: 68% vs. re-reading: 
50% hits, d = -0.39, OR = 0.49). Moreover, re-reading had positive effects 
when the perpetrator was disguised and absent from the lineup (control: 
50% vs. re-reading: 70% correct rejections, d = 0.45, OR = 2.26). 
Sporer (2007) also explored possible effects of re-reading 
descriptions using a relatively shorter exposure time of the target and a 
retention interval of one week. There was a tendency for participants who re-
read their descriptions (52% correct identification decisions) to perform 
better at the identification task than participants in the no-reread condition 
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(36%), OR = 1.90. However, this effect did not reach significance, due to the 
small sample size (N = 54).  
In sum, re-reading one's own description does not only not impair 
identification performance, but may actually activate an associative memory 
network for the target face, resulting in an increase in identification accuracy, 
especially after long delays and with target-absent lineups. Re-reading 
descriptions may function as self-generated retrieval cues, which have been 
shown to induce even higher memory performance compared to other-
generated cues (analogous to the studies with word lists: e.g., Mäntylä, 
1986). Thus, the present study aimed for a replication of the re-reading 
effect with new stimulus material to further test its effectiveness, while taking 
extensive care to ensure ecological validity. 
Do Quantity and Quality of Person Descriptions Matter? 
The benefit of re-reading is likely to depend on the quantity and 
quality of a witness's description. Re-reading should be helpful to the extent 
that the description includes many details, which act as retrieval cues to 
activate the original memory for the target face, thus enabling better 
identification. Hence, the question is: Does context reinstatement by means 
of re-reading depend on a "good" person description containing many 
correct details? 
Sporer (1996) identified five aspects that can be related to 
identification accuracy: the length of the description (i.e., the number of 
words), the number of details reported, the accuracy, the internal 
consistency between different descriptions by the same witness, and the 
general quality of the statement. To judge the "goodness" of a description, 
both the total number of details reported and the proportion of accurate and 
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inaccurate details have to be considered. Relationships between different 
aspects of a description and identification are generally weak but stronger if 
person descriptions are measured with methodological rigor (cf. the meta-
analysis by Meissner et al., 2008). Sometimes description properties are not 
related to identification accuracy but to choosing rates with participants who 
were allowed to re-read their descriptions prior to the identification task 
(Sauerland et al., 2008). 
This supports the idea that, within re-readers, increased lineup 
rejections might be due to the perceived inaccuracy of their descriptions 
making participants more skeptical of their own memory and thus, more 
reluctant to chose someone from the lineup (cf. the criterion shift account of 
the VOE, Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004; Sauerland et al., 2008). 
In the present study, relationships between identification accuracy 
and description accuracy as well as the number of details were examined. 
Because in actual criminal cases, there is no way of assessing the actual 
accuracy of a description--the true identity of the perpetrator is unknown--
different aspects of the perceived description quality (cf. Valentine, 
Pickering, & Darling, 2003) were additionally measured, including ratings of 
a description's precision, specificity and informativeness. Especially for re-
readers we expected positive relationships between these ratings and 
identification accuracy. 
The Present Study 
The main goal of the present study was to investigate the effects of 
verbalization and re-reading one’s own description on subsequent 
identification accuracy. We were also interested in examining possible 
associations with description quality. 
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Using three groups, a no description control group, a description only 
group, and a description plus re-reading group, orthogonally crossed with 
both target-present and target-absent lineups, allowed us to test rival 
predictions from the verbal overshadowing theories and the context 
reinstatement literature. We inserted two ecologically valid delays of two 
days and five weeks between the exposure to the target and the 
identification task, which we predicted would result in a positive effect of 
verbalization on recognition performance. Based on accounts of retrieval-
based learning (cf. Karpicke & Grimaldi, 2012) we expected greater 
identification accuracy for participants who gave a target description 
compared to those in a control group who did not (verbal facilitation 
hypothesis). 
Furthermore, we expected that re-reading one's description prior to 
the identification task would serve as a self-generated retrieval cue and, 
based on an associative memory network model, a mental reinstatement of 
the encoding context. Re-reading should increase the probability of a correct 
identification decision compared to a description only and a no description 
control group (context reinstatement hypothesis). 
To further substantiate this assumption, we investigated whether 
mock witnesses who had not seen the stimulus film but were only given a 
person description from a yoked witness-participant would be equally able to 
make a correct identification decision as participant-witnesses who had re-
read their own descriptions. Here we sought to rule out the alternative 
explanation that not the activation of an associative memory network by self-
generated retrieval cues was responsible for the expected improvement in 
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identification accuracy but the simple use of anyone's person descriptions 
(i.e., other-generated retrieval cues).  
Method 
Design 
To assess the effect of person descriptions and context-reinstatement 
on the accuracy of a subsequent lineup identification decision two 
experiments were conducted (see Table 1). In Experiment 1, a 3 x 2 factorial 
between-participants design was used. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three groups: A control group in which participants gave no 
description, a description only group in which participants provided a 
description of the perpetrator, and a description re-reading group in which 
participants provided a description of the perpetrator and were allowed to re-
read prior to the identification task that took place two days later. The 
presence versus absence of the target face in the lineup was orthogonally 
varied. Experiment 2 was identical, however, there was no description only 
group and the post-description delay was five weeks. Preliminary analyses 
revealed that the effects reported did not interact with Experiment (1 vs. 2), 
so we combined the data from both experiments to increase statistical 
power. 
Participants 
Across both experiments 208 students participated as a course 
requirement. Ninety-five students were tested at the Arizona State University 
(32 males and 59 females, age 17-52, Mdn = 20.0), and 117 at the Justus-
Liebig University Giessen in Germany (32 males and 85 females, age 19-53, 
Experiment 1: Verbal Facilitation Effect 46 
Mdn = 22.0). The participants were mainly Caucasian. Participants of other 
ethnic groups (Mexican-American and Native American, Asian, African) 
originated from the American sample and were equally distributed across the 
different conditions. Participants were tested in groups of one to five persons 
and individually seated in front of personal computers. Preliminary analyses 
revealed that there were no differences in results across countries. 
Therefore, location of study will not be considered as a factor. 
Materials 
Stimulus film. 
The stimulus was a high-quality color and sound video film showing a 
theft of a wallet from a young man's backpack. It was filmed at a sidewalk in 
a quiet residential area and had two actors. A young Caucasian male 
("victim"), 22 years old, was searching through his backpack when he was 
approached by another male ("thief"), 25 years old, who asked for directions. 
After the victim had finished giving his directions, his cell phone rang and he 
walked a few steps away to take the call, turning his back to the thief and 
leaving his backpack lying on the floor. The thief then quickly bent down and 
took the victim's wallet out of the backpack. He thanked the victim for the 
directions and walked off. The victim was still speaking on the phone, 
saying: "Yes, I've got her number, it's in my wallet, hold on, I'll get it for you." 
He then went back to his backpack and searched for his wallet. When he 
could not find it he took several things (water bottle, book, sweater, sheets of 
paper, keys) out of his backpack. When his wallet still did not show up, he 
angrily got up and told the person on the phone that the guy who had just 
asked for directions must have stolen it. The film lasted 1 minute and 34 
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seconds. Altogether, the thief could be seen for 42 seconds (24 s in close-
up). 
Photo lineups. 
Lineups consisted of six frontal portrait color photographs, presented 
simultaneously in two rows of three pictures each, and an additional picture 
next to them on the right depicting a white silhouette of a face on a black 
background labeled "Not Present". In a pilot study foils were selected (out of 
17 possible) based on their similarity to the target. In order to avoid 
recognition on the basis of clothing cues, all individuals wore a dark blue 
cloth covering their upper torso. 
Four different lineups were composed, one target-present [TP] one 
target-absent [TA], each with two different target positions (3 = top right and 
4 = bottom left) in the lineup. Target-presence and target position were 
completely counter-balanced across participants and description conditions. 
Lineups were constructed for both the perpetrator and the victim. 
Procedure 
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were seated in front of a 
35-inch TV screen. Participants were instructed to watch the film attentively 
because they were going to be asked several questions about it afterwards. 
Following the film, control group participants (n = 80) were allowed to leave. 
Description task. 
Shortly after seeing the film, participants of the two experimental 
groups (n = 128) were seated in front of the 15-inch screen of a Macintosh 
computer. The program SuperLab 1.75 (www.cedrus.com) was used for all 
instructions, lineup tests and data collection. At first, participants were 
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instructed to imagine having to give a statement about the incident seen in 
the film to the police. They were asked to describe the incident in as much 
detail as possible on an answer sheet. Following this, they were asked some 
non-leading specific questions about the event (approximately 5 to 10 min). 
After that, they first gave a free description of the perpetrator, followed by 12 
specific, non-leading questions about his appearance (see Appendix A). 
Participants were instructed to describe the perpetrator as precisely as 
possible on an answer sheet, so that another person could find him in a 
crowd. Importantly, they had the opportunity to give "don't know" answers, if 
they were not able to remember any of the specific features asked for. In 
Experiment 1, participants were also asked to describe the victim with 
equivalent instructions and questions. 
Re-reading manipulation and identification tasks. 
Two days (n = 144) or five weeks (n = 64) later all participants, 
including the control group, returned to the laboratory. All participants were 
presented with the lineup task on a 15-inch computer screen. Prior to the 
lineup task, only participants in the re-reading group were allowed to read 
again their own free description of the thief they had given earlier. All 
participants were presented with unbiased lineup instructions, which 
stressed the possibility that the thief may or may not be present in the lineup. 
Following this, they either saw a TP or TA lineup (n = 104 in each condition). 
Afterwards all participants had to give a confidence rating about their lineup 
decision on an 11-point scale (0% to 100%). Next, the same procedure was 
repeated for the identification of the victim (in Experiment 1 only). At the end, 
participants were thanked, asked not to talk about the experiment with future 
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participants, and released. All procedures were in accordance with 
departmental (based on APA) ethical guidelines. 
Rating and Coding of Person Descriptions 
The free reports as well as the specific questions regarding the 
perpetrator's physical appearance were analyzed to obtain separate scores 
for description quantity (total number of details), the number of correct 
details, the number of false details and description accuracy (= number of 
correct details/[number of correct details plus number of false details]). A 
comprehensive coding scheme was prepared in a pilot study, which was 
used by two independent coders to code the descriptions. 
Preparation of a coding scheme. 
First, three persons were instructed to watch the stimulus film 
carefully and to create as many feature categories considered necessary to 
capture all possible aspects of the perpetrator's physical appearance that 
could have been described by any participant of the main study. This 
resulted in a total of 130 features of the perpetrator's face, hair, body, 
clothes and accessories. 
Then, in a pilot study N = 20 participants individually watched the 
stimulus film and were asked to describe the perpetrator based on those 
preset feature categories, as precisely as possible (e.g., "Which eye-color 
does the perpetrator have?" or "Describe the perpetrator's skin texture."). 
They were allowed to watch the film as often as necessary and/or to stop it 
anytime to find all the information needed to answer the questions. For every 
of the 130 features the most frequently stated answer (the mode) was 
defined as correct. In most cases there were clear modal answers (e.g., 18 
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out of 20 persons described the perpetrator's eyes as "brown", thus brown 
eyes were adopted as correct answer in the coding scheme). If there was no 
clear majority in the participants' answers or if there were any ambiguities in 
the formulations, two additional coders had to agree on the correct answer. 
Age was coded correct if it matched the perpetrator's true age (25 years +/- 
one year). For perpetrator's height and weight answers within a specific 
range were defined that should be coded as correct (184.5 to 190.5 cm and 
77.5 to 82.0 kg). 
The final coding scheme resulted in a total of 132 variables (one 
variable each for age, height and weight, as well as 51 variables describing 
the perpetrator's face, 8 variables describing his hair, 18 his body, 26 his 
clothes and 26 describing further accessories). 
Ratings of description quality. 
First, all descriptions in the free report were rated on three different 
dimensions regarding their content quality by two independent coders. 
Ratings referred to a description's precision, specificity and informativeness 
using 7-point Likert scales (i.e., 1 = not at all precise/specific/informative; 7 = 
very precise/specific/informative).4 Precision was defined as a measure for 
the elaborateness and clearness of the description. If a description was 
rated as highly precise, lots of different features were explicitly stated (e.g., 
facial form, nose, mouth, skin, eyes, ears, hair structure, hair color, clothes). 
In contrast, descriptions containing just a few vaguely described features 
were to be rated low in precision (e.g., hair color and length). Specificity 
explicitly referred to the degree of differentiation the features were described 
                     
4 The verbatim definitions used are available from the authors. 
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with (e.g., "Hair was short, 5-7 cm, brown and curly" vs. "brown hair"). 
Informativeness referred to the description's ability to differentiate the 
perpetrator from other persons (i.e., to find him in a crowd). Thus in a highly 
informative description the perpetrator's unique or distinctive features were 
emphasized (e.g., "He had a small tattoo on his right arm."). 
Coding of descriptions for number and accuracy of details. 
Descriptions given in free report and in specific questions were coded 
separately. The coding scheme as well as the descriptions of N = 101 
participants5 from the main study were imported into Maxqda2 
(www.maxqda.de), a software program for qualitative data and text analysis. 
Two independent coders who were familiar with the complex coding 
procedure, coded every descriptor as "correct", "incorrect", "confabulated", 
or "subjective". If a feature was mentioned that the perpetrator did not have 
(e.g., he wore glasses, although he did not wear any) the item was treated 
as a confabulation. Items coded as subjective were descriptions 
idiosyncratic for a participant (e.g., "He looked like my brother"; "He was 
handsome"). For details not included in the coding scheme a "rest" category 
was used. 
After the coding process, incorrect and confabulated items were 
merged into a category of "false" descriptors due to low frequencies. 
Categories of subjective details and remaining features were excluded from 
further analyses for the same reason (in the free reports, less than 50% and 
                     
5 Unfortunately, 27 free report and specific questions descriptions were lost 
in the process of moving offices. Thus, 101 descriptions could be used for these 
analyses. 
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less than 25% of participants mentioned one or more feature that was coded 
in these categories). 
Subsequent data collection 
To eliminate the mere use of descriptions as an alternative 
explanation of the proposed re-reading effect an additional N = 128 
participants (76 male, 52 female, age 16-79, Mdn = 26.0), who did not see 
the stimulus film, were instructed to identify the perpetrator solely based on 
the 128 free person descriptions given by the participants in the two main 
experiments. First, every participant had to read one yoked participant's free 
target description, and was then immediately shown the same lineup the 
corresponding participant of the main experiments had seen. Participants 
received the same unbiased lineup instructions used in the main study, that 
is, they were informed about the possibility to reject the lineup. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses: Description Use as Alternative Explanation for 
the Expected Re-Reading Effect? 
To rule out the possibility that simply reading anyone's description 
might be responsible for correct identification decisions, we compared 
identification accuracy of the two re-reading groups from both experiments 
and mock witnesses who had not seen the film but were asked to select the 
target based on a yoked description of an experimental participant. 
Identification accuracies were clearly higher for re-readers (85.0%) than 
mock witnesses (37.5%), LR chi2(1, N = 160) = 40.15, p < .001, OR = 9.44. 
Likewise, participants in the description only group of Experiment 1 (79.2%) 
made significantly more correct identification decisions than mock witnesses 
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given these descriptions (33.3%), LR chi2(1, N = 96) = 21.35, p < .001, OR = 
7.60. 
Overview of Further Analyses 
Preliminary analyses revealed that the results of Experiment 1 and 2 
were completely parallel, with the exception of the influence of delay. 
Therefore, we first present the joint results of Experiment 1 and 2 regarding 
the potential benefit of re-reading on the accuracy of identification decisions. 
Subsequently, we analyze the effect of prior describing a perpetrator on 
subsequent identifications (i.e., no description control group [CG] vs. the two 
description groups combined) to differentiate between verbal overshadowing 
vs. verbal facilitation effects. 6 
In light of the ongoing controversy regarding the most appropriate 
analysis of identification data, we first report diagnosticity ratios (DR) as well 
as the signal-detection theory based analyses of receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curves (cf. Gronlund, Mickes, Wixted, & Clark, 2015; 
Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014; Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 2012; Mickes, 
Moreland, Clark, & Wixted, 2014; Wells, Smalarz, & Smith, 2015; Wells, 
Yang, & Smalarz, 2015; Wixted & Mickes, 2012, 2014). We are aware that 
conducting repeated comparisons potentially inflate the type-1 error rate. 
However, the main purpose here was to demonstrate that similar 
conclusions can be drawn no matter which of these analyses are conducted. 
                     
6 Effects of verbalization and re-reading on choosing rates and confidence 
are available on request. We do encourage future researchers to investigate 
whether the confidence-accuracy relationship is affected by re-reading, or more 
generally, by verbalization of the target's face. 
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Further, data were analyzed via four hierarchical loglinear frequency 
analyses (SPSS Hiloglinear, hierarchical backward elimination method), 
which are considered appropriate when both independent and dependent 
variables are categorical in nature (Howell, 2013; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007; 
cf. also Meissner et al., 2001). 
To describe the size of effects for categorical variables we report 
odds ratios (OR), that is, the ratio of the odds for a given outcome (e.g., the 
odds for a correct identification decision) in one group divided by the odds 
for the same outcome in another group (cf. Fleiss, 1994; Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). For example, in the re-reading group, the odds of a correct lineup 
decision are the proportion of correct decisions (e.g., 0.85) divided by the 
proportion of incorrect decisions (e.g., 0.15), which equals 5.7. Thus, in this 
condition the odds for correct decisions are almost six times higher than 
those for incorrect decisions. In contrast, in the no description CG the odds 
for a correct decision were 0.63/0.37 = 1.7. The OR is the ratio between 
these two odds, which is 5.7/1.7 = 3.4 in this case. Hence, the odds for a 
correct lineup decision in the re-reading group are 3.4 times higher than in 
the no description CG. An OR of 1 means the odds of correct lineup 
decisions to be the same for both groups. 
At the end, point-biserial correlations between the different description 
measures and identification accuracy as a function of delay and 
experimental condition (description only vs. re-reading group) are reported. 
Diagnosticity Ratios vs. Receiver Operating Characteristic Analyses 
Diagnosticity ratios (= correct identifications in target-present 
lineups/[false identifications in target-absent lineups/lineup size]), signal 
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detection theory performance d' and response criterion C (cf. Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005) for the different description groups are displayed in Table 
2. The indices d' and C were calculated based on hit and false alarm rates, 
with foil identifications in TP lineups excluded from the analysis (cf. 
Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005). False alarm rates were 
calculated in the same way as for diagnosticity ratios, that is, false 
identifications in TA lineups were divided by nominal lineup size (see 
"Estimated FAs" in Table 2). 
Moreover, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for each 
description condition were constructed based on the current approach 
illustrated by Gronlund et al. (2014) using participants' identification 
response data and confidence ratings. Therefore, the cumulative hit and 
false alarm rates (HR and FAR) were plotted at each confidence level, 
ranging from conservative responding at the one end (i.e., identifications 
with high confidence levels only) to a more liberal response criterion at the 
other end. Again, false alarm rates were corrected by the nominal size of the 
lineup, and foil identifications in TP lineups were excluded from the analysis. 
Then, partial area under the curve (pAUC) analyses were conducted to 
compare identification discriminability across the different description 
conditions. The procedure yielding the higher pAUC is considered 
diagnostically superior, that is, yielding a higher ability to distinguish between 
innocent and guilty suspects in a lineup. Partial AUC analyses are 
appropriate here, because the data do not include the full range of HR and 
FAR from 0 to 1. For each comparison we selected the maximum FAR as 
cutoff point. pAUCs were computed and compared using the data analysis 
package pROC for R (Robin et al., 2011), applying the bootstrapping method 
Experiment 1: Verbal Facilitation Effect 56 
(with the number of bootstraps set to 10000). For comparing the two pAUCs 
the following formula was used: D = (AUC1-AUC2)/s, where s is the 
standard deviation of the bootstrap differences and AUC1 and AUC2 are the 
areas under the curve of the two ROC curves (Robin et al., 2011). 
Parallel to our further analyses described below, we first compared 
the identification performance of the no description control group and the re-
reading groups in both experiments. The pAUC of the no description control 
group (pAUC = 0.012, CI95% = 0.006 - 0.022) was significantly smaller than 
the pAUC of the re-reading groups (pAUC = 0.031, CI95% = 0.021 - 0.041), D 
= -2.75, p = .006. The ROC curves are displayed in Figure 1, whereby FARs 
were divided by the total number of persons in the lineup (i.e., six). 
Next, possible effects of verbalization on identification discriminability 
(VOE or VFE) were tested. The difference between the pAUCs of both 
description conditions joined (pAUC = 0.024, CI95% = 0.015 - 0.037) and the 
no description control group (pAUC =0.012, CI95% = 0.006 - 0.022) was only 
marginally significant, D = -1.85, p = .064. 
In Experiment 1, comparing the pAUCs of the description only group 
(pAUC = 0.012, CI95% = 0.007 - 0.024) with the no description control group 
(pAUC = 0.010, CI95% = 0.005 - 0.023), showed no significant difference, D = 
-0.26, p = .798. 
Effects of Re-Reading on Identification Accuracy 
Comparing the re-reading with the no description control group. 
First, we focus on the conditions present in both experiments (N = 
160), thus excluding the description only condition in Experiment 1. Table 2 
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and Figure 2 give an overview of the accuracy of identification decisions and 
other outcomes in the different conditions in both experiments. 
Data were analyzed via a four-way hierarchical loglinear frequency 
analysis including re-reading condition (no description CG vs. re-reading 
group), delay (2 days vs. 5 weeks), target-presence (TA vs. TP) and 
accuracy of identification decisions (coded as a binary variable: 0 = incorrect 
[false rejection or filler identification in TP lineups; any positive identification 
in TA lineups]; 1 = correct [hit in TP lineups or correct rejection in TA 
lineups]). 
Stepwise selection by simple deletion of effects produced a model 
that included only first-order effects and two-way associations. Tests of k-
way interactions revealed that none of the three-way or four-way interactions 
were significant. The final model had a likelihood ratio chi2(8, N = 160) = 
5.93, p = .655, indicating a good fit between observed and expected 
frequencies generated by the model. There were highly significant partial 
associations between identification accuracy and re-reading, partial chi2(1, N 
= 160) = 12.37, p < .001, identification accuracy and delay, partial chi2(1, N = 
160) = 15.67, p < .001, and identification accuracy and target-presence, 
partial chi2(1, N = 160) = 7.62, p = .006. Re-reading one's prior description 
improved identification accuracy from 62.5% in the no description CG to 
85.0% in the re-reading group (OR = 3.40). Thus, the odds of correct 
identification decisions were 3.4 times higher in the re-reading group than in 
the no description CG. Performance deteriorated from 84.4% after two days 
to 57.8% after five weeks (OR = 3.94). Perhaps surprisingly, participants 
were better with TA lineups than when tested with TP lineups (82.5% vs. 
65.0%, OR = 0.39). 
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Although there was no evidence for the existence of three-way 
interactions, it is worth noting that the benefit of re-reading was at least as 
strong, if not stronger, in TA lineups (95.0% vs. 70.0% correct rejections; OR 
= 8.14) as in TP lineups (75.0% vs. 55.0% hits; OR = 2.45). Notably, the 
effect was comparable in magnitude for the two-day (91.7% vs. 77.1% 
correct decisions; OR = 3.27) and five-week delay (75.0% vs. 40.6% correct 
decisions; OR = 4.38). 
Comparing the re-reading with the description only group. 
Although re-readers apparently yielded slightly better identification 
outcomes than participants in the description only group (see Table 2), none 
of the differences, neither for TP nor for TA lineups, were statistically 
significant, all ps > .148. 
Effects of Verbalization on Identification Accuracy: Verbal Facilitation 
or Verbal Overshadowing? 
The data presented above demonstrate that re-reading one's 
description facilitates performance rather than impairing it. In Experiment 1, 
a description only control group was used to test whether this beneficial 
effect is restricted to re-reading or if giving a description itself is sufficient to 
increase identification accuracy. 
Comparing both description groups of Experiment 1 and 2 with 
the control group. 
Data were analyzed via a four-way hierarchical loglinear frequency 
analysis including description condition (no description [CG] vs. description 
[description only plus re-reading]), delay (2 days vs. 5 weeks), target-
presence (TA vs. TP) and identification accuracy (0 = incorrect; 1 = correct). 
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The likelihood ratio for the final model was chi2(2, N = 208) = 0.45, p = .798, 
revealing a good model fit. Tests of k-way effects revealed that all three-way 
or four-way interactions could be excluded from the model. Besides the 
already known highly significant associations between identification 
accuracy and delay as well as target presence (all ps < .002), there was a 
significant two-way effect of Description Condition x Identification Accuracy, 
partial chi2(1, N = 208) = 8.06, p = .005. Combining the description only 
group of Experiment 1 (79.2%) and the two re-reading groups (85.0%; M of 
both conditions = 82.8%) and comparing them with the no description CG 
(62.5%) yielded a highly significant VFE (OR = 2.89). Thus, when person 
descriptions were given, the odds of correct identification decisions were 
almost three times higher than in the no description CG. 
Although the three-way interaction was not significant, separate 
analyses within TA and TP lineups yielded similar conclusions. In the TA 
condition, performance was significantly higher in the two description 
conditions combined (92.2%) than in the control condition (70.0%), LR 
chi2(1, N = 104) = 8.67, p = .003, OR = 5.06. In the TP condition the effect 
failed to reach significance, with a tendency for higher identification 
accuracies in the description conditions (73.4%) than in the no description 
CG (55.0%), LR chi2(1, N = 104) = 3.71, p = .054, OR = 2.26. 
Comparing the description only with the control group. 
Only in Experiment 1, it was possible to test the traditional VOE by 
comparing the description only group (79.2%) with the no description CG 
(77.1%), which was far from significant, LR chi2(1, N = 96) = 0.06, p = .805, 
OR = 1.13. Separate analyses for TA and TP lineups also revealed neither a 
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VOE nor a VFE effect, both ps > .40 (correct rejections: OR = 1.84; hits: OR 
= 0.81; see the means in Table 2). 
Replication of the Effects With Another Target: Victim Identification 
Accuracy 
In order to replicate the observed effects of re-reading and 
verbalization on identification accuracy, parallel analyses were conducted for 
the identification of the victim in Experiment 1. There was a significant effect 
of re-reading, LR chi2(1, N = 96) = 6.25, p = .012, OR = 2.87, with 70.8% 
correct identification decisions for re-readers compared to 45.8% for the no 
description CG. Moreover, participants who gave a victim description (re-
reading plus description only group combined) performed better at the 
identification task (67.7%) than the no description CG (45.8%), LR chi2(1, N 
= 144) = 6.35, p = .012, OR = 2.48. There was a marginally significant VFE 
without re-reading, with 64.6% of the description only group making a correct 
lineup decision compared to 45.8% of the control group, LR chi2(1, N = 96) = 
3.43, p = .064, OR = 2.16. 
Quantity and Quality of Person Descriptions as "Postdictors" of 
Identification Accuracy 
Results are presented separately for free reports and specific 
questions. As only free descriptions were re-read prior to the identification 
task, we focused on the relationship between free report description 
measures and identification accuracy. Features mentioned twice (i.e., in both 
free report and in specific questions) were not coded separately, and thus, 
no overall description score was calculated. 
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Details coded for different feature categories (face, hair, body, clothes 
and accessories) were summed up for the total number of details reported 
regarding the whole person. Accuracy scores were only calculated for the 
whole person. 
Inter-coder reliabilities. 
Different measures of inter-coder reliability were computed separately 
for free reports and for specific questions (Pearson correlation coefficient [r] 
and intra-class correlation coefficients [ICC]). All values were highly 
satisfactory. 
Pearson correlations between the two coders for the total number of 
descriptors in free reports were r(99) = .90, and r(99) = .93 for specific 
questions (both ICCs = .95). Codings for the number of correct details 
correlated by r(99) = .89 in free reports, and by r(99) = .92 in specific 
questions (both ICCs =.94). Correlations for the number of false details were 
r(99) = .71 (ICC =.83), and r(99) = .82 (ICC =.90), respectively. Accuracy 
scores correlated by r(99) = .67 in free reports, and by r(99) = .87 in specific 
questions (ICCs = .81 and .91, respectively). 
For the ratings, reliabilities were satisfactory as well (precision: r(99) = 
.66, ICC = .78; specificity: r(99) = .62, ICC = .75; informativeness: r(99) = 
.61, ICC = .71). For further analyses the means of the two coders' ratings 
were used. 
Descriptive statistics of description quantity and quality. 
In free reports M = 10.68 (SD = 4.18) details were mentioned 
concerning the perpetrator's physical appearance. Thereof, M = 7.51 (SD = 
3.76) descriptors were coded as correct, and M = 3.17 (SD = 1.87) 
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descriptors as false. This resulted in an overall accuracy rate of 69.14% (SD 
= 17.74). In specific questions participants reported M = 14.05 (SD = 3.57) 
details in total, whereof M = 8.79 (SD = 3.42) were coded as correct and M = 
5.26 (SD = 1.98) were coded as false. Accuracy rate was M = 61.76% (SD = 
14.01). The distribution of details across the different feature categories 
(face, hair, body, clothes and accessories), separately for free report and 
specific questions is displayed in Table 3. Specific questions yielded more 
correct and more false details but lower accuracy than free reports, all ps < 
.001. 
Relationship between identification performance and description 
quantity and accuracy. 
All correlations between identification accuracy and description 
measures are shown in Table 4. For the total sample, in free reports there 
were significant positive correlations between identification accuracy and the 
number of descriptors, rpb(99) = .23, and the number of correct descriptors, 
rpb(99) = .22. These correlations were also significant in the re-reading 
group, rpb(66) = .29 and .28, whereas all correlations in the description only 
group remained nonsignificant. For specific questions the same pattern of 
results emerged. Correlations after five weeks tended to be larger than for 
identifications after two days but the samples are too small to test for 
significance of differences in correlations. 
Relationship between identification performance and ratings of 
description quality. 
Finally, we examined whether identification performance covaried 
with the rated degree of description precision, specificity and 
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informativeness. Additionally, based on high inter-correlations between 
these variables, we computed a mean composite rating across all four 
ratings (Cronbach's alpha = .95). Point-biserial correlations are displayed in 
Table 5. In the re-reading group each rating variable was significantly 
positively correlated with identification accuracy. In contrast, for the 
description only group none of these correlations were reliable. 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the potentially beneficial effect 
of describing a target's physical appearance on a subsequent identification. 
In particular, we explored the usefulness of re-reading one's own free target 
description prior to the identification task as a new system variable. As a 
possible explanation for the expected beneficial effect of re-reading, the 
relationships between identification performance and description quantity, 
accuracy as well as quality ratings were considered. A primary concern was 
to ensure ecological validity. Hence, we inserted a retention interval of either 
two days or five weeks between observation of the crime and the 
identification task. Person descriptions were collected according to common 
police practice, that is, a free report was followed by open-ended questions. 
By allowing a “Don't Know” option we discouraged the self-generation of 
false details. Both unbiased TA and TP lineups were used to assess the 
effects on identification accuracy. 
Verbal Facilitation vs. Verbal Overshadowing 
Contrary to assumptions in the VOE literature (e.g., Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001; Meissner et al., 2008; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) 
identification performance across all description groups, with or without re-
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reading (83%) compared to a no description control group (63%) was 
superior. The odds of correct identification decisions were almost three times 
larger when prior descriptions were given compared to the no description 
group (OR = 2.89). 
The effect was especially strong for TA lineups (correct rejections: 
93% vs. 70%, OR = 5.06), while there was only a nonsignificant tendency of 
facilitation when the target was present (hits: 73% vs. 55%, OR = 2.26). 
Even when re-readers were not considered in the analysis, thus comparing 
the description only group with the no description CG in Experiment 1, 
results showed that verbalization per se did not impair identification 
performance (OR = 1.13). Note that Meissner and Brigham's (2001) meta-
analysis also showed a VFE after the insertion of a post-description delay of 
more than thirty minutes. Hence, our results support the assumption that 
realistic delays of more than two days or even several weeks, in combination 
with conservative description instructions, seem to annihilate or even 
reverse the VOE. 
The present results are in line with the assumed memory advantages 
that are accompanied by early first retrieval attempts (cf. the testing effect; 
McDermott et al., 2014; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), especially after longer 
delays (cf. Butler & Roediger, 2007; Chan, 2009).  
In sum, these findings suggest that under ecologically valid 
conditions, if identification performance is affected by verbalization at all, it 
seems to be in a positive, and not, as assumed by the VOE hypothesis, in a 
negative way. Longer retention intervals of several days or weeks are more 
representative of real crime situations (see Sporer, 1996; Wells, Steblay, et 
al., 2015)  
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Re-Reading as an Effective Retrieval Cue after a Long Delay 
As predicted, we found a positive effect of context reinstatement by 
re-reading one’s description prior to the identification task. Identification 
accuracy was higher for participants that were allowed to re-read their 
description prior to identification (85%) than for participants who were not 
allowed to do so (63%), with odds for re-readers to make an accurate 
identification decision more than three times as high than the odds for non-
re-readers (OR = 3.40). The effect was internally replicated for the 
identification of the victim (OR = 2.87). 
Moreover, diagnosticity ratios were much higher in the re-reading 
group (90.0) compared to the no description control group (11.0). Thus, after 
re-reading witnesses were 90 times more likely to identify the target than to 
choose an innocent suspect. Due to the current criticisms concerning 
diagnosticity ratios (e.g., Wixted & Mickes, 2012) signal-detection based 
ROC analyses were computed, which led exactly to the same conclusions. 
The observed beneficial effect of re-reading tended to be stronger for 
TA (OR = 8.14) than for TP lineups (OR = 2.45). Thus, there was a tendency 
for re-reading to be more effective to reduce false identification in TA lineups 
than to increase hits in TP lineups. The positive re-reading effects did not 
differ as a function of the different delays, a finding future studies should 
explore. As re-readers and participants of the description only group did not 
differ in their identification performance, a joint effect of giving a person 
description and re-reading is assumed. However, based on Experiment 1, 
describing the perpetrator's face alone is not sufficient to explain the 
observed improvement in identification accuracy on its own. 
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Furthermore, the observed re-reading benefit seems not just to be 
due to the use of an appropriate person description. As the mock witness 
data reveal, merely reading someone else's person description does not 
suffice to select the target in a lineup (nor to correctly reject it). Mock 
witnesses who did not watch the stimulus film but only read someone else's 
person description yielded much lower identification accuracy. Thus, our 
results are compatible with the view that re-reading one's own description of 
the target does induce processes akin to spreading activation in a memory 
network in which the original target face is embedded (cf. Anderson, 1983). 
In line with Paivio's (1971) dual coding hypothesis, we assumed that 
describing the target should lead to coding features about the target not only 
visually but also verbally. Presumably, re-reading the description prior to 
identification would lead to a reinstatement of this verbal code as a self-
generated retrieval cue as well as to a re-activation of the associated 
encoding context resulting in better recognition performance. 
To further understand the underlying mechanism that affects person 
memory and identification, future research should examine whether the 
observed benefits due to re-reading are restricted to the use of one's own 
description as a self-generated retrieval cue compared to being given 
another person's (e.g., a co-witness's) description (other-generated cues; cf. 
Mäntylä, 1986; Sporer, 1991).  
Robustness of the Re-Reading Effect: A Meta-Analysis 
Several studies have found some form of re-reading effect (Cutler et 
al., 1986; Cutler et al., 1987; Sauerland et al., 2008; Sporer, 2007). To 
demonstrate the robustness of our findings including conceptual replications 
with different stimulus materials (films, targets, and lineups), we conducted 
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several small meta-analyses, which include the four studies mentioned 
above as well as the present results. Following the procedures of Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001), mean weighted effect sizes (ORs) for different lineup 
outcomes (overall correct identification decisions [TA and TP], hits [TP] and 
correct rejections [TA]) were calculated, comparing re-reading vs. no 
description control groups (Table 6) and re-reading vs. description only 
groups (Table 7). All effects for the comparison between a re-reading and a 
no description CG were reliable, with ORs between 2 and 3. Regarding the 
comparison between a re-reading and a description only group, there was 
only a beneficial effect for correct rejections (OR = 1.79), which seems to be 
most important regarding preventing mistaken identifications. Moreover, the 
results support the idea that verbalization and re-reading make people 
aware of their poor memory of the target, which in turn may make them more 
cautious at the identification task (cf. Sauerland et al., 2008; Sporer, 2007).  
Hence, re-reading one's own description may be worth considering as 
a simple and easy to implement system variable to improve identification 
accuracy.  
Quantity and Quality of Person Descriptions as Possible Reasons for 
the Re-Reading Effect 
To test the assumption that the beneficial effect of re-reading might 
be associated with the quantity and quality of the re-read person 
descriptions, relationships between description measures and identification 
accuracy were investigated.  
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Description quantity and accuracy. 
Different from the findings in Meissner et al.'s (2008) meta-analysis, in 
free reports and in specific questions, we found moderate positive 
associations between identification accuracy with the number of details 
reported (cf. Sporer, 1992) as well as with the number of correct details. 
However, these relationships were significant among re-readers only, being 
nearly equal in size for free reports and specific questions. It seems that 
recognition performance was facilitated when the descriptions that 
participants were allowed to re-read contained a large number of (correct) 
details. In contrast, in the description only group, none of the relationships 
were significant. However, relationships with specific questions were 
comparable in magnitude to those in the re-reading group, although not 
significant due to the smaller sample sizes. 
But how could identification accuracy be related to the quantity of the 
re-read description for the perpetrator, while it was independent of 
description accuracy? As a possible explanation we assume that the mere 
number of (correct) details was decisive, irrespective of the presence of false 
details or the overall description accuracy. Hence, re-reading may have 
been beneficial not via directly activating the memory for the true target's 
physical appearance, but by activating the associative network (Anderson, 
1983) in which the face of the perpetrator was embedded, and thus 
providing participants a sound basis for the identification task.  
Although these analyses are correlational, and thus, do not allow 
causal conclusions, natural variations in description quantity and accuracy, 
which often occur in real cases (Sporer, 1996) seem to be associated with 
the benefits of re-reading. 
Experiment 1: Verbal Facilitation Effect 69 
Correlations between identification accuracy and number of details as 
well as number of correct details were moderate in size (rpb > .30) after the 
longer delay but tended to be smaller after a delay of two days (but sample 
sizes are too small to test for differences in correlations). The results are in 
line with the assumption that a large number of initially recalled descriptors 
might be more beneficial for identifications after longer delays (cf. Butler & 
Roediger, 2007). We encourage future researchers to use even longer 
retention intervals to test this. 
Quality of description ratings. 
As the true accuracy of a given description is not known in actual 
criminal cases, we additionally rated descriptions quality given in free reports 
in terms of precision, specificity and informativeness. For re-readers all of 
the quality ratings as well as the composite mean rating were positively 
associated with identification accuracy. Thus, the current results confirm our 
expectation that the beneficial effect of re-reading on identification 
performance is associated with the quality of the re-read descriptions. 
The present results are consistent with findings from police records by 
Valentine et al. (2003), who observed positive associations between 
identification of the suspect (which may or may not have been the 
perpetrator) and description completeness, which is vaguely comparable to 
our "precision" variable. 
Conclusions and Practical Implications 
This research provides a new look at the role of person descriptions 
and identifications. We replicated across two ecologically valid delays that 
the practice of having witnesses re-read their own prior descriptions showed 
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better identification performance in both TP and TA lineups. Re-reading 
one's description is an easily applicable system variable (Wells, 1978) that 
does not require any additional procedures, training, or resources. Our 
results also contradict the VOE that has not only "declined" over decades 
(Schooler, 2011) but may be reversed if examined in situations 
representative of real crimes. Consequently, the initially cited proscription 
made by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) not to show the 
witness any descriptions of the suspect prior to the identification task 
appears inappropriate in light of our data. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Summary of Experimental Design with Corresponding Number of 
Participants per Condition 
   Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
   Two days delay  Five weeks delay 
Condition n TA TP  TA TP 
No description CG 80 24 24  16 16 
Description only 48 24 24  - - 
Re-reading 80 24 24  16 16 
Total 208 72 72  32 32 
Note. CG = control group; TA = target-absent; TP = target-present. Due to 
the study’s primary focus on the effects of re-reading, there was no 
description only group in Experiment 2. 
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Table 2 
Identification Outcomes (%; with Frequencies in Parentheses), Diagnosticity Ratios, Signal Detection Performance d' and Response Bias C for 
Description Conditions in Experiment 1 (Two Days Delay) and Experiment 2 (Five Weeks Delay) 
Condition n Correct decisions Hits FAs Estimated FAs DR d' C 
Experiment 1         
   No description CG 48 77.1 (37) 75.0 (18) 20.8 (5) 3.5 21.6 2.49 0.57 
   Description only 48 79.2 (38) 70.8 (17) 12.5 (3) 2.1 34.0 2.58 0.74 
   Re-reading 48 91.7 (44) 87.5 (21)    4.2 (1) 0.7 125.0 3.61 0.65 
Experiment 2         
   No description CG 32 40.6 (13) 25.0 (4) 43.8 (7) 7.3   3.4 0.78 1.06 
   Re-reading 32 75.0 (24) 56.2 (9)    6.2 (1) 1.0 54.4 2.48 1.09 
Experiment 1 and 2         
   No description CG 80 62.5 (50) 55.0 (22) 30.0 (12) 5.0 11.0 1.77 0.76 
   Description only 48 79.2 (38) 70.8 (17) 12.5  (3) 2.1 34.0 2.58 0.74 
   Re-reading 80 85.0 (68) 75.0 (30)   5.0  (2) 0.8 90.0 3.08 0.87 
Note. Hits = correct identifications in TP lineups; FAs = any positive identification in TA lineups; Estimated FAs = false identifications in TA 
lineups/lineup size; DR = diagnosticity ratio. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Description Quantity, Number of Correct 
and False Descriptors and Description Accuracy in Free Reports and in 
Specific Questions (N = 101) 
  Free report  Specific questions 
Category M SD  M SD 
  Total number of details 
Face   2.96   1.90    3.26   1.11 
Hair   2.13   0.73    2.40   0.83 
Body   0.96   0.85    1.86   0.85 
Clothes   4.63   2.79    6.53   2.41 
Sum 10.68   4.18  14.05   3.57 
  Number of correct details 
Face   2.18   1.65    1.85   1.07 
Hair   1.88   0.75    2.07   0.83 
Body   0.28   0.49    0.69   0.66 
Clothes   3.18   2.66    4.18   2.48 
Sum   7.51   3.76    8.79   3.42 
  Number of false details 
Face   0.78   0.87    1.41   0.96 
Hair   0.25   0.48    0.33   0.62 
Body   0.68   0.77    1.17   0.76 
Clothes   1.46   1.24    2.36   1.22 
Sum   3.17   1.87    5.26   1.98 
  Accuracy of details (%) 
Face 67.09 36.63  56.02 27.90 
Hair 88.05 23.68  88.37 21.12 
Body 19.64 36.01  35.23 34.84 
Clothes 60.89 32.21  60.72 20.46 
Sum 69.14 17.74  61.76 14.01 
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Table 4 
Point-biserial Correlations Between Identification Accuracy and Description 
Quantity, Number of Correct and False Descriptors and Description 
Accuracy for Free Reports and Specific Questions 
   Details  
Sample n Number Correct False Accuracy 
  Free report 
Total sample 101 .23* .22*  .06 .06 
Delay      
   2 days 69 .13 .15 -.03 .10 
   5 weeks  32 .34o .30o .15 -.01 
Condition      
   Description only 33 .13 .13 .04 .01 
   Re-reading 68 .29* .28* .09 .07 
  Specific questions 
Total sample 101 .27* .24* .09 .09 
Delay      
   2 days  69 .21 .19 .04 .10 
   5 weeks  32 .39* .31o .18 .03 
Condition      
   Description only 33 .32 .26 .13 .09 
   Re-reading 68 .26* .24* .06 .10 
Note. Number = number of details; Correct = number of correct details; 
False = number of false details.  
o p < .10; * p < .05. 
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Table 5 
Point-biserial Correlations Between Quality Ratings of Perpetrator 
Descriptions in Free Reports with Identification Accuracy 
Sample n Spec Info Prec Comp 
Total sample 101 .14 .16  .17o .16 
Delay      
   Two days 69 .07 .04 .08 .07 
   Five weeks 32 .17  .31o .24 .25 
Condition      
   Description 
only 
33 .00 .02 .08 .03 
   Re-reading 68  .25*  .28*  .24*  .27* 
Note. Spec = specificity; Info = informativeness; Prec = precision; Comp = 
mean composite rating. 
o p < .10; * p < .05. 
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Table 6 
Mean Weighted Effect Sizes for the Re-Reading Effect (Re-Reading vs. No Description Control Group) for Overall Correct 
Identification Decisions, Correct Identifications in Target-Present Lineups and Correct Rejections in Target-Absent Lineups 
     95% CI      
DV k N LOR OR LL UL Z pZ Q pQ I2 
Overall Correct  
Identification Decisions 
4 352 0.764 2.15 1.34 3.44 3.179 .001 6.924 .074 56.671 
Correct Identifications 
in TP Lineups 
4 176 0.668 1.95 0.99 3.84 1.932 .053 3.937 .268 23.796 
Correct Rejections 
in TA Lineups 
4 176 1.008 2.74 1.27 5.92 2.564 .010 3.837 .280 21.805 
Note. LOR = logged odds ratio; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; Z = significance test;  
pZ = significance level for Z-test; Q = heterogeneity test statistic; pQ = significance level for Q-test; I2 = indicator of heterogeneity. 
 
Experiment 1: Verbal Facilitation Effect        87 
 
Table 7 
Mean Weighted Effect Sizes for the Re-Reading Effect (Re-Reading vs. Description Only Group) for Overall Correct Identification 
Decisions, Correct Identifications in Target-Present Lineups and Correct Rejections in Target-Absent Lineups 
     95% CI      
DV k N LOR OR LL UL Z pZ Q pQ I2 
Overall correct 
identification decisions  
6 919 0.144 1.15 0.88 1.52 1.031 .302 5.167 .396     3.225 
Correct identifications 
in TP lineups 
5 315 -0.262 0.77 0.48 1.24 1.072 .284 7.315 .120    45.320 
Correct rejections  
in TA lineups 
5 315 0.585 1.79 1.08 2.98 2.254 .024 0.432 .980 -825.575 
Note. LOR = logged odds ratio; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit; Z = significance test;  
pZ = significance level for Z-test; Q = heterogeneity test statistic; pQ = significance level for Q-test; I2 = indicator of heterogeneity. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Confidence-based receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves 
for the re-reading and no description control group. Data points reflect 
cumulative hit and false alarm rates (i.e., false alarms in TA lineups/lineup 
size) for each confidence level. The rightmost point of the ROC represents 
the hit and false alarm rate across all confidence levels (i.e., most liberal 
decision criterion). The remaining points were computed using ever lower 
cutoff values on the confidence scale (i.e., an increasingly conservative 
decision criterion). 
      	



	











Experiment 1: Verbal Facilitation Effect      89 
 
 
Figure 2. Means (and 95% CIs) for identification accuracy (hits and correct 
rejections) in the no description control, the description only, and the re-
reading condition after a 2 day vs. 5 weeks delay. Note that there was no 
description only group after five weeks. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Specific Questions About the Perpetrator's Physical Appearance 
 
Now we will ask you some specific questions regarding the outer 
appearance of the perpetrator. Please answer these questions on answer 
sheet B2. If you have already answered one of the questions in your 
previous report, please answer it again. If you don’t know the answer to one 
of the questions, write "don’t know" in the corresponding line. 
 
1. What age do you estimate the perpetrator was? 
2. What size do you estimate the perpetrator was? 
3. Please describe the figure of the perpetrator in detail! 
4. Please describe the clothes of the perpetrator in detail! 
5. Please describe the color of the perpetrator’s hair in detail! 
6. Please describe the perpetrator’s hairdo in detail! 
7. Please describe the shape of the perpetrator’s face! 
8. Did you notice any special features on the perpetrator? If so, which? 
9. Did the perpetrator wear a headdress? If so, which? 
10. Did the perpetrator wear glasses? If so, what did they look like? 
11. Did the perpetrator have a beard? If so, what did it look like? 
12. Did the perpetrator speak in a certain dialect or did he have an 
accent? If so, which? 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Discriminating Between Correct and Incorrect Eyewitness 
Identifications: The Use of Appropriate Cues 
Police investigations often involve asking eyewitnesses to make an 
identification decision. If a positive identification is made and it comes to a 
trial, judges and/or jurors have to evaluate the accuracy of these 
identification decisions to arrive at their verdicts. Indeed, eyewitness 
testimonies including identification decisions are often the only, or the major, 
source of evidence available and consequently serve as an essential basis 
for later convictions. 
Many studies focused on estimator and system variables influencing 
identification decisions (Wells, 1978; Wells & Olson, 2003). However, not a 
misidentification per se leads to judicial errors, but rather the wrong 
evaluation of these identification decisions (in light of other evidence). At this 
judgment level (cf. Sporer, 2007, 2008) fact finders do not only evaluate 
witnesses’ reports, but also try to consider witnessing conditions at the 
perceptual, the retention and the recall/recognition stage. They also take 
witnesses’ meta-memory statements (e.g., confidence, self-reports about 
their decision processes) as well as behavioral aspects (e.g., response 
latency to make an identification decision) into account (Garrett, 2011; 
Sporer, 2007). 
Moreover, fact finders’ beliefs and knowledge about indicators of 
correct eyewitness testimonies affect the weight given to specific factors in 
the evaluation process and thus influence fact finders’ judgments in a given 
case (Leippe, 1994; Semmler, Brewer, & Bradfield Douglass, 2012). 
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However, observers seem to have only limited knowledge about factors 
affecting eyewitness memory (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & 
Bradshaw, 2006; Desmarais & Read, 2011). This holds true even for judges, 
attorneys and law enforcement personnel, although they are more 
knowledgeable than jurors (Benton et al., 2006; Brigham & Wolfskeil, 1983; 
Wise & Safer, 2004).  
But are people able to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
eyewitnesses nonetheless? Using mock-juror paradigms that asked 
observers to evaluate the accuracy of presented identification decisions, 
observers showed only poor judgment accuracies comparable with chance 
level (e.g., Beaudry, Lindsay, Leach, Mansour, Bertrand, & Kalmet, 2015; 
Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Wells & Lindsay, 1983). As a possible 
explanation, observers often use commonsense evaluations and rely on 
cues erroneously believed to be postdictive of accurate identification 
decisions (Boyce, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007; Semmler et al., 2012). Thus, 
they either use invalid cues and/or weight these cues inappropriately to 
make their judgments (cf. Lindsay, 1994; Semmler et al., 2012). 
To account for fact finders’ decisions, Leippe (1994) proposed the 
validity-intuition model that locates accuracy cues in a memory message 
somewhere along two dimensions. The validity dimension refers to the 
degree to which cues are diagnostic of identification accuracy, whereas the 
intuition dimension describes the degree to which people have preconceived 
beliefs that the cues are associated with identification accuracy. 
Consequently, judgment accuracy should increase, if highly valid cues are 
appropriately perceived and intuitively used by observers and if invalid cues 
are neglected appropriately. In contrast, judgment accuracy should decrease 
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if observers intuitively rely on cues that are not (or only weakly) related to 
identification accuracy or if they fail to use cues that are actually good 
indicators of identification accuracy. 
Hence, to improve judgment accuracy, it is necessary to get deeper 
insight into observers' evaluation and decision processes. Thus, we focus on 
the discriminant validity of cues that observers use to make their judgments 
and on observers’ interpretation of these cues when judging identification 
accuracy. 
Valid Indicators of Identification Accuracy vs. Intuitively Used Cues 
There are several suggestions by the courts in the United States (cf. 
Biggers criteria, Neil vs. Biggers, 1972), in the United Kingdom (cf. Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984), and in Germany (Sporer & Cutler, 2003) 
about which criteria should be used as reliable indicators of an accurate 
identification decision (for a review see Semmler et al., 2012). However, the 
validity of these criteria is not always decisively given (Garrett, 2011, 2012; 
National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, 
Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). Thus, both legal scholars and psychologists 
tried to identify empirically valid factors to be used to distinguish between 
witnesses who made an accurate and those who made an inaccurate 
identification decision, especially concentrating on characteristics of the 
testimony and the identification procedure itself.  
Confidence and response latency. 
Positive identifications made by highly confident eyewitnesses (who 
reported their confidence directly after the identification decision) are more 
likely to be correct than identifications made by less confident witnesses 
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(Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted, 
Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015). Moreover, correct positive 
identifications are associated with shorter response latencies than false 
identifications (e.g., Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994). 
While fact finders seem to be sensitive to the existing confidence-
accuracy relationship (at least for choosers) but tend to overestimate it when 
judging identification accuracy (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Wells, 
Lindsay. & Ferguson, 1979; for a review, see Boyce et al., 2007) results 
regarding observers' usage of decision time as a marker of identification 
accuracy are inconsistent. On the one hand observers intuitively associate 
response latency with identification accuracy (Benton et al., 2006) and 
hence judge witnesses who make fast identifications as more credible than 
those deciding slower (Neal, Christiansen, Bornstein, & Robicheaux, 2012). 
On the other hand, the exoneration cases analyzed by Garrett (2011) 
demonstrate that fact finders often ignore this relationship. Garrett (2011) 
reported that many eyewitnesses who later were judged as credible in court 
had been uncertain when they first saw the lineup and took up to several 
minutes to make an identification decision. 
Decision processes. 
Indicators of identification accuracy also arise from self-reports of 
decision strategies applied by an eyewitness during the identification 
procedure. Wells (1984) distinguished between absolute and relative 
decision processes, with correct lineup choices being more often 
accompanied by absolute than by relative decision processes than incorrect 
choices (e.g., Lindsay & Bellinger, 1999; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000). 
According to Wells (1984), relative decisions go along with a comparison of 
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the different lineup members, resulting in the choice of the person that is the 
closest relative match to the eyewitness' memory of the culprit. In contrast, 
eyewitnesses making an absolute decision compare each lineup member 
with their memory for the perpetrator (absolute match).  
Based on the reality/source monitoring framework (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981), Dunning and Stern 
(1994) suggested that eyewitnesses differ especially in their employed 
cognitive effort when making a positive identification. Accordingly, correct 
identifications are made more quickly and automatic without explicit 
cognitive effort (Behrman & Richards, 2005; Dunning & Stern, 1994). In 
contrast, poor memories may force people to make more logical inferences 
and to actively reconstruct memory (cf. Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; 
Wells & Lindsay, 1983). Thus, eyewitnesses making a false identification 
use more deliberative and reflective explicit cognitive strategies to arrive at 
their decision (Dunning & Stern, 1994).  
The reality monitoring framework has also been fruitfully employed to 
judge other people's memory termed interpersonal source monitoring 
(Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 2004). If people use certain qualities to 
evaluate the source of their own memory, these cues might also be useful 
for the evaluation of someone else's memory report (Leippe, 1994; Sporer, 
1997, 2004, 2008). For example, Leippe (1994) expected that people might 
be sensitive to an eyewitness’s "noisy thinking out loud" (p. 395) reflecting 
more cognitive operations in the witness’s report and in turn indicating a 
poor memory. 
In line with this, Dunning and Stern (1994) reported that mock-jurors’ 
associated an automatic recognition process with higher identification 
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accuracy and also used it to make their judgments. However, participants 
failed to use elimination processes as a marker of an inaccurate 
identification. Moreover, witnesses who reported a negligible influence of 
nonchosen photos and a higher impact of their own memory (compared to 
the other photos) were judged as more likely to be accurate. 
Encoding conditions. 
There are recommendations of the US Supreme Court to use the 
witness's quality of view as well as the attention a witness paid to the culprit 
to evaluate an identification decision (Neil vs. Biggers, 1972). Indeed, 
studies manipulating witness attention and viewing conditions (i.e., exposure 
time, distance) provide some empirical evidence supporting the assumptions 
of these two Biggers criteria (e.g., Lindsay, Semmler, Weber, Brewer, & 
Lindsay, 2008; Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010). Similarly, observers seem 
to use information about encoding conditions to make their judgments to 
some extent (e.g., Lindsay, 1994).  
Amount of details and report consistency. 
Although research on their validity is inconsistent, fact finders 
sometimes intuitively rely on content cues, like the amount of details 
described by an eyewitness (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Wells & Leippe, 1981), as 
well as on intra-subjective report consistency or contradictions included in 
the testimony (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995; 
Semmler & Brewer, 2002). Thus, in the present study we investigate if these 
cues are indeed valid to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
identifications and if observers use them. 
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The Present Study 
Numerous studies have investigated whether there are valid cues to 
discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications using witnesses’ 
self-reports or objectively measurable decision times. However, only few 
studies examined if observers are also able to infer these cues based on 
original identification protocols and how they interpret them to evaluate the 
accuracy of an identification decision. In criminal cases witnesses are 
commonly asked to give reasons for their identification decision, to state 
their confidence, and to estimate duration and the degree of attention they 
have paid to the perpetrator. The witnesses’ answers are then used to 
postdict their identification accuracy. However, witnesses are often not able 
to describe reasons for their decisions adequately (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Moreover, these questions are often asked at trial and not directly after the 
identification decision and thus might be biased (e.g., due to feedback 
effects: Wells & Bradfield, 1998). To prevent fact finders’ from relying on 
biased eyewitness statements when evaluating the accuracy of their 
identification decisions, it would be of high practical relevance if there are 
valid indicators of identification accuracy in a witness’s original identification 
protocol that are perceivable for observers without asking the witness to 
evaluate his/her decision before. 
Consequently, in our study, observers' perceptions (instead of 
witnesses’ self-report measures) of witnesses’ confidence, response latency, 
decision processes, perceptual basis and quality of reasons given for the 
identification decision are analyzed and tested for their discriminative value. 
To explain observers’ judgment accuracy (and to extrapolate 
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recommendations how to increase it) the discriminative value of observer 
ratings is contrasted with their interpretation and use of these cues.  
Application of the Brunswikian lens model. 
The Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956, 1965) provides a 
theoretical framework to describe the relationship between the validity of 
certain perceived cues to predict an objective outcome on the one hand and 
perceivers’ usage of these cues to predict their judgments of this outcome 
on the other hand. The model has been applied to medical decision-making 
(e.g., Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964), social perception (e.g., Vicaria, 
Bernieri, & Isaacowitz, 2015) and to many fields of psychology, for example 
to the detection of deception (e.g., Fiedler, 1989; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; 
Sporer, 1997; Sporer & Küpper, 1995; Sporer, Masip, & Cramer, 2014).  
The model can be divided into two parts. First, relationships between 
the presence of certain cues (e.g., a patient’s symptoms) and an objective 
outcome (e.g., an appendicitis) are investigated. These correlations describe 
if the observed cues are valid indicators of the outcome (ecological 
validities).  
Second, relationships between the observed cues and perceivers’ 
judgments (e.g., a doctor’s decision to operate and extract the appendix 
based on the observed symptoms) are analyzed (subjective utilities). High 
correlations indicate a strong usage of these cues. 
To ensure high judgment accuracy (e.g., a correct decision to operate 
based on the observed symptoms, because there was an appendicitis) the 
perceived cues should be strongly related to the objective outcome of 
interest and perceivers should use and interpret these cues appropriately to 
arrive at their judgments. Thus, a correspondence measure is computed, to 
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estimate the agreement between cue validities and perceivers usage of 
these cues.  
A perfect agreement between ecologically valid and subjectively used 
cues is demonstrated when the correlations between the cues and the 
objective outcome as well as between the cues and perceivers’ judgments 
are in the same direction and equal in size. In this case observers are able 
to distinguish between valid and invalid cues. First, they are sensitive to 
discriminating cues and thus use and weight them appropriately. Second, 
they realize that other cues do not have discriminative value and thus do not 
weight them strongly. To the extent, that the two sets of correlations differ, 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities 
decreases. 
We applied the Brunswikian lens model to judgments of identification 
decisions (to our knowledge) for the first time to (a) examine the validity of 
several cues perceived by observers based on identification protocols to 
discriminate between correct and incorrect identification decisions 
(ecological validities), and (b) to investigate if these cues are indeed used by 
observers to make their judgments (subjective utilities) and how much 
weight observers give to each of these cues. To the extent that there is a 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities 
observers’ judgment accuracy of identification decisions should be improved. 
It can be assumed that jurors are not aware of factors that influence 
their decisions and thus, asking them which cues they have used and how 
they have weighted them is not expected to result in appropriate statements 
(cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Consequently, the application of the 
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Brunswikian lens model seems to be an adequate solution to contrast 
ecological validities and subjective utilities. 
Retrospective reasoning vs. thinking-aloud protocols. 
To make the witnesses’ decision processes and thoughts more 
apparent for observers, in the present study half of the witnesses were 
instructed to verbalize their thoughts (“think-aloud”) while arriving at their 
identification decision (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In contrast, the other 
half of participants had to list reasons for their decision afterwards.  
In the think-aloud condition participants had to verbalize every 
thought or idea that came to their mind while trying to identify the target 
person.1 By this procedure, we hoped to gain deeper insight into the 
reported cognitive processes compared to witnesses who were instructed to 
just give reasons for their identification decision afterwards. Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) claimed that people only have limited access to cognitive 
processes that prompt their actions and decisions and thus are often unable 
to explain the causes of their behavior appropriately. Thus, when asked to 
describe reasons for their behavior afterwards, participants were found to 
only retrospectively justify their behavior. 
Consequently, we hypothesized that think-aloud protocols will include 
more (salient) cues about the accuracy of the identification decision than 
retrospective reasoning protocols. This is expected to result in an increased 
observer ability to perceive valid indicators of identification accuracy and 
                     
1 It is noteworthy, that thinking aloud instructions do not impair task 
performance, as reported in a meta-analysis by Fox, Ericsson and Best (2011). 
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hence an increased ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect 
identifications when think-aloud protocols are used compared to 
retrospective reasoning reports. 
Written transcripts vs. videotapes. 
To evaluate the reliability of an eyewitness’s testimony Garrett (2011) 
suggested to rely on the original (videotaped) identification decision instead 
of considering testimonies about the identification made at court. Several 
researchers have recommended the videotaping of eyewitnesses during the 
identification procedure since many years (e.g., Kassin, 1998; Sporer, 1992, 
1993; Wells et al., 1998). Videotaping results in a conservation of behavioral 
cues and information about the original identification procedure to be used 
by jurors as potentially diagnostic information to determine identification 
accuracy in court. Based on dual-process theories (e.g., the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) as well as on Leippe’s (1994) 
model of eyewitness persuasion, not only the message content but also 
peripheral and heuristic cues like the message delivery style and witness 
attributes affect fact finders’ judgments. Peripheral cues are assumed to be 
more salient in videotapes, showing, for example, the witness’s appearance, 
the powerfulness of speech (cf. Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 1978), 
response latencies as well as nonverbal and paraverbal behaviors. In turn, 
these behaviors allow observers to make inferences about the witness’s 
confidence and credibility (Erickson et al., 1978; Schooler et al., 1986). 
Former judgment studies often used videotaped mock trial 
procedures as stimulus materials in which only the type of presented 
material was varied (e.g., the presentation of the witness examination at trial 
vs. presentation of the witness examination and the original identification) to 
Experiment 2: Judgments of Identification Accuracy  102 
assess its effects on observer judgments (e.g., Beaudry et al., 2015; Kassin, 
Rigby, & Castillo, 1991; Reardon & Fisher, 2011). For example, Reardon 
and Fisher (2011) compared observers’ ability to discriminate between 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses showing them videotapes of witness 
examinations at trial with or without an additional videotape of the original 
description of the perpetrator and the identification decision. In contrast to 
the examination-only condition, observers’ judgment accuracy increased 
when the videotaped identification procedure was presented. This supports 
the assumption that observers benefit from videos of the original 
identification decision that seem to contain useful additional information to 
evaluate identification accuracy (for similar conclusions see also Bradfield 
Douglass & Jones, 2013). 
To our knowledge there are no studies that investigated different 
presentation media to test its effects on mock jurors’ discrimination between 
correct and incorrect identifications. Thus, we conducted two studies, in 
which observers were presented with the original identification decisions 
only (i.e., without further eyewitness testimonies at trial) either presented as 
written transcripts (Study 1) or as videotapes (Study 2). We hypothesized 
that presenting observers with videotaped identification decisions should 
result in an increased discriminability of the perceived cues as well as in 
higher judgment accuracies, both due to an increased cue salience. 
Method 
First, we describe the study conducted to construct eyewitness 
statements (Phase 1), followed by a detailed description of the two judgment 
studies (Phase 2) using written transcripts (Study 1) and videotapes (Study 
2). 
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Phase 1: Witnessing and Identification 
Design and participants. 
A 2 (stimulus film: short vs. long) x 2 (type of decision protocol: 
retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) x 2 (target presence in the lineup: 
target-absent [TA] vs. target-present [TP]) factorial between-participants 
design was used with 192 witness-participants (48 male, 144 female, aged 
19 to 61, Mdn = 22.0) who were randomly assigned to the experimental 
conditions. They participated voluntarily in the study and were mainly 
Caucasian students of a German university. 
Stimulus film and description task. 
Witness-participants saw a short video film showing a theft of a 
bicycle in a pedestrian area. There were two versions of the film lasting 1:44 
minutes and 2:24 minutes with the perpetrator, a young woman, seen in 
close-up for 3 vs. 5 seconds. After having completed an unrelated filler task 
(for approximately 40 minutes), participants were instructed to imagine 
having to give a statement about the incident seen in the film to the police. 
First, they were asked to give a free report of the perpetrator's physical 
appearance followed by several non-leading questions. Participants were 
asked to describe the perpetrator as precisely as possible but had the 
opportunity to give "don't know" answers, if they were not able to remember 
any of the specific features asked for. Afterwards, participants described the 
observed incident and the crime scene in as much detail as possible, again 
followed by several non-leading questions. 
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Training to think-aloud vs. retrospective reasoning. 
Half of the witness-participants received a short training to get familiar 
with the "think-aloud" procedure. First, a short film showing a man thinking-
aloud while playing "Four in a Row" was presented. Then, participants were 
instructed to "think-aloud" concurrently while solving a cognitive puzzle 
(Tower of Hanoi). They were asked to say out loud everything (i.e., every 
idea, thought or recollection) that comes to their mind while they were 
solving the task, even if it seemed to be irrelevant (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 
1993). The other half of participants (in the retrospective reasoning 
condition) also had to solve the puzzle, but had to give reasons for their 
solution process afterwards instead. 
Photo lineups and identification procedure. 
Lineups consisted of six frontal portrait photographs, presented 
simultaneously in two rows of three pictures each. In a pilot study, foils were 
selected based on the "match-to-description-of-culprit" strategy (Luus & 
Wells, 1991). For TA lineups, the photo that matched the description most 
was taken as replacement for the target. Lineup fairness (Tredoux, 1998) 
was satisfactory, with Tredoux's E = 5.25 for TA lineups (N = 50) and E = 
5.79 for TP lineups (N = 50). 
Half of the participants were either instructed to think-aloud while 
making their identification decision or to give reasons for their decision 
afterwards. Participants had to state their identification decision orally. 
Afterwards, they were asked to rate their confidence regarding the accuracy 
of their identification decision (0 to 100%) as well as their willingness to 
testify in court (0 to 100%). 
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Testing modalities. 
All experimental instructions were given via the speakers of the 
computer the witness-participants were seated in front of. They were 
instructed to give their answers orally while focusing on a video camera, 
which was placed diagonally in front of them. Witness-participants were 
videotaped during the description and the identification task. Afterwards, all 
statements were literally transcribed. 
Selection of the stimulus identification statements. 
In sum, 126 (65.6%) participants made a positive identification. Of 
these choosers' statements, 48 were randomly selected to be judged in 
Phase 2, counterbalancing identification accuracy (incorrect choices in TA 
lineups vs. correct choices in TP lineups) and type of decision protocol 
(retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud).2 Thus, there were 12 identification 
statements (of 6 male and 6 female witnesses) per condition to be judged by 
observer-participants in the subsequent study. Hence, our experiment was 
12 times internally replicated, satisfying stimulus sampling requirements 
(Wells & Windschitl, 1999). 
                     
2 Preliminary analyses showed no differences in choosers' identification 
accuracy for the short (36.7%) and the long (28.8%) stimulus film, chi2(1, N = 126) 
= .889, p = .346, OR = 0.70, 95% CI [0.33, 1.48]. Consequently, length of the 
stimulus film was not considered in the statement selection. The final selection 
resulted in n = 26 witnesses who had watched the short and n = 22 witnesses who 
had watched the long film version. 
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Phase 2: Judgment of identification statements 
Overview and Design. 
Two parallel experiments with N = 288 observer-participants of an 
Internet survey (Study 1) evaluating written transcripts and N = 96 observer-
participants evaluating videos of the identification decisions in the laboratory 
(Study 2) were conducted. In both studies each observer-participant had to 
judge only one of the 48 stimulus identification statements created in Phase 
1.  
For both studies a 2 (objective identification accuracy: incorrect 
choice [TA] vs. correct choice [TP]) x 2 (type of decision protocol: 
retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) x 2 (person and event descriptions: 
not presented vs. presented) factorial between-participants design was 
used. Dependent variables were a number of ratings described below. 
Participants. 
In Study 1, a total of N = 288 observer-participants (96 male, 192 
female, age 18 to 70, Mdn = 25.0, 67% students) were recruited via circular 
e-mails and postings in social networks (e.g., Facebook). They received an 
Internet link guiding them to the experiment and completed it on their 
personal computers.  
In Study 2, a total of N = 96 observer-participants (32 male, 64 
female, age 18 to 34, Mdn = 23.0, 96% students) were individually tested in 
the laboratory. Participation in both studies was completely voluntary and 
was rewarded with the chance to win one of several vouchers or to gain 
course credit. 
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Materials. 
Eyewitness statements. 
The same 48 eyewitness statements were used in both studies and 
differed only due to presentation medium. Observer-participants were either 
presented with a written transcript (Study 1) or with a video film (Study 2) of 
a witness's given person and event descriptions as well as the to be judged 
identification decision.  
The description statements included the entire instructions to give a 
free report of the target's physical appearance, the incident and the crime 
scene as well as the witness's given descriptions and answers to the specific 
questions. The identification statement contained the lineup instructions and 
the photo lineup used in Phase 1, as well as the recorded identification 
decision, with either thinking aloud or retrospective reasoning protocols for 
the lineup choice given by the eyewitness. The length of the identification 
statements varied between 22 and 453 words (Mdn = 134 words) and lasted 
from 11 to 270 seconds (Mdn = 73 sec) with retrospective reasoning 
protocols (M = 85.0 words) being much shorter than think-aloud protocols (M 
= 190.2 words). To avoid undue reliance of observer-judges on confidence 
the witnesses’ explicit numerical confidence statements and their willingness 
to testify in court, which was asked for after the identification task, were 
excluded from statements/videos. 
Every statement was accompanied with details of the witness's age, 
gender and occupation. The mean age of the selected witnesses was 24.65 
years (SD = 7.08) and all of them were students. In the video films used in 
Study 2 the upper part of the witness's body was visible, while he/she was 
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sitting in front of a computer. Most of the time the witness's face was seen in 
three-quarter profile. In contrast, participants of Study 1 did not see a photo 
of the witness's physical appearance. 
Photo lineups. 
Observer-participants were presented with the corresponding photo-
lineup, the to be judged witness had seen before (see Phase 1). In Study 1, 
the lineups were included in the presented transcript, shown in a separate 
browser window. In Study 2, the lineups were printed on high quality photo 
paper (A4 format) and handed to the observer-participants. In both studies 
the lineups remained visible for the participants during the whole experiment. 
Procedure. 
Both studies followed exactly the same sequence and used the same 
instructions. All observer-participants were instructed to imagine being a 
judge or juror in court who had to evaluate an eyewitness identification 
decision. Additionally, participants were briefly informed about the incident 
(i.e., the witnessed theft) and the identification that took place approximately 
one hour after the film. Next, the participants were presented with the 
transcript (Study 1) or video (Study 2) of the eyewitness statement and were 
instructed to read it, or watch the video, carefully. All participants had the 
opportunity to read or watch the whole statement again during the following 
judgment process. 
Observer ratings. 
Participants were asked to evaluate the identification statements 
regarding different qualities described below. In doing so they had to infer 
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these qualities based on their overall impression of the witness gained from 
the witness testimony and the used lineup. 
Based on the measures of witnessing experience used in Wells and 
Bradfield's (1998) study, first, all observer-participants completed five ratings 
concerning their subjective impression of the witnessing conditions, followed 
by another five ratings reflecting the quality of the witness's identification 
decision (Table 1). 
Afterwards, the spontaneity of the witness's identification decision (1 
= spontaneous vs. 7 = hesitant; 1 = without any deliberations vs. 7 = with 
lots of deliberations) was evaluated, followed by evaluations of the 
eyewitness's reasons for his/her identification decision (1 = not at all 
precise/detailed/consistent/convincing vs. 7 = very 
precise/detailed/consistent/convincing). 
Then, participants were asked to give a dichotomous judgment 
whether they believed that the witness had made a correct identification (0 = 
incorrect choice vs. 1 = correct choice). This measure reflected the main 
dependent variable in the present study. Afterwards, observer-participants 
indicated their confidence in their judgment (11-point scale ranging from 0 to 
100%). 
Finally, all observer-participants rated 15 variables concerning the 
witness's decision processes (Table 2). Most of these items are based on 
measures used by Dunning and Stern (1994) and Sauerland and Sporer 
(2007), reflecting automatic vs. deliberative and absolute vs. relative 
identification decisions. 
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Results 
Overview 
First we present the data of the Internet survey using written 
transcripts (Study 1: N = 288) followed by the results of the laboratory study 
using videotapes (Study 2: N = 96) with observer judgments as unit of 
analysis.  
For each study we first present logistic regressions predicting 
observers’ judgments of identification accuracy as well as observers’ 
judgment accuracies as a function of the manipulated independent variables. 
Subsequently, we focus on the observer ratings. In separate analyses of 
variance we compared the observer ratings for objectively and for perceived 
correct and incorrect identifications. We were particularly interested whether 
think-aloud protocols would increase differences in observer ratings to 
increase their discriminability between correct and incorrect identifications 
and between observer judgments, respectively. 
Finally, to test the Brunswikian lens model, relationships between 
observer ratings and objective identification accuracy (ecological validities) 
as well as between observer ratings and perceived identification accuracy 
(subjective utilities) were examined. Two multiple regression analyses were 
computed to compare the predictions of the objective and the perceived 
identification accuracy. To test the agreement between ecological validities 
and subjective utilities the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC: two-way 
mixed effect model, average measure, estimated absolute agreement; cf. 
McGraw & Wong, 1996; Orwin & Vevea, 2009; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) 
between the two sets of correlations was computed (using Fisher's Zr 
transformations).  
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The corrected standardized mean difference Hedges gu and point-
biserial correlations are reported as effect sizes (cf. Borenstein, 2009; Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001). According to Cohen (1988) a small effect is represented by 
a point-biserial correlation of .10 that equals a standardized mean difference 
of .20, whereas moderate and large effects are reflected by rpbs of .24 and 
.37 equaling ds of .50 and .80, respectively. For dichotomous variables we 
report odds ratios (OR) as effect size (cf. Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
Study 1: Written Transcripts 
Observer judgments and judgment accuracy. 
Separate hierarchical (sequential) logistic regression analyses were 
conducted to predict (1) observer judgments (identification perceived as 
incorrect vs. perceived as correct) and (2) judgment accuracy. Predictor 
variables were objective identification accuracy (incorrect ID vs. correct ID), 
type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) and 
description presence (with vs. without descriptions), and their two-way and 
three-way interactions. Proportions for the different experimental conditions 
are displayed in Table 3. 
With observer judgments (identifications perceived as incorrect vs. 
perceived as correct) to be classified we started by considering a fully 
specified logistic regression model including the three-way interaction 
between the three predictors as its most complex term. In a backward 
hierarchical sequence we removed nonsignificant higher-order interactions. 
We ended up with a model containing the three main effects, chi2(3, 288) = 
7.57, p = .056, Nagelkerke R2 = .04, with none of them being a significant 
predictor of observer judgments, all Wald statistics < 3.64, all ps > .056. 
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Parallel analyses were conducted with judgment accuracy (incorrect 
vs. correct judgment) to be predicted. After removing nonsignificant higher-
order interactions we ended up with a model containing the three main 
effects chi2(3, 288) = 78.23, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .32. Overall predictive 
accuracy of the model was 75.0%. In this model objective identification 
accuracy was a significant predictor of judgment accuracy with incorrect 
identifications (79.9%) being judged correctly more often than correct 
identifications (29.9%), B = -2.25, SEB = 0.28, Wald statistic = 65.28, p < 
.001, OR = 0.11. Effects of type of decision protocol and description 
presence were not significant, both Wald statistics < 1.87, both ps > .172. 
Factor structure of observer ratings. 
Perceived witnessing conditions and perceived identification 
decision. 
A factor analysis was conducted on the 16 items concerning the 
observer ratings of the perceived witnessing conditions, the perceived 
identification decision and the perceived quality of reasons. Four factors 
were extracted (using the maximum likelihood method), explaining 64.8% of 
the variance. To permit inter-correlations between factors oblique rotation 
(direct oblimin) was used (cf. Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 
1999).3 Factor loadings after rotation are displayed in Appendix A. Items 
loading on the respective factors were averaged, yielding four scales with 
high internal consistencies and satisfactory corrected item-total correlations 
                     
3 We followed the advice of an anonymous reviewer who recommended 
this method instead of principal components analysis. 
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(all CITCs > .30): Perceived perceptual basis (alpha = .82), perceived 
confidence (alpha = .86), perceived decision time and difficulty (alpha = .71), 
perceived persuasiveness of reasons (alpha = .79).  
Perceived decision processes. 
Another factor analysis was conducted on 14 items concerning the 
observer ratings of the perceived decision processes in Table 2 (Item 10 
was removed from the analysis due to low inter-correlations). Four factors 
were extracted (using the maximum likelihood method), explaining 61.8% of 
the variance. Factor loadings after oblique rotation (direct oblimin) are 
displayed in Appendix B (cf. Fabrigar et al., 1999). Based on our theoretical 
assumptions items loading on the same factors were averaged, yielding four 
scales with satisfactory internal consistencies and corrected item-total 
correlations (all CITCs > .32): Perceived automatic decision (alpha = .70), 
perceived deliberative and effortful decision (alpha = .81), perceived 
absolute decision and a good memory for the perpetrator (alpha = .61) and 
perceived eliminative and relative decision (alpha = .68). 
Observer ratings as a function of objective identification 
accuracy (ecological validities). 
For every scale separate 2 x 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
conducted with objective identification accuracy (incorrect ID vs. correct ID) 
and type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) as 
classification variables. Means and standard deviations of each scale as well 
as the effect sizes gu for objectively correct and incorrect identification 
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statements in the retrospective reasoning and the think-aloud condition are 
displayed in Table 4.4 
For five of the eight observer ratings we found a significant main 
effect of objective identification accuracy, all Fs(1, 284) > 3.98, all ps < .047 
(see Table 4). For ratings of perceived deliberative and effortful decision 
processes the effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
objective identification accuracy and type of decision protocol, F(1, 284) = 
6.28, p = .013.5 
                     
4 In preliminary analyses of Studies 1 and 2 we had included description 
presence as a third independent variable. However, for all eight rating scales 
neither the interaction between description presence and objective identification 
accuracy, description presence and perceived identification accuracy, nor the three-
way interactions reached significance. Consequently, the factor was excluded from 
further analyses. 
5 There were significant main effects of type of decision protocol for four 
scales. Ratings of perceived decision time and difficulty, gu = 0.28, 95% CI [0.05, 
0.51], perceived deliberative and effortful decision processes, gu = 0.36, 95% CI 
[0.13, 0.59], and perceived eliminative and relative decision processes, gu = 0.58, 
95% CI [0.34, 0.81], were higher in the think-aloud than in the retrospective 
reasoning condition, all Fs(1, 284) > 5.73, all ps < .017. In contrast, ratings of 
perceived automatic decision processes were higher when retrospective reasoning 
protocols were used compared to think-aloud protocols, F(1, 284) = 9.23, p = .003, 
gu = -0.35, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.12]. 
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Observer ratings as a function of perceived identification accuracy 
(subjective utilities). 
To focus on the perceived cues observers used to make their 
judgments, we conducted separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs for each scale with 
perceived identification accuracy (perceived incorrect ID vs. perceived 
correct ID) and type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. think-
aloud) as classification variables. 
Seven rating scales differed due to observer judgments of perceived 
identification accuracy, all Fs(1, 284) > 9.51, all ps < .002. For none of the 
eight scales were there any interactions between observer judgments and 
type of decision protocol, all Fs(1, 284) < 2.02, all ps > .157. Means and 
standard deviations of each scale as well as the effect sizes are displayed in 
Table 5. 
Brunswikian lens model analyses: Do observers use appropriate 
cues? 
To test the Brunswikian lens model two multiple regression analyses 
including objective and perceived identification accuracy as dependent 
variables and observer ratings as predictors were conducted. The analyses 
were conducted separately for participants in the think-aloud and in the 
retrospective reasoning condition (n = 144 judgments each). 
In the think-aloud condition, ratings explained 27% of the variance of 
perceived identification accuracy (p < .001), while 12% of the variance of 
objective identification accuracy were explained (p = .015). For every rating 
scale zero-order correlations with the two dependent variables were 
computed. Seven of the eight zero-order correlations demonstrated 
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significant relationships between the ratings and the perceived identification 
accuracy. In contrast, only three ratings were related with objective 
identification accuracy (see Figure 1). The two sets of correlation coefficients 
(Fisher's Zr transformations were used) were related by ICC = .68 
demonstrating high correspondence between ecological validities and 
subjective utilities, but also some minor discrepancies. 
In the retrospective reasoning condition ratings explained 25% of the 
variance of perceived identification accuracy (p < .001) and 12% of the 
variance of objective identification accuracy (p = .023). Seven scales were 
significantly correlated with observer judgments of identification accuracy. In 
contrast, only one of the eight zero-order correlations demonstrated a 
significant relationship with objective identification accuracy (see Figure 2). 
The two sets of correlation coefficients were weakly related by ICC = .22 
reflecting essential non-correspondence in the validity of the perceived cues 
(ecological validities) on the one hand and the use of these cues on the 
other hand (subjective utilities). 
Study 2: Videos 
Observer judgments and judgment accuracy. 
Parallel to Study 1, hierarchical logistic regressions were conducted 
to predict (1) observer judgments (identification perceived as incorrect vs. 
perceived as correct) and (2) judgment accuracy as a function of objective 
identification accuracy (incorrect ID vs. correct ID), type of decision protocol 
(retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) and description presence (with vs. 
without descriptions). Proportions of observer judgments and judgment 
accuracy for the different experimental conditions are displayed in Table 3. 
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With observer judgments again we started by considering a fully 
specified logistic regression model including the three-way interaction 
between the three predictors as most complex term. In a backward 
hierarchical sequence we removed nonsignificant higher-order interactions. 
We ended up with a model containing the three main effects, chi2(3, 96) = 
12.32, p = .006, Nagelkerke R2 = .16. Overall predictive accuracy of the 
model was 69.8%. In this model only objective identification accuracy was a 
significant predictor of observer judgments with correct identifications 
(52.1%) being judged as correct more often than incorrect identifications 
(25.0%), B = 1.25, Wald statistic = 7.47, SEB = 0.47, p = .006, OR = 3.26. 
Effects of type of decision protocol and description presence were not 
significant, both Wald statistics < 2.36, both ps > .124. 
Parallel analyses were conducted with judgment accuracy (incorrect 
vs. correct judgment) to be classified. After removing nonsignificant higher-
order interactions we ended up with a model containing the three main 
effects chi2(3, 96) = 7.91, p = .048, Nagelkerke R2 = .11. Overall predictive 
accuracy of the model was 69.8%. In this model objective identification 
accuracy was a significant predictor of judgment accuracy with incorrect 
identifications (75.0%) being judged correctly more often than correct 
identifications (52.1%), B = -1.04, SEB = 0.45, Wald statistic = 5.41, p = .020, 
OR = 0.36. Effects of type of decision protocol and description presence 
were not significant, both Wald statistics < 2.31, both ps > .129. 
Scale construction. 
Considering the relatively small sample size (N = 96) in Study 2 the 
factor structures obtained in Study 1 were applied on observer ratings of 
Study 2 to make both studies comparable. The eight rating scales were 
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constructed parallel to Study 1 (factor loadings of observer ratings in Study 2 
after oblique rotation are displayed in Appendices C and D). Internal 
consistencies of the eight scales and corrected item-total correlations (all 
CITCs > .22) were satisfactory: Perceived perceptual basis (alpha = .76), 
perceived confidence (alpha = .91), perceived decision time and difficulty 
(alpha = .92), perceived persuasiveness of reasons (alpha = .81), perceived 
automatic decision (alpha = .65), perceived deliberative and effortful 
decision (alpha = .91), perceived absolute decision and a good memory for 
the perpetrator (alpha = .44) and perceived eliminative and relative decision 
(alpha = .76). 
Observer ratings as a function of objective identification 
accuracy (ecological validities). 
Parallel to Study 1 separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted for each 
scale with objective identification accuracy (incorrect ID vs. correct ID) and 
type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) as 
classification variables. Means and standard deviations of each scale as well 
as the effect sizes are displayed in Table 6. 
Similar to Study 1, five observer rating scales differed as a function of 
objective identification accuracy, all Fs(1, 96) > 6.63, all ps < .012. 
Moreover, there were significant interactions between objective identification 
accuracy and type of decision protocol for ratings of perceived perceptual 
basis, perceived decision time and difficulty and for perceived absolute 
decision processes accompanied by a good memory for the perpetrator, all 
Fs(1, 92) > 4.79, all ps < .031. For ratings of perceived eyewitness 
confidence and perceived deliberative and effortful decision processes the 
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interactions were only marginally significant, all Fs(1, 92) > 3.39, all ps < 
.069.6 
Observer ratings as a function of perceived identification 
accuracy (subjective utilities). 
To test for differences in observer ratings due to judgments of 
perceived identification accuracy (identifications perceived as incorrect vs. 
correct) and type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. think-
aloud) again separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted for each rating scale. 
Six rating scales differed due to observer judgments of perceived 
identifications accuracy, all Fs(1, 92) > 9.37, all ps < .003. For none of the 
eight scales were there any interactions between observer judgments and 
type of decision protocol, all Fs(1, 92) < 1.73, all ps > .192. Means and 
standard deviations of each scale as well as the effect sizes are displayed in 
Table 7. 
Brunswikian lens model analyses: Do observers use appropriate cues? 
Parallel to Study 1, the Brunswikian lens model was constructed 
separately for the think-aloud and the retrospective reasoning conditions (n 
= 48 judgments each). 
                     
6 Significant main effects of type of decision protocol were found for ratings 
of perceived decision time and difficulty, F(1, 92) = 4.64, p = .034, gu = 0.42, 95% 
CI [0.01, 0.82], and perceived eliminative and relative decision processes, F(1, 92) 
= 12.03, p = .001,gu = 0.68, 95% CI [0.27, 1.09], with higher ratings in the think-
aloud than in the retrospective reasoning condition. 
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In the think-aloud condition, ratings explained 44% of the variance of 
objective identification accuracy (p = .002) and 37% of the variance of 
judgments of perceived identification accuracy (p = .015). Six of the eight 
zero-order correlations demonstrated significant relationships between the 
ratings and the objective identification accuracy. In contrast, five ratings 
were related with perceived identification accuracy (see Figure 3). The two 
sets of correlation coefficients (Fisher's Zr transformations were used) were 
related by ICC = .93 demonstrating high correspondence between ecological 
validities and subjective utilities. 
In the retrospective reasoning condition ratings explained only 13% of 
the variance of objective identification accuracy (p = .660), while 49% of the 
variance of judgments of perceived identification accuracy were explained (p 
< .001). Seven scales were significantly correlated with observer judgments 
of identification accuracy. In contrast, only one of the eight zero-order 
correlations demonstrated a significant relationship with objective 
identification accuracy (see Figure 4). The two sets of correlation coefficients 
were not related, ICC = -.12, reflecting essential non-correspondence 
between ecological validities and subjective utilities. 
Discussion 
The purpose of these studies was to examine observers' judgmental 
processes when evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision, 
focusing on observers’ subjective perceptions and interpretations of different 
identification qualities. Three major research questions were addressed: (1) 
Do cues as perceived by observers discriminate between correct and 
incorrect identification decisions (ecological validities)? (2) How do 
observers use these cues to make their judgments (subjective utilities) and 
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how do they weight them? (3) Are these relationships better visible in think-
aloud protocols and video presentations due to an increased cue saliency 
than in retrospective reasoning protocols and transcripts? 
Ecological Validities: Observer Ratings as Indicators of Identification 
Accuracy? 
In both studies, there were five cues, as perceived by observers, 
discriminating between objectively correct and incorrect identifications. 
Observer ratings of perceived confidence (Study 1: gu = 0.28; Study 2: gu = 
0.54) and perceived automatic decision processes (Study 1: gu = 0.48; Study 
2: gu = 0.76) were higher for objectively correct than for incorrect 
identifications. In contrast, perceived decision time and difficulty (Study 1: gu 
= -0.25; Study 2: gu = -0.50), perceived deliberative and effortful decision 
processes (Study 1: gu = -0.32; Study 2: gu = -0.64) as well as perceived 
relative and eliminative decision processes (Study 1: gu = -0.23; Study 2: gu 
= -0.55) were rated lower for correct than for incorrect identifications. 
These results are in line with previous studies on variables to postdict 
identification accuracy (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sporer, 1992, 1993; 
Sporer et al., 1995; Wells, 1984), supporting the existence of ecologically 
valid indicators to discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications. 
However, in the present study we did not examine eyewitnesses' self-report 
measures but observers' subjective ratings of these variables. We found that 
witness self-report measures do not seem to be necessary to postdict 
identification accuracy. Instead, observers were also able to correctly gauge 
the underlying decision processes based on witnesses’ identification 
decision protocols. From an applied perspective, this is of high practical 
relevance when witness self-reports at later stages of the investigation or at 
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a trial are assumed to be biased (e.g., through post-identification feedback: 
Steblay, Wells, & Bradfield Douglass, 2014). 
In the present studies the witnesses’ numerical estimates of 
confidence per se were not presented to observers to avoid their strong 
influences on observers’ judgments that were observed in former studies 
(e.g., Beaudry et al., 2015; Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Cutler et al., 1988; Wells 
et al., 1979). Nevertheless, our results suggest that witness confidence will 
be inferred by observers in a way that it discriminates between correct and 
incorrect identifications. In line with Martire and Kemp (2009), observers 
seem to use “more than just these numerical statements to evaluate 
confidence, possibly incorporating verbal and nonverbal cues into their 
estimates” (p. 233). As these estimates show similarly high correlations with 
objective identification accuracy as witness self-reports, observer ratings of 
confidence may be used as fruitful alternative indicators of identification 
accuracy. 
However, not all scales as perceived by observers were valid 
indicators of identification accuracy. Neither the attributed eyewitness's 
perceptual basis, the perception of markers of an absolute decision strategy 
nor the rated quality of reasons differed as a function of identification 
accuracy. However, in both studies the observed relationships between 
observer ratings and objective identification accuracy tended to depend on 
the type of decision protocol the observers were presented with. 
Effects of type of decision protocol and presentation medium on 
ecological validities. 
Although not all of the two-way interactions reached significance, 
several observer ratings were valid indicators of identification accuracy only 
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when think-aloud protocols were presented. When videotapes were used 
(Study 2) observer ratings of six of the eight scales strongly discriminated 
between correct and incorrect identifications only in think-aloud protocols 
(i.e., perceived perceptual basis, gu = 0.79; perceived confidence, gu = 0.97; 
perceived decision time and difficulty, gu = -0.94; perceived automatic 
decisions, gu = 1.01; perceived deliberative and effortful decision processes, 
gu = -1.10; perceived absolute decisions, gu = 0.73). When retrospective 
reasoning protocols were presented, ratings for these scales did not differ 
significantly (gus ranged from -0.25 to 0.47).  
In contrast, when written transcripts were presented (Study 1) the 
effect of type of decision protocol was far from being as strong as with the 
use of videotapes. Differences in observer ratings were only shown for 
perceived confidence (gu = 0.43) and perceived deliberative and effortful 
decisions (gu = -0.63), which were valid indicators of identification accuracy 
in the think-aloud condition only, but not with retrospective reasoning 
protocols (gus ranged from -0.03 to 0.14). 
Increased cue saliency due to think-aloud procedures? 
In line with our hypotheses, discriminating cues seemed to be more 
apparent for observers when witnesses were instructed to think-aloud during 
the identification task than when they had to give reasons for their decisions 
afterwards. Think-aloud procedures allow observers to trace decision steps 
the witness engages in and display reconstructive memory activities and 
qualifiers that are associated with poor memories (Schooler et al., 1986; 
Wells & Lindsay, 1983). This procedure probably facilitates an adequate 
rating of the witness's cognitive effort to make a decision, the degree of 
deliberation as well as the witness's decision speed. Moreover, observers 
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may form an impression of the witness's perceptual basis more easily based 
on verbalized thoughts about specific physical features of the perpetrator or 
references to the witness's memory. 
 The results support Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) claim that people are 
aware about their results of thinking (i.e., their identification decision) but are 
unable to access past thought processes correctly that describe how they 
made their final decisions. Thus, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) assumed that 
people cannot explain the causes for their behavior adequately afterwards. 
Moreover, our results are in line with Ericsson and Simon's (1993) theory 
that retrospective reports (i.e., answers to questionnaires) are often 
incomplete due to forgetting or selective reporting of thoughts and mental 
processes (cf. also Bainbridge, 1999). Consequently, witnesses in the 
reasoning conditions did not mention enough cognitive details 
retrospectively, either due to limited access to their actual thought processes 
during the identification task or due to a biased appraisal of their decision 
processes going along with an individual report threshold (cf. strategic 
regulation of memory accuracy: Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Pansky, Koriat, & 
Goldsmith, 2005).  
Support for the assumption of less detailed reasoning protocols was 
obtained by analyzing protocol length showing that retrospective reasoning 
protocols were much shorter than think-aloud protocols. Nonetheless, in the 
reasoning condition there were also significant differences of perceived 
automatic (Study 1: gu = 0.56) and perceived relative and eliminative 
decision processes (Study 2: gu = -0.63) as a function of identification 
accuracy. Thus, although reasoning reports were clearly shorter than think-
aloud protocols, witnesses did report these decision strategies at least to 
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some extent when they justified their decisions. We encourage future 
research to explicitly focus on objectively measurable content differences in 
think-aloud and retrospective reasoning reports. Think-aloud and reasoning 
protocols could be coded for the presence of different decision processes 
(and not just rated based on observers’ subjective impressions), to further 
test our explanation of the observed results. 
Increased cue saliency due to the use of videotapes? 
Like a magnifying glass, think-aloud protocols seemed to be much 
more effective to allow observers to assess discriminating cues when they 
were presented as videotapes compared to written transcripts. Videotaped 
peripheral witness characteristics that were visible during the identification 
task (e.g., decision time, hesitations, hedges or facial expressions) facilitated 
the assessment of valid indicators of identification accuracy (cf. Erickson et 
al., 1978; Leippe, 1994). Thus, our results support the common 
recommendation to videotape the original identification procedure (Garrett, 
2011; Sporer, 1992, 1993; Wells et al., 1998) and encourage the application 
of think-aloud methods. 
In contrast, in both retrospective reasoning conditions observer 
ratings only had low predictive value to explain objective identification 
accuracy. Thus, videotapes of witnesses who have to give reasons for their 
identification decision afterwards do not seem to be more effective than 
written transcripts in general. As there were almost no valid indicators of 
identification accuracy that were perceivable for observers, the use of 
reasoning protocols does not seem to be sufficient to allow fact finders’ 
evaluation of identification accuracy at all. 
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In sum, observers seem to be able to perceive several ecologically 
valid cues to discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications, 
especially when think-aloud protocols are used and the identification 
decision is videotaped. Thus, videotaped think-aloud protocols seem to be a 
fruitful approach to increase the salience of valid indicators of identification 
accuracy, and to make them perceivable and usable by observers. As a 
result an increase in judgment accuracy can be expected. However, in Study 
2, judgment accuracy in the videotaped think aloud condition (70.8%) was 
not significantly higher compared to the videotaped retrospective reasoning 
condition (56.3%), probably due to the small sample size (n = 48 in each 
condition). Further improving think-aloud instructions and pilot testing them 
might increase this difference. 
Subjective Utilities: Which Cues Did Observers Use to Make Their 
Judgments? 
Independently of type of decision protocol, observers heavily used 
seven of the eight scales to make their judgments in the theoretically 
expected way (for additional support see Semmler et al., 2012), with results 
having been almost parallel in both studies. 
Based on the interpersonal source monitoring framework (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000), an increased number of cognitive operations are perceived 
as an indicator of an erroneous memory (Leippe, 1994; Sporer, 2004, 2008). 
In line with this assumption, in both studies observers evaluated 
identification decisions as incorrect more often when they were perceived as 
highly deliberative and effortful (Study 1: gu = -0.44; Study 2: gu = -0.57), that 
is, when the decisions contained a higher number of cognitive operations. In 
contrast, identification decisions that were perceived as highly automatic 
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were more likely judged as correct than incorrect in Study 1 (gu = 0.50), but 
the effect failed to reach significance in Study 2 (gu = 0.28).  
Similarly, identifications were judged as incorrect more frequently 
when the identification decision was perceived as slow and difficult (Study 1: 
gu = -0.63; Study 2: gu = -0.62), which was also found by Neal et al. (2012). 
However, from his archival analysis Garrett (2011) concluded that fact 
finders often seemed to ignore witnesses’ initial hesitations and judged the 
identification as correct. Perhaps training of judges, expert testimony or jury 
instructions might help decision makers. 
Regarding observers’ use of absolute and relative decision processes 
(Wells, 1984), results were mixed. Observers heavily used an attributed 
good memory for the perpetrator accompanied by an absolute decision as 
an indicator of a correct identification (Study 1: gu = 1.00; Study 2: gu = 
1.06). Dunning and Stern (1994) also found that observers judged 
identifications as correct more often, when witnesses reported a higher 
impact of their own memory than of the other photos in the lineup, which 
reflects an absolute decision strategy to some extent. However, 
contradictory to our assumptions, in both studies observers did not use 
perceived relative and eliminative decision processes as an indicator of an 
incorrect identification. In Study 2, they even tended to interpret them in the 
opposite direction (gu = 0.41), however the effect failed to reach significance 
due to the small sample size. In Dunning and Stern’s (1994) study, 
observers also failed to associate eliminative decision processes with 
identification accuracy. Perhaps, observers interpret their perception of 
eliminative strategies as an indicator for a conscientious and reliable 
witness. 
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As suggested by different courts (e.g., Neil vs. Biggers, 1972), 
identifications were judged as correct more often when the witness’s 
attributed perceptual basis (Study 1: gu = 1.08; Study 2: 0.99) and perceived 
confidence (Study 1: gu = 0.87; Study 2: gu = 0.99) were high. Several 
studies have shown observers’ high reliance on confidence for a long time 
(e.g., Wells et al., 1979). As expected observers also seemed to infer the 
witnesses’ perceptual basis from their identification protocols and used this 
cue heavily to make their judgments. 
Finally, identifications were judged as correct when the reported 
reasons were perceived as very persuasive (Study 1: gu = 0.94; Study 2: 
1.11). As persuasiveness was defined in terms of detailedness and 
consistency of the reported reasons, our results replicate previous findings 
that observers use these factors intuitively (cf. Bell & Loftus, 1989; Berman & 
Cutler, 1996). 
To sum up, observers seem to heavily use the investigated cues to 
make their judgments. However, high judgment accuracies can only be 
observed if the used cues validly discriminate between correct and incorrect 
identifications as well and are given an appropriate weight. 
Ecological Validities vs. Subjective Utilities: Did Observers Use the 
Cues Appropriately? 
In Study 1, observer judgment accuracy was 54.9%, which is 
comparable to chance level, and thus mirrors previous research results (for 
reviews see Boyce, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007; Wells & Lindsay, 1983). In 
contrast, when videotapes were used (Study 2) judgment accuracy (63.5%) 
exceeded chance level.  
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We applied the Brunswikian lens model to explain the observed 
judgment accuracies by focusing on observers’ weighting of cues. Therefore, 
objectively valid and subjectively used cues were contrasted to investigate if 
observers used the cues appropriately (cf. Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Sporer & 
Küpper, 1995). 
Brunswikian analyses in the retrospective reasoning conditions. 
In the retrospective reasoning conditions of both studies observer 
ratings showed greater predictive value for the judgments of perceived 
identification accuracy (Study 1: R2 = .25; Study 2: R2 = .49) than for 
objective identification accuracy (Study 1: R2 = .12; Study 2: R2 = .13). 
Although there was only one valid indicator of identification accuracy in each 
study, observers heavily relied on the majority of the investigated cues and 
overestimated their discriminative value (Figures 1 and 3). In Study 2, 
observers also failed to use eliminative and relative decision processes as a 
valid indicator of an incorrect identification decision and even interpreted it in 
the opposite direction.  
A comparison of the correlations between observer ratings and 
objective identification accuracy on the one hand and between ratings and 
perceived identification accuracy on the other hand reveals that observers 
gave far too much weight to non-diagnostic cues. Thus, correspondences 
between ecological validities and subjective utilities were low (Study 1: ICC 
= .22; Study 2: ICC = -.12). 
To conclude, the low judgment accuracies in the retrospective 
reasoning conditions (i.e., 51.4% for written transcripts and 56.3% for 
videotapes) can be explained by observers’ inappropriate use of non-
diagnostic cues. However, it is noteworthy that ratings explained only 25% 
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and 49% of the variance of observer judgments. Thus, there must be also 
other influence factors that are not investigated here (e.g., perceived 
description qualities, perceived witness characteristics: see Kaminski & 
Sporer, 2016). 
Brunswikian analyses in the think-aloud conditions. 
Although correspondences between ecological validities and 
subjective utilities were much higher in both think-aloud conditions compared 
to the retrospective reasoning conditions, the analyses differed due to 
presentation medium. 
Study 1: Written transcripts of think-aloud protocols. 
When transcribed think-aloud protocols were used observer ratings 
showed greater predictive value for the judgments of perceived identification 
accuracy (R2 = .27) than for objective identification accuracy (R2 = .12), 
which is comparable to both reasoning conditions. However, contrary to the 
reasoning conditions (Study 1: ICC = .22; Study 2: ICC = -.12), 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities was 
moderately high when think-aloud protocols were used (ICC = .68), 
reflecting an appropriate weighting of the investigated cues, but also some 
discrepancies.  
First, observers were highly sensitive to the three discriminating cues 
(i.e., perceived confidence, perceived automatic decision, perceived 
deliberative and effortful decision) and weighted them appropriately. For 
these scales the correlations with the objective and perceived identification 
accuracy were in the same direction and comparable in size (see Figure 2). 
Second, observers tended to appropriately weight perceived decision time 
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and difficulty, although this cue did not significantly discriminate between 
correct and incorrect identifications. Third, observers gave low weight to 
eliminative and relative decision processes, which indeed were not valid 
indicators of identification accuracy.  
However, there were also discrepancies. Observers highly 
overestimated the discriminative value of the witnesses’ attributed 
perceptual basis, the perceived quality of reasons and the perceived 
witness’s memory quality for the perpetrator resulting in an absolute 
decision. Although these cues were not related to objective identification 
accuracy, observers gave them the highest weights. These results support 
the assumption that observers tend to overestimate some situational factors, 
like the attributed witness’s attention and his/her quality of view of the 
perpetrator, when making their judgments (Boyce et al., 2007). Lindsay 
(1994) had also reported that participants rated these factors as most 
important cues to identification accuracy. Although we do not deny the 
importance of situational factors (cf. Shapiro & Penrod, 1986) their impact 
may not be gauged easily from witness statements. 
Study 2: Videotapes of think-aloud protocols. 
Contrary to the other conditions, observer ratings based on think-
aloud protocols showed greater predictive value for objective identification 
accuracy (R2 = .44) than for the judgments of perceived identification 
accuracy (R2 = .37). Six of eight cues showed moderate to high relationships 
with objective identification accuracy with observers being sensitive to these 
relationships and weighting these cues highly appropriately. Thus, 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities was 
almost perfect. Minor discrepancies are reflected in observers’ 
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underestimation of the discriminative value of automatic and deliberative and 
effortful decision processes (Figure 4). Moreover, they failed to give 
sufficient weight to eliminative and relative decision processes although this 
cue was moderately related to objective identification accuracy (similar 
results were found by Dunning & Stern, 1994). 
According to Leippe’s (1994) validity-intuition model, judgment 
accuracy increases if observers intuitively use highly valid cues and ignore 
invalid cues. This was the case when videotaped think-aloud protocols were 
used resulting in a judgment accuracy of 70.8% that dropped to 58.3% with 
literally transcribed think-aloud protocols. In videotaped think-aloud protocols 
discriminative cues were much more visible for observers explaining 44% of 
the variance of objective identification accuracy (vs. only 12% in transcripts 
of think-aloud protocols). Thus, observers’ intuitive use and correct weighting 
of these cues produced higher judgment accuracy. 
Conclusions and Practical Implications 
To sum up, observers were able to detect several valid cues to 
discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications that were present 
in eyewitnesses’ identification decision protocols. However, this finding was 
mainly restricted to the use of videotaped think-aloud procedures. Videos 
showing witnesses who think-aloud during the identification task probably 
make discriminating cues more salient for observers compared to the use of 
written transcripts and compared to retrospective reasoning protocols. The 
latter just seem to elicit a post hoc rationalization to explain the identification 
decision, with presentation medium being not helpful to detect discriminating 
cues. In contrast, videotaped think-aloud protocols seem to allow observers 
to detect witnesses who just beat around the bush and to distinguish them 
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from those who rely on their memory and make absolute and automatic 
decisions. However, due to the lack of random assignment no direct 
statistical comparisons of the two studies are legitimate. Hence, effects of 
presentation medium have to be interpreted with caution. 
Independent of type of decision protocol observers heavily relied on 
the investigated cues to make their judgments and correctly interpreted their 
relationships with objective identification accuracy in both studies. However, 
the investigated cues did not explain more than 44% of the variance in 
observers’ judgments. Thus, other cues have to be considered to gain a 
deeper understanding of observers’ evaluation processes. 
To investigate how much weight is given to each cue the Brunswikian 
lens model offers a useful method to understand the relationships between 
empirically valid and intuitively used cues. In the videotaped think-aloud 
condition there were good correspondences in the use of valid cues, 
whereas in the reasoning condition cue discriminability was highly 
overestimated. 
To increase fact finders’ judgment accuracy when evaluating an 
identification decision we recommend (1) to use think-aloud protocols to 
record witnesses’ decision processes which make discriminating cues more 
salient, (2) to videotape the identification decision and (3) to inform fact 
finders about valid factors that are associated with identification accuracy. 
We encourage to pilot test and refine think-aloud instructions to optimize 
them for the evaluation of identification decisions. Ultimately, guidelines 
about the appropriate weighting of valid indicators of identification decisions 
can be devised on the basis of Brunswikian analyses.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Observer Ratings (Based on Wells & Bradfield, 1998) of the Witnesses’ 
Identification Statements 
Rating Variables Scale Anchors 
Witnessing conditions 
(1) How good was the witness's quality 
of view of the target? 
1 = very poor; 7 = very good 
(2) How long was the target face in 
view for the witness? 
1 = very short; 7 = very long 
(3) How well was the witness able to 
make out specific features of the 
target's face? 
1 = not at all; 7 = very well 
(4) How much attention did the witness 
pay to the target' s face? 
1 = no attention; 7 = total attention 
(5) Did the witness have a good basis 
(enough information) to make an 
identification? 
1 = no basis at all;  
7 = very good basis 
Identification decision 
(6) How easy or difficult was it for the 
witness to make an identification? 
1 = very difficult; 7 = very easy 
(7) How long did it take the witness to 
make an identification? 
1 = very short; 7 = very long 
(8) How confident was witness that the 
identified person is the target? 
1 = not confident at all;  
7 = totally confident 
(9) How willing would the witness be to 
testify about his/her identification in 
court? 
1 = not willing at all;  
7 = totally willing 
(10) How willing would the witness be to 
swear an oath about his/her 
identification in court? 
1 = not willing at all;  
7 = totally willing 
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Table 2 
Observer Ratings of the Witnesses’ Decision Processes Using 7-point 
Likert Scales (1 = not at all; 7 = absolutely so) 
Rating Variables 
(1) The witness matched the image in his/her head to the pictures in 
front of him/her. 
(2) The witness first looked at all the photos before making a decision. 
(3) The witness compared each face with the others to make a decision. 
(4) The witness used a process of elimination. 
(5) The witness relied on specific facial features (e.g. nose, hair, eyes) 
when making an identification. 
(6) The person chosen by the witness seemed to be an exact match to 
his/her memory. 
(7) The witness just recognized the target and could not explain why. 
(8) The target's face seemed to just "pop out" at the witness. 
(9) The witness first eliminated the ones definitely not the target, then 
chose among the rest. 
(10)* The target face seemed to be the person closest to what the witness 
remembered but not exact. 
(11) The faces seemed to be all so similar that they made the decision 
more difficult. 
(12) The faces confused the witness, which made the task more difficult. 
(13) The witness had to think carefully to make a decision. 
(14) Much effort was necessary to make the decision. 
(15) The witness still seemed to have a clear picture of the target in mind. 
Note. *Item 10 was dropped from later analyses due to low inter-correlations 
with other items. 
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Table 3 
Observer Judgments (% of Identifications Perceived as Correct) and 
Judgment Accuracy (% Correct Judgments) for each Experimental Condition 
of Study 1 (N = 288) and Study 2 (N = 96) 
 
Study 1  Study 2 
 Observer 
Judgments 
Judgment 
Accuracy 
 
Observer 
Judgments 
Judgment 
Accuracy 
Total 25.0 54.9a  38.5 63.5b 
Identification Accuracy      
 Incorrect 20.1 79.9  25.0 75.0 
 Correct 29.9 29.9  52.1 52.1 
Type of decision protocol      
 Reasoning 27.8 51.4  31.3 56.3 
 Think-aloud 22.2 58.3  45.8 70.8 
Description presence      
 Without descriptions 20.8 55.6  31.3 64.6 
 With descriptions 29.2 54.2  45.8 62.5 
Note. a Judgment accuracy did not differ from chance level of 50%, t(287) = 
1.66, p = .099; b Judgment accuracy significantly differed from chance level of 
50%, t(95) = 2.74, p = .007. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Ratings of Study 1 (Using Written Transcripts) for Objectively Correct and Incorrect Identifications 
 Total (N = 288)  Retrospective Reasoning (n = 144)  Think-aloud (n = 144) 
 Incorrect ID  Correct ID   Incorrect ID  Correct ID   Incorrect ID  Correct ID  
Observer ratings M SD  M SD gu  95% CI]  M SD  M SD 
gu 
[95% CI]  M SD  M SD 
gu 
[95% CI] 
Perceptual basis 3.59 1.05  3.69 1.14 0.09 
[-0.14, 0.32] 
 3.73 1.06  3.75 1.12 0.02 
[-0.30, 0.35] 
 3.46 1.02  3.63 1.16 0.16 
[-0.17, 0.48] 
Confidence 3.14 1.31  3.53 1.47 0.28 
[0.05, 0.51]  
 3.26 1.43  3.46 1.41 0.14 
[-0.19, 0.46] 
 3.01 1.17  3.60 1.53 0.43 
[0.10, 0.76]  
Decision time and 
difficulty 
4.78 0.96  4.53 1.01 -0.25 
[-0.48, -0.02]  
 4.61 0.95  4.43 1.00 -0.18 
[-0.51, 0.15] 
 4.95 0.95  4.64 1.02 -0.32 
[-0.65, 0.00] 
Persuasiveness of 
reasons 
3.35 1.06  3.20 1.11 -0.15 
[-0.38, 0.09] 
 3.40 1.03  3.13 0.97 -0.27 
[-0.60, 0.06] 
 3.31 1.09  3.27 1.24 -0.04 
[-0.36, 0.29] 
Automatic decision 2.41 1.34  3.16 1.74 0.48 
[0.25, 0.72]  
 2.65 1.31  3.47 1.59 0.56 
[0.23, 0.89]  
 2.17 1.33  2.85 1.83 0.42 
[0.09, 0.75]  
Deliberative/ 
effortful decision 
4.45 1.27  4.03 1.46 -0.32 
[-0.55, -0.09]  
 4.02 1.41  3.98 1.32 -0.03 
[-0.36, 0.29] 
 4.91 0.93  4.08 1.60 -0.63 
[-0.97, -0.30]  
Absolute decision/ 
good memory for 
perpetrator 
4.23 1.15  4.34 1.23 0.09 
[-0.14, 0.32] 
 4.34 1.08  4.33 1.17 -0.01 
[-0.34, 0.31] 
 4.11 1.21  4.35 1.29 0.19 
[-0.14, 0.51] 
Eliminative/ relative 
decision 
4.38 1.31  4.07 1.42 -0.23 
[-0.46, 0.01]  
 3.96 1.36  3.73 1.38 -0.17 
[-0.49, 0.16] 
 4.80 1.12  4.42 1.39 -0.30 
[-0.63, 0.02] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences (p < .05) and 
effect sizes. 
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Ratings of Study 1 (Using Written Transcripts) for Perceived Correct and Incorrect Identifications 
 Total (N = 288)  Retrospective Reasoning (n = 144)  Think-aloud (n = 144) 
 Perceived Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID    
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID    
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD  M SD gu  95% CI]  M SD  M SD 
gu 
[95% CI]  M SD  M SD 
gu 
[95% CI] 
Perceptual basis 3.38 0.99  4.45 1.00 1.08 
[0.80, 1.36]  
 3.46 0.99   4.46 1.00 1.00 
[0.62, 1.38]  
 3.29 0.98   4.43 1.01 1.15 
[0.73, 1.56]  
Confidence 3.05 1.31  4.19 1.33 0.87 
[0.60, 1.15]  
 3.03 1.29   4.23 1.40 0.91 
[0.53, 1.28]  
 3.07 1.33   4.16 1.25 0.83 
[0.42, 1.23]  
Decision time and 
difficulty 
4.81 0.99  4.20 0.86 -0.63 
[-0.90, -0.36]  
 4.68 0.99   4.10 0.82 -0.61 
[-0.98, -0.24]  
 4.93 0.98   4.33 0.90 -0.62 
[-1.02, -0.22]  
Persuasiveness of 
reasons 
3.04 0.93  3.99 1.22 0.94 
[0.67, 1.22]  
 3.04 0.90   3.84 1.05 0.84 
[0.47, 1.22]  
 3.04 0.95   4.18 1.40 1.07 
[0.66, 1.48]  
Automatic decision 2.59 1.58  3.37 1.49 0.50 
[0.23, 0.77]  
 2.87 1.52   3.55 1.39 0.45 
[0.09, 0.82]  
 2.33 1.60   3.14 1.61 0.50 
[0.11, 0.90]  
Deliberative/ 
effortful decision 
4.40 1.38  3.80 1.30 -0.44 
[-0.71, -0.17]  
 4.16 1.40   3.59 1.17 -0.42 
[-0.78, -0.05]  
 4.62 1.33   4.05 1.42 -0.42 
[-0.82, -0.03]  
Absolute decision/ 
good memory for 
perpetrator 
4.01 1.16  5.10 0.86 1.00 
[0.73, 1.28]  
 4.08 1.14   4.98 0.77 0.85 
[0.47, 1.23]  
 3.94 1.17   5.26 0.94 1.17 
[0.75, 1.58]  
Eliminative/ relative 
decision 
4.17 1.39  4.40 1.30 0.17 
[-0.10, 0.43] 
 3.75 1.45   4.08 1.11 0.24 
[-0.13, 0.60] 
 4.56 1.22   4.80 1.43 0.19 
[-0.20, 0.58] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences (p < .05) and 
effect sizes.
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Ratings of Study 2 (Using Videos) for Objectively Correct and Incorrect Identifications 
  Total (N = 96)   Retrospective Reasoning (n = 48)   Think-aloud (n = 48) 
  Incorrect ID   Correct ID     Incorrect ID   Correct ID     Incorrect ID   Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD   M SD gu  
[95% CI]   M SD   M SD 
gu 
 [95% CI]   M SD   M SD 
gu  
[95% CI] 
Perceptual basis 3.65 1.05   3.93 1.00 0.27 
[-0.13, 0.67] 
  3.87 1.25   3.66 0.81 -0.19 
[-0.75, 0.36] 
  3.43 0.77   4.19 1.12 0.79 
[0.21, 1.36]  
Confidence 3.41 1.56   4.24 1.50 0.54 
[0.14, 0.94]  
  3.83 1.54   4.10 1.66 0.16 
[-0.40, 0.72] 
  2.99 1.50   4.39 1.34 0.97 
[0.38, 1.56]  
Decision time and 
difficulty 
4.57 1.48   3.81 1.55 -0.50 
[-0.91, -0.10]  
  3.93 1.37   3.81 1.47 -0.08 
[-0.64, 0.48] 
  5.22 1.32   3.80 1.65 -0.94 
[-1.52, -0.35]  
Persuasiveness of 
reasons 
3.58 1.22   3.70 1.20 0.09 
[-0.30, 0.49] 
  3.58 1.32   3.31 0.99 -0.23 
[-0.79, 0.33] 
  3.58 1.14   4.08 1.28 0.41 
[-0.16, 0.97] 
Automatic decision 2.49 1.54   3.77 1.79 0.76 
[0.35, 1.17]  
  2.83 1.36   3.58 1.72 0.47 
[-0.09, 1.04] 
  2.15 1.65   3.96 1.87 1.01 
[0.42, 1.60]  
Deliberative/ 
effortful decision 
4.29 1.69   3.23 1.59 -0.64 
[-1.05, -0.23]  
  3.69 1.68   3.27 1.65 -0.25 
[-0.80, 0.31] 
  4.90 1.50   3.19 1.56 -1.10 
[-1.70, -0.50]  
Absolute decision/ 
good memory for 
perpetrator 
4.51 1.01   4.79 1.20 0.26 
[-0.14, 0.65] 
  4.74 1.14   4.53 1.13 -0.18 
[-0.74, 0.38] 
  4.27 0.82   5.05 1.23 0.73 
[0.16, 1.31]  
Eliminative/ relative 
decision 
4.42 1.42   3.59 1.58 -0.55 
[-0.95, -0.15]  
  3.97 1.39   3.03 1.55 -0.63 
[-1.20, -0.05]  
  4.88 1.33   4.15 1.42 -0.52 
[-1.09, 0.05] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences  (p < .05) and 
effect sizes. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Ratings of Study 2 (Using Videos) for Perceived Correct and Incorrect Identifications 
  Total (N = 96)   Retrospective Reasoning (n = 48)   Think-aloud (n = 48) 
  Perceived Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID     
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID     
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD   M SD gu 
[95% CI]   M SD   M SD 
gu 
[95% CI]   M SD   M SD 
gu 
[95% CI] 
Perceptual basis 3.43 0.84   4.36 1.06 0.99 
[0.56, 1.42]  
  3.44 0.87   4.48 1.08 1.09 
[0.45, 1.73]  
  3.42 0.83   4.27 1.06 0.90 
[0.31, 1.48]  
Confidence 3.28 1.48   4.70 1.34 0.99 
[0.56, 1.42]  
  3.46 1.47   5.07 1.29 1.11 
[0.47, 1.75]  
  3.04 1.48   4.45 1.35 0.98 
[0.39, 1.57]  
Decision time and 
difficulty 
4.55 1.43   3.61 1.59 -0.62 
[-1.04, -0.20]  
  4.23 1.29   3.07 1.35 -0.88 
[-1.50, -0.25]  
  4.95 1.51   3.99 1.66 -0.60 
[-1.17, -0.03]  
Persuasiveness of 
reasons 
3.18 1.08   4.37 1.02 1.11 
[0.68, 1.55]  
  3.01 0.92   4.42 1.06 1.43 
[0.77, 2.10]  
  3.40 1.24   4.34 1.02 0.81 
[0.22, 1.39]  
Automatic decision 2.94 1.74   3.43 1.82 0.28 
[-0.13, 0.68] 
  3.15 1.54   3.33 1.73 0.11 
[-0.49, 0.71] 
  2.67 1.97   3.50 1.92 0.42 
[-0.15, 0.98] 
Deliberative/ 
effortful decision 
4.13 1.67   3.18 1.65 -0.57 
[-0.98, -0.15]  
  3.84 1.64   2.68 1.47 -0.72 
[-1.33, -0.10]  
  4.49 1.67   3.51 1.72 -0.57 
[-1.14, 0.00]  
Absolute decision/ 
good memory for 
perpetrator 
4.24 0.95   5.30 1.05 1.06 
[0.62, 1.49]  
  4.33 1.03   5.30 1.08 0.91 
[0.28, 1.54]  
  4.13 0.85   5.30 1.05 1.21 
[0.61, 1.82]  
Eliminative/ relative 
decision 
3.76 1.52   4.39 1.54 0.41 
[0.00, 0.82] 
  3.21 1.44   4.13 1.59 0.61 
[0.00, 1.22]  
  4.46 1.35   4.57 1.51 0.07 
[-0.49, 0.63] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant (p < .05) mean differences and 
effect sizes.
Experiment 2: Judgments of Identification Accuracy  153 
 
Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of 
identification decision protocols and objective and perceived identification 
accuracy (Pearson correlations) in the think-aloud condition of Study 1 (n = 
144 judgments). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 2. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of 
identification decision protocols and objective and perceived identification 
accuracy (Pearson correlations) in the retrospective reasoning condition of 
Study 1 (n = 144 judgments). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 3. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of 
identification decision protocols and objective and perceived identification 
accuracy (Pearson correlations) in the think-aloud condition of Study 2 (n = 
48 judgments). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 4. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of 
identification decision protocols and objective and perceived identification 
accuracy (Pearson correlations) in the retrospective reasoning condition of 
Study 2 (n = 48 judgments). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Factor Loadings of the 16 Original Items Measuring Perception and 
Identification Qualities in Study 1 (N = 288) and Inter-Correlations Between 
Factors 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Good view of perpetrator (1)   .43a -.03  .03 -.12 
Time perpetrator's face was in 
view (2) 
  .59a -.02  .02  .01 
Special facial features visible (3)   .74a -.03 -.12 -.15 
Attention paid to face (4)   .73a .07  .04  .04 
Good basis for identification (5)   .81a .09  .07 -.05 
Difficulty of identification decision 
(6) 
 .39  -.37b  .23  .13 
Response latency Identification 
(7) 
-.04   .86b  .02 -.04 
Post-identification confidence (8) .18 -.16   .60c  .07 
Willingness to testify in court (9) -.07 -.01   .86c -.09 
Willingness to swear oath in 
court (10) 
-.04  .08   .96c -.01 
Decision made with hesitations -.08   .26b -.09  .19 
Decision made with deliberations   .13   .81b -.01  .00 
Accuracy of reasons -.04 -.08 -.01  -.96d 
Detailedness of reasons   .06  .20  .07  -.66d 
Consistency of reasons   .15 -.08  .03  -.31d 
Convincingness of reasons   .28 -.02  .13  -.50d 
Factor 1 
  
1.00 -.25  .53 -.58 
Factor 2   1.00 -.39  .02 
Factor 3     1.00 -.38 
Factor 4       1.00 
Note. The number in brackets refers to the original item of Table 1; Bold 
values refer to primary loadings for a factor. a Perceived perceptual basis 
(alpha = .82); b Perceived decision time and difficulty (alpha = .71; item 6 
was recoded to build the scale); c Perceived confidence (alpha = .86); d 
Perceived persuasiveness of reasons (alpha = .79). 
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Appendix B 
Factor Loadings of 14 Original Items Measuring Decision Processes in 
Study 1 (N = 288) and Inter-Correlations Between Factors 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Matched image in head to 
pictures (1) 
-.16  .05 -.18   .51d 
First looked at all photos (2)  .14   .16b -.08  .29 
Compared each face with others 
(3) 
 .17   .31b  .08  .17 
Used process of elimination (4) -.04   .82b  .03 -.04 
Relied on special facial features 
(5) 
 .14  .02 -.05   .53d 
Exact match with memory (6) -.17  .02  .36   .42d 
Just recognized the target, 
cannot explain why (7) 
-.01  .01   .63c -.13 
Face just popped out (8) -.09 -.07   .81c -.02 
First eliminated faces, then 
chose among rest (9) 
-.06   .85b -.06 -.06 
Faces were all similar (11)   .61a  .00 -.11 -.13 
Photos were confusing (12)   .52a  .02  .01 -.13 
Had to think carefully (13)   .82a  .01  .03  .29 
Much effort necessary (14)   .80a  .04 -.09  .01 
Clear picture in mind (15) -.15 -.05  .39   .60d 
Factor 1 1.00 .37 -.39 -.05 
Factor 2   1.00 -.18 .32 
Factor 3     1.00 .06 
Factor 4       1.00 
Note. The number in brackets refers to the original item of Table 2; Bold 
values refer to primary loadings for a factor. a Perceived deliberative and 
effortful decision (alpha = .81); b Perceived eliminative and relative decision 
(alpha = .68); c Perceived automatic decision (alpha = .70); d Perceived 
absolute decision and a good memory for the perpetrator (alpha = .61). 
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Appendix C 
Factor Loadings of the 16 Original Items Measuring Perception and 
Identification Qualities in Study 2 (N = 96) and Inter-Correlations Between 
Factors 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Good view of perpetrator (1)  .10  .31 -.10   .10d 
Time perpetrator's face was in 
view (2) 
 .01  .03 -.05   .48d 
Special facial features visible (3) -.05  .04 -.02   .81d 
Attention paid to face (4)  .03 -.02  .19   .77d 
Good basis for identification (5)  .00  .05 -.15   .63d 
Difficulty of identification decision 
(6) 
 .18  .02   -.69c  .18 
Response latency Identification 
(7) 
 .06 -.05   .90c  .02 
Post-identification confidence (8)   .58a -.03 -.30  .10 
Willingness to testify in court (9)   .97a  .05  .01 -.06 
Willingness to swear oath in 
court (10) 
  .86a -.03 -.06  .06 
Decision made with hesitations -.23  .07   .69c  .02 
Decision made with deliberations  .00  .03   .93c  .03 
Accuracy of reasons -.05  1.01b -.06 -.06 
Detailedness of reasons -.11   .79b  .15  .05 
Consistency of reasons  .22   .32b  .06  .05 
Convincingness of reasons  .08  .55b -.11  .16 
Factor 1 1.00 .28 -.59 .41 
Factor 2   1.00 -.02 .67 
Factor 3     1.00 -.21 
Factor 4       1.00 
Note. The number in brackets refers to the original item of Table 1; Bold 
values refer to primary loadings for a factor. a Perceived confidence (alpha = 
.91); b Perceived persuasiveness of reasons (alpha = .81); c Perceived 
decision time and difficulty (alpha = .92; item 6 was recoded to build the 
scale); d Perceived perceptual basis (alpha = .76).  
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Appendix D 
Factor Loadings of 14 Original Items Measuring Decision Processes in 
Study 2 (N = 96) and Inter-Correlations Between Factors 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Matched image in head to 
pictures (1) 
 .17  .12  .37c -.01 
F rst looked at all photos (2)  .15   .47b  .00  .04 
Compared each face with others 
(3) 
-.03   .82b  .06  .04 
Used process of elimination (4)  .06   .61b  .19  .12 
Relied on special facial features 
(5) 
-.01  .03  .04c  .28 
Exact match with memory (6) -.45  .17   .48c  .08 
Just recognized the target, 
cannot explain why (7) 
-.11 -.12  .24  -.79d 
Face just popped out (8) -.34 -.28  .50  -.26d 
First eliminated faces, then 
chose among rest (9) 
-.10   .70b -.06  .01 
Faces were all similar (11)   .76a  .12 -.07 -.05 
Photos were confusing (12)   .79a  .00 -.02 -.11 
Had to think carefully (13)   .84a  .09  .11  .09 
Much effort necessary (14)   .98a -.08  .10  .15 
Clear picture in mind (15) -.22 -.26   .42c  .36 
Factor 1 1.00 .42 -.21 .04 
Factor 2   1.00 .05 .36 
Factor 3     1.00 .17 
Factor 4       1.00 
Note. The number in brackets refers to the original item of Table 2; Bold 
values refer to primary loadings for a factor. a Perceived deliberative and 
effortful decision (alpha = .91); b Perceived eliminative and relative decision 
(alpha = .76); c Perceived absolute decision and good memory for the 
perpetrator (alpha = .44); d Perceived automatic decision (alpha = .65). 
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EXPERIMENT 3: 
The evaluation of eyewitness identification decisions by 
indirect measures 
Eyewitness testimony including identification decisions is often the 
only, or the major, source of evidence available in court and consequently 
serves as an essential basis for later convictions (Garrett, 2011; Wells & 
Olson, 2003). At trial, judges and/or jurors have to evaluate the accuracy of 
identification decisions to arrive at their verdicts. Importantly, it is not only a 
witness’s misidentification per se that leads to judicial errors, but rather the 
erroneous evaluation of these identification decisions that leads to wrongful 
convictions.  
Many studies have shown that observers’ ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect identification decision is limited, that is, their 
judgment accuracy is often no better than chance level (e.g., Beaudry, 
Lindsay, Leach, Mansour, Bertrand, & Kalmet, 2015; Brigham & Bothwell, 
1983; Wells & Lindsay, 1983). Thus, to explain fact finders’ judgment 
accuracy it is necessary to get a deeper insight into observers’ judgmental 
processes. 
In these evaluation processes an identification decision serves as a 
persuasive message that affects fact finders’ judgments. Similarly, fact 
finders’ judgmental processes can be explained in line with typical two-
process models of persuasion (cf. Leippe, 1994). In these models, for 
example the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) or 
the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM: Chaiken, 1980), there are two ways of 
evaluating a message. When a message is processed at a systematic or 
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central route, fact finders carefully consider the message’s content (e.g., the 
strength and logic of the arguments) and form opinions based on the 
detailed elaboration of the presented arguments. A message can also be 
processed through a peripheral route, which is characterized by a limited 
elaboration of the message’s arguments and the use of heuristic decision 
rules. Here, fact finders focus on simple and easily accessible cues, for 
example, the length of the testimony (e.g., number of details), the perceived 
credibility of the witness (e.g., expert witness or police officer), the witness’s 
appearance, nonverbal behaviors (e.g., maintenance of eye contact, 
attractiveness) or the message delivery style (e.g., speech style or voice 
loudness). Based on the ELM, the message content is elaborated centrally 
when fact finders’ motivation (e.g., when the message has a personal 
relevance) and cognitive ability (e.g., appropriate message complexity, time, 
attention) to process the information are high. Otherwise persuasion 
develops trough peripheral processing, which takes place when personal 
involvement is low or when the message content is too complex and difficult 
to be carefully processed (cf. Carpenter, 2015; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 
1986; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). 
Many studies have examined the persuasive impact of content related 
aspects of an identification decision (i.e., aspects that have been shown to 
be related with identification accuracy) on observer judgments (i.e., 
witnessing conditions, confidence, response latency and witnesses’ decision 
processes; e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Kaminski & Sporer, 2016; Neal, 
Christiansen, Bornstein, & Robicheaux, 2012; for a review see Semmler, 
Brewer, & Bradfield Douglass, 2012). In contrast, the present study focused 
on the persuasive impact of indirect measures (i.e., measures that are not 
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directly linked to eyewitnesses’ memory performance) that are assumed to 
be processed peripherally. In particular, it is analyzed if observer judgments 
are related to (1) an overall impression of certain witness traits, (2) perceived 
witness speech style characteristics and (3) different easily accessible 
quantitative and qualitative description characteristics. Observers’ use of 
these cues when evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision is 
contrasted with the validity of these cues to discriminate between correct 
and incorrect identifications. 
Perceived Witness Traits 
Based on social perception theories, a first global impression of a 
person is built within a few milliseconds (for a recent review see Todorov, 
Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). Inferences about emotions, 
intentions and personality traits are made automatically and quickly from 
facial appearance, vocal and behavioral aspects.  
Based on implicit personality theories trait inferences are highly 
correlated and guide social attributions and social judgments (e.g., credibility 
judgments, sentencing decisions, guilt verdicts). For example, based on a 
“what is beautiful is good” stereotype, attractive people are also perceived as 
more trustworthy and honest (cf. Spellman & Tenney, 2010; Zebrowitz, 
Voinescu, & Collins, 1996), and are rated as more intelligent and competent 
(Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Zebrowitz, Hall, Murphy, & 
Rhodes, 2002).  
In a legal context it has been shown that witnesses who were 
perceived as very likeable were also rated as more credible (Garcia & 
Griffitt, 1978), whereas nervous witnesses were perceived as being less 
believable in court than witnesses showing only few signs of nervousness 
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(Bothwell & Jalil, 1992; Pryor & Buchanan, 1984). Porter, ten Brinke, and 
Gustaw (2010) even showed that participants requested less evidence to 
convict a defendant who was previously rated as untrustworthy compared to 
a defendant rated as trustworthy.  
In sum, many such peripheral cues seem to affect the evaluation of 
witness credibility. In the present study we extended this idea by 
investigating the persuasive impact of certain witness traits on observer 
judgments of perceived identification accuracy. Therefore, we adapted the 
Witness Credibility Scale (WCS), which was developed by Brodsky, Griffin, 
and Cramer (2010). The WCS is designed to measure expert witnesses’ 
credibility in court, which is assumed to be associated with the perceived 
persuasiveness of the expert’s report. The scale consists of four highly inter-
correlated subscales: confidence, likeability, trustworthiness and knowledge. 
Higher ratings in these scales were associated with higher credibility ratings 
(e.g., Neal, Guadagno, Eno, & Brodsky, 2012), as well as with mock-juror 
judgments of perpetrator blame and sentencing recommendations (Cramer, 
Titcomb Parrott, Gradner, Stroud, Boccaccini & Griffin, 2014). 
In the present study, we adapted the WCS as a measure for the 
perceived accuracy of non-expert witnesses’ identification decisions, but 
also included additional items to assess further perceived witness 
characteristics. Although it is an empirical question, if these trait measures 
are associated with objective identification accuracy, it is expected that 
observers will rely on the four dimensions of the WCS to evaluate the 
accuracy of an identification decision. In particular, perceived witness 
confidence, which has been shown to heavily affect observers’ judgments of 
witness accuracy (for a review, see Boyce, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007), is 
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assumed to be used by observers as an indicator of identification accuracy. 
In line with this assumption Leippe (1994) describes a witness’s holistic 
“confident look” (p. 396) integrating many verbal and nonverbal witness 
aspects that affect fact finders’ judgments of eyewitness accuracy.  
Perceived Speech Style 
Speech markers in addition to witness traits contribute to a global 
impression of the witness and also affect the evaluation of an eyewitness’s 
memory report (e.g., Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 1978). Based on 
empirical investigations of witnesses’ natural speech variations in the 
courtroom, O‘Barr and colleagues (Conley, O’Barr, & Lind, 1978; Erickson et 
al., 1978; O’Barr, 1982) differentiated between a powerless and a powerful 
speech style, which affects the perceived power of a witness’s testimony. A 
powerful style of speaking was more likely to be used by witnesses with high 
social status and was characterized by the infrequent use of “intensifiers 
(“so”, “very”, “surely” as in “I surely did”), hedges (“kinda”, “I think”, “I guess” 
etc.), especially formal grammar (the use of bookish grammatical forms), 
hesitation forms (“uh”, “well”, “you know”, etc.), gestures (e.g., the use of 
hands and expressions such as “over there” while speaking), questioning 
forms (e.g., the use of rising question intonation in declarative contexts), and 
polite forms (“please”, “thank you”, etc.)” (Erickson et al., 1978, p. 267).  
A powerful speech style has been shown to affect observers’ 
evaluations of the speaker in a favorable way (e.g., they were perceived as 
more truthful, credible, convincing, intelligent and attractive) as well as to 
heighten the message’s persuasive influence (e.g., Areni & Sparks, 2005; 
Blankenship & Holtgraves, 2005; Bradac, Hemphill, & Trady, 1981; Clancy & 
Bull, 2014; Erickson et al., 1978; Holtgraves & Lasky, 1999; O’Barr, 1982; 
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Ruva & Bryant, 2004). Laboratory studies also provide more direct evidence 
that hedges and hesitations negatively affect evaluations of witness 
credibility and guilt (Hosman & Wright, 1987; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 
1986).  
It is assumed that a powerful speech style also serves as an indicator 
of witness confidence (Erickson et al., 1978; Leippe, 1994). Conversely, a 
powerless speech style, including hedges and hesitations, reflects the 
speakers’ lack of confidence. Focusing on other linguistic features, a 
speaker’s confidence is also expressed in higher voice loudness and faster 
speech rate (Scherer, London, & Wolf, 1973). Moreover, a higher speech 
rate is associated with higher ratings of perceived credibility (Miller, 
Maruyama, Beaber, & Valone, 1976), whereas people speaking louder than 
others are perceived as more friendly and logical (Robinson & Zebrowitz 
McArthur, 1982).  
Leippe (1994) concluded that all these linguistic characteristics 
convey a general impression of expertise, which can be applied to a 
witness’s ability to give an accurate memory report. In line with this 
assumption, Jules and McQuiston (2013) demonstrated that observers rated 
witnesses’ recollections of details as well as witnesses’ identification 
decisions as more accurate when witnesses used a powerful compared to a 
powerless speech style. 
Another potentially persuasive characteristic of a witness’s speech 
style derives from the interpersonal source monitoring approach (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000; Schooler et al., 1986). In the classical reality monitoring 
framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981) it is suggested that reports of imagined 
or internally generated events differ from memory reports of perceived 
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events by an increased inclusion of the speaker’s cognitive processes (“it 
must have been”, “lets see”, “If I think about it”). These cognitive processes 
could be reflected in hedges and hesitations as well as in long, indirect and 
evasive answers (cf. Schooler et al., 1986) that imply the impression of a 
witness “beating around the bush”. Observers are assumed to use the same 
phenomenal characteristics when they evaluate other people’s memories--a 
judgment process referred to as interpersonal reality monitoring (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 2004).  
In the present study we expect observers’ judgments of identification 
accuracy to vary with differences in the perceived linguistic features. A 
powerful speech style, high speech rate, a loud voice as well as the 
infrequent use of long, indirect and evasive answers are assumed to be 
associated with observers’ tendency to evaluate an identification decision as 
correct. It is an empirical question, whether or not speech style is associated 
with objective identification accuracy as well. 
Perceived Description Qualities 
There are many characteristics of eyewitness descriptions that may 
intuitively affect fact finders’ evaluations of an identification decision (e.g., 
the perceived number of details, the frequent use of “don’t know” answers, 
clear contradictions, or the fit [“congruence”], between the description and 
the identified person). These characteristics are easily accessible for 
observers and do not need a careful elaboration or knowledge about the 
culprit and the crime. 
Indeed, it is recommended to use eyewitness descriptions as an 
indicator of identification accuracy (Neil vs. Biggers, 1972; Sporer & Cutler, 
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2003). A notable body of research demonstrated small but reliable 
relationships between person description quality and quantity and 
identification accuracy (e.g., Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, 2008; Sauerland, 
Holub, & Sporer, 2008; Sporer, Kaminski, Davids, & McQuiston, 2015). In 
line with these findings, witness credibility is enhanced when witnesses 
display a “good memory” (Bell & Loftus, 1988, 1989; cf. Spellman & Tenney, 
2010). Bell and Loftus (1988, 1989) showed that ratings of witness credibility 
increased with the degree of details in an eyewitness’s testimony. A detailed 
testimony was also associated with a better memory for the culprit’s face 
and a higher degree of attention paid to the culprit. Similarly, Wells and 
Leippe (1981) found mock jurors to judge identifications to be more likely to 
be accurate when a witness’s memory for peripheral details was good; A 
finding that contradicts the negative correlation found between objective 
identification accuracy and memory for peripheral details.  
According to Petty and Cacioppo (1984), simply increasing the 
number of arguments should increase the persuasive impact of a message 
by applying the simple decision rule “the more arguments the better”. Bell 
and Loftus’s (1988, 1989) as well as Wells and Leippe’s (1981) findings are 
also in line with the interpersonal source monitoring approach (Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2000; Schooler et al., 1986). It is assumed that a highly detailed 
memory report including more sensory details and more contextual 
information is associated with an externally perceived and well-remembered 
event, resulting in a higher perceived credibility of the witness (cf. Sporer, 
2004).  
Besides the degree of details in a testimony, report consistency 
(Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995; Leippe, Manion 
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and Romanczyk, 1992) and a high congruence between the description of 
the perpetrator and the identified person (Bradfield & Wells, 2000) have 
been shown to favorably affect jurors’ judgments as well.  
Unfortunately, only little is known about the persuasive impact of 
person and event descriptions. Therefore, we (1) manipulated the content of 
the to be judged eyewitness statements by presenting identification 
decisions with or without a description of the perpetrator, the event and the 
crime scene and (2) created a series of ratings that assessed various 
aspects of description quantity and quality (see Appendices A and B). We 
investigated the persuasive influence of these description characteristics on 
observer judgments of identification accuracy and expected observers to 
heavily rely on these cues.  
Application of the Brunswikian Lens Model 
For a detailed analysis of observers’ judgmental processes and the 
persuasive influence of different indirect measures, we applied the 
Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956, 1965). The model has been used 
to explain judgments of medical decision-making (Hammond, Hursch, & 
Todd, 1964), social perception (Vicaria, Bernieri, & Isaacowitz, 2015) as well 
as credibility judgments in the context of the detection of deception (Fiedler, 
1989; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Sporer, 1997; Sporer & Küpper, 1995; Sporer, 
Masip, & Cramer, 2014). Recently, we also applied it to judgments of 
identification decisions (Kaminski & Sporer, 2016). 
The Brunswikian lens model provides a theoretical framework to 
describe the relationship between the validity of certain perceived cues to 
predict an objective outcome on the one hand (ecological validities) and 
perceivers’ usage of these cues to predict their judgments of this outcome 
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on the other hand (subjective utilities). To ensure high judgment accuracy 
the perceived cues should be strongly related to the objective outcome of 
interest and perceivers should use, interpret and weight these cues 
appropriately to arrive at their judgments. To estimate the agreement 
between cue validities and perceivers usage of these cues a 
correspondence measure is computed. This measure shows whether 
observers are sensitive to indicators of identification accuracy, that is, if they 
use valid cues to discriminate between correct and incorrect identification 
decisions and if they weight them appropriately. Consequently, high 
correspondences should result in increased judgment accuracy. 
In the present study, we contrasted ecological validities of observers’ 
perceptions of the investigated indirect measures (i.e., relationships between 
these characteristics and objective identification accuracy) with observers’ 
usage of these measures (i.e., relationships between these characteristics 
and observer judgments) when evaluating the accuracy of an identification 
decision.  
Method 
First, we describe Study 1, which was conducted to obtain judgments 
of identification accuracy and a series of ratings of perceived person and 
event description qualities. In Study 2, we collected ratings of different 
witness traits and speech style characteristics. Finally, data of both studies 
were combined to examine the relationships between observer ratings and 
observer judgments. 
Experiment 3: Indirect Measures 171 
Study 1: Ratings of Description Qualities and Judgment of 
Identification Accuracy 
Study 1 has already been reported by Kaminski and Sporer (2016). 
However, in the present study we focus on the manipulation of description 
presence and on observer ratings of perceived description qualities, which 
have not been analyzed before. 
Observer-participants and design. 
Ninety-six observer-participants (32 male, 64 female; 75% students, 
25% working) between the ages of 18 and 34 years (Mdn = 23.0) voluntarily 
participated in this study. Each observers-participant judged one of 48 
videotaped identification statements with or without the presentation of an 
additional person and event description. A 2 (objective identification 
accuracy: incorrect choice in a target absent lineup [TA] vs. correct choice in 
a target present lineup [TP]) x 2 (type of presented decision protocol: 
retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud)1 x 2 (presence of person and event 
descriptions: not presented vs. presented) factorial between-participants 
design was used. Thus, there were 12 identification statements (of 6 male 
and 6 female witnesses) per condition, which internally replicates our 
experiment 12 times to satisfy stimulus sampling requirements (Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999). 
                     
1 Effects of type of decision protocol were investigated in detail by 
Kaminski and Sporer (2016). Thus, we do not focus on this manipulation in the 
present study. 
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Stimulus eyewitness statements. 
To construct the videos a pilot-study was conducted (for a detailed 
description of this study see Kaminski & Sporer, 2016). In this study witness-
participants first watched a short stimulus film and then gave a free 
description of the perpetrator, the event and the crime scene, which was 
followed by several non-leading questions. Witness-participants were asked 
to give the description as precisely as possible but also had the opportunity 
to give "don't know" answers. Afterwards, they were asked to identify the 
perpetrator from a target-absent or target-present lineup. The witness-
participants were either instructed to think-aloud while making their 
identification decision (i.e., to say out loud everything, that is, every idea, 
thought or recollection, that comes to their mind even if it seemed to be 
irrelevant; cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993) or to give reasons for their decision 
afterwards.  
The identification statements contained the lineup instructions given 
to the witness-participants and the witnesses’ identification decision. The 
witnesses’ explicit numerical confidence statements, which we had also 
collected, were cut from the videos and not presented to observers to avoid 
a halo effect of confidence to influence all other judgments. 
Procedure. 
All observer-participants were tested individually and were instructed 
to imagine being a lay judge or juror in court who had to evaluate a 
videotaped eyewitness identification statement. Additionally, participants 
were briefly informed about the incident the witness had observed (i.e., a 
short film of a bicycle theft) and the identification that had taken place 
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approximately one hour after the film. Next, the observer-participants were 
presented with the videotaped testimony and were instructed to watch it 
carefully. All participants had the opportunity to watch the video repeatedly 
during the whole judgment process. Every video was accompanied with 
details of the witness's age, sex and occupation. The mean age of the 
videotaped witnesses was 24.65 years (SD = 7.08). Moreover, the six-
person photo lineup the witnesses saw in the video was printed on high 
quality photo paper (A4 format) and was handed to the observer-
participants. 
Observer ratings. 
When person and event descriptions were presented (depending on 
condition), different description qualities were evaluated first (see 
Appendices A and B). Then, observer-participants were asked to evaluate 
the identification statements regarding different qualities, which are not 
considered here (see Kaminski & Sporer, 2016). Finally, observer-
participants were asked to give a dichotomous judgment whether they 
believed that the witness had made a correct identification (0 = incorrect 
choice vs. 1 = correct choice), which reflects the main dependent variable in 
the present study.  
Study 2: Ratings of Indirect Measures 
This study was designed to evaluate the same 48 eyewitness 
statements exclusively regarding the witness’s speech style and observers’ 
subjective impression of different witness traits. 
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Observer-participants and design. 
Thirty-two students (8 male, 24 female), aged from 19 to 34 years (M 
= 23.71, SD = 3.41) participated in this study to gain course credit. We used 
a 2 (identification accuracy: incorrect choice [TA] vs. correct choice [TP]) x 2 
(type of decision protocol: retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) x 2 
(person and event descriptions: not presented vs. presented) mixed design 
with identification accuracy as repeated measures factor. Thus, per condition 
each participant rated six correct and six incorrect identifications, which were 
presented in random order. In sum, each of the 48 identification statements 
was evaluated eight times, with four raters each evaluating the identification 
statement with and four raters without the presentation of person and event 
descriptions. 
Procedure and materials. 
Raters were informed that they would have to watch 12 videos 
showing different witness-participants of a former study who had testified on 
a witnessed crime, described the perpetrator (depending on condition) and 
made an identification decision. They were instructed to evaluate each 
witness regarding his/her speech style as well as regarding several 
personality adjectives. Rating order was counterbalanced, that is, half of the 
participants evaluated the speech style first whereas the other half started 
with the evaluation of the witness traits. It was emphasized that there are no 
correct or incorrect answers for these ratings, which should only reflect their 
subjective impression of the witness statements. The videos were shown 
and evaluated one after the other in a randomized order. The lineups used 
were not presented. 
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Rating variables. 
Ten items were constructed to describe the witness’s speech style 
(Appendix C), of which seven items described the powerless-powerful 
speech style dimension (Erickson et al., 1978; O’Barr, 1982).  
To assess the participants’ subjective impression of the witness, 37 
items were used (Appendix D), including 20 items adapted from the Witness 
Credibility Scale (Brodsky et al., 2010) as well as items adapted from the 
Observed Witness Efficacy Scale (Cramer, DeCoster, Neal, & Brodsky, 
2013). All further items were added by us. 
For all ratings observers had to evaluate the degree to which each 
speech characteristic, adjective or behavior was applicable to the witness (1 
= not at all; 7 = very much). Items within each category were presented in a 
newly randomized order for each part to avoid carry-over effects. 
Results 
Overview 
First, we present the results of observer judgments of identification 
accuracy as a function of the manipulated independent variables (with N = 
96 judgments as unit of analysis; cf. Study 2 in Kaminski & Sporer, 2016). 
Subsequently, we focus on observer ratings of witness traits, speech style 
and description qualities with N = 48 stimulus identification decisions as unit 
of analysis.  
To test the Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1956, 1965) 
relationships between observer ratings and objective identification accuracy 
(ecological validities) as well as between observer ratings and perceived 
identification accuracy (subjective utilities) were examined. Two multiple 
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regression analyses were computed to compare the predictions of the 
objective and the perceived identification accuracy. Further, we computed 
zero order correlations between ratings and (1) objectively and (2) perceived 
identification accuracy. To test for agreement between ecological validities 
and subjective utilities the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC: two-way 
mixed effect model, average measure, estimated absolute agreement; cf. 
McGraw & Wong, 1996; Orwin & Vevea, 2009; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) 
between the two sets of correlations was computed (using Fisher's Zr 
transformations).  
The corrected standardized mean difference Hedges gu, point-biserial 
correlations (rpb), and odds ratios (OR) are reported as effect sizes (cf. 
Borenstein, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). According to Cohen (1988), a 
small effect is represented by a point-biserial correlation of .10 that equals a 
standardized mean difference of .20, whereas moderate and large effects 
are reflected by rpbs of .24 and .37 equaling ds of .50 and .80, respectively. 
Judgments of Identification Accuracy 
Observer judgments. 
In sum, 38.5% of identifications were perceived as correct. 
Objectively correct identifications were judged as correct (52.1%) more often 
than objectively incorrect identifications (25.0%), chi2(1, N = 96) = 7.43, p = 
.006, OR = 3.26, 95% CI [1.37, 7.74]. Judgments did not differ due to the 
presence of person and event descriptions (identification statement only: 
31.3% perceived as correct vs. identification and descriptions: 45.8%, OR = 
1.86), nor were there differences in judgments due to type of decision 
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protocol (retrospective reasoning: 31.3% perceived as correct vs. think-
aloud: 45.8%, OR = 1.86). 
Judgment accuracy. 
Overall, 63.5% of the identification decisions were judged correctly 
above the chance level of 50%, t(95) = 2.74, p = .007. Incorrect 
identifications were judged correctly (75.0%) more often than correct 
identifications (52.1%), chi2(1, N = 96) = 5.44, p = .020, OR = 0.36, 95% CI 
[0.15, 0.86]. Judgment accuracy did not differ due to the other manipulated 
variables (identification statement only: 64.6% vs. identification and 
descriptions: 62.5%, OR = 0.91; retrospective reasoning: 56.3% vs. think-
aloud: 70.8%, OR = 1.89). 
Observer Ratings of Witness Speech Style and Witness Traits 
Inter-rater reliabilities. 
Eight different raters evaluated each identification video in Study 2. 
As measures of inter-rater reliability we computed the average correlation 
between the eight raters using the Spearman-Brown correction (rSB; cf. 
Rosenthal, 1995) as well as the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC: one-
way random effects model, average measure, estimated consistency; cf. 
McGraw & Wong, 1996; Orwin & Vevea, 2009; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).  
Across all raters and ratings, there was an average rSB of .65 (mean 
ICC = .63) ranging from .38 (for the rated “use of intensifiers” in the witness’s 
speech) to .80 (for the rated witness’s “attractiveness”). Results for the 
subgroups were nearly comparable: for the 10 ratings of the witness speech 
style (rSB = .68; mean ICC = .67) and for the 37 trait ratings (rSB = .64; mean 
ICC = .62). However, due to relatively low inter-reliabilities (rSB < .45) the trait 
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items 31 (“control behavior”), 34 (“admit memory failures”) and 35 (“act 
natural”) were excluded from further analyses. 
As four raters judged the speech style and witness traits solely based 
on the identification statement, while another four raters made their ratings 
based on the identification statement presented along with additional person 
and event descriptions, ratings were averaged within these two conditions, 
respectively. 
Scale construction. 
Based on the factor structure underlying the Witness Credibility Scale 
(Brodsky et al., 2010), ratings of witness traits that were highly inter-
correlated were combined separately in both description conditions, yielding 
four scales each measuring perceived witness likeability, trustworthiness, 
knowledge and confidence (Appendix E; cf. WCS: Brodsky et al., 2010). For 
each scale high internal consistencies (all Cronbach’s alphas > .89) and 
satisfactory corrected item-total correlations were observed (Appendix E). 
Items 26 (“reserved”), 27 (“spontaneous”) and 36 (“thinking hard”) were 
excluded due to low inter-correlations with the other items.2 
                     
2 The seven items describing characteristics of a powerless speech style 
were not averaged to build a scale, which was due to low internal consistencies 
(ratings based on identification statements only: Cronbach’s alpha = .35; ratings 
based on identification statements and descriptions: Cronbach’s alpha = .61) and 
low corrected item-total correlations (all CITCs < .55). 
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Perceived witness traits as a function of objective and perceived 
identification accuracy. 
In separate 2 x 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVAs we compared observer 
ratings with (1) objectively and (2) perceived correct and incorrect 
identifications as classifying variables. Type of decision protocol 
(retrospective reasoning vs. think-aloud) was included as between-
participants factor. Description presence was treated as a repeated 
measures factor. 
None of the four rating scales differed due to objective identification 
accuracy (means, standard deviations and effect sizes are displayed in 
Table 1). However, for ratings of witness confidence there was an interaction 
between type of decision protocol and objective identification accuracy, F(1, 
44) = 4.75, p = .035, partial eta2 = .098. In the think-aloud condition 
confidence ratings were higher for correct (M = 4.69, SD = 0.51) than for 
incorrect identifications (M = 4.22, SD = 0.45), F(1, 44) = 4.23, p = .046, gu = 
0.96, 95% CI [0.14, 1.78]. With retrospective reasoning protocols no 
differences were observed (correct ID: M = 4.30, SD = 0.76 vs. incorrect ID: 
M = 4.54, SD = 0.52), F(1, 44) = 1.06, p = .310, gu = -0.36, 95% CI [-1.14, 
0.42]. 
Regarding observer judgments, ratings of perceived confidence 
differed as a function of perceived identification, F(1, 44) = 9.88, p = .003. 
The main effect was also marginally significant for ratings of perceived 
witness knowledge, F(1, 44) = 3.73, p = .060 (means, standard deviations 
and effect sizes are displayed in Table 1). 
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Ratings did not differ due to type of decision protocol and description 
presence, nor were there any other significant interactions including 
objective or perceived identification accuracy. 
Brunswikian lens model analysis for perceived witness traits. 
Two multiple regression analyses with objective and perceived 
identification accuracy as dependent variables and observer ratings of 
witness traits as predictors were conducted. Ratings of witness traits showed 
greater predictive value for the perceived (R2 = .21, p = .039) than for the 
objective identification accuracy (R2 = .02, p = .926). There were no 
significant relationships between the rating scales and objective identification 
accuracy, whereas the perceived confidence was significantly correlated 
with observer judgments (rpb = .43; Figure 1). The two sets of zero-order 
correlations between ratings and observer judgments and between ratings 
and objective identification were related by ICC = .37, demonstrating 
differences between ecological validities and subjective utilities. 
Ratings of perceived speech style as a function of objective and 
perceived identification accuracy. 
Parallel mixed model ANOVAs were conducted to compare 
observers’ speech style ratings for (1) objectively and (2) perceived correct 
and incorrect identifications.3 Means and standard deviations of each 
                     
3 For none of the ten speech style ratings were there significant main 
effects of type of decision protocol, all Fs < 2.98, all ps > .092. Nor were there 
significant interactions with objective or with perceived identification accuracy 
(except for the perceived speech rate), Fs < 3.25, all ps > .078. Thus, this factor is 
not further discussed here. 
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speech rating for objectively and perceived correct and incorrect 
identification statements (as well as effect sizes) are displayed in Tables 2 
and 3.  
Effects of objective identification accuracy. 
Ratings of the perceived use of intensifiers and perceived speech rate 
differed due to objective identification accuracy, both Fs(1, 44) > 5.03, both 
ps = .030. For three speech ratings (i.e., hedges, hesitations, and long, 
indirect and evasive answers) there were interactions between description 
presence and objective identification accuracy, all Fs > 4.44, ps < .041, all 
partial eta2 > .092 (see Table 2). 
Moreover, for ratings of perceived speech rate there was a significant 
interaction between objective identification accuracy and type of decision 
protocol, F(1, 44) = 4.15, p = .048, partial eta2 = .086. Only when think-aloud 
protocols were presented were ratings higher for correct (M = 3.75, SD = 
0.59) than for incorrect identifications (M = 3.11, SD = 0.67), F(1, 44) = 9.18, 
p = .004, gu = 0.97, 95% CI [0.15, 1.79]. With retrospective reasoning 
protocols, perceived speech rate was comparable (correct ID: M = 3.66, SD 
= 0.38 vs. incorrect ID: M = 3.63, SD = 0.34), F(1, 44) = 0.02, p = .882, gu = 
0.08, 95% CI [-0.69, 0.86]. All further main effects and interactions failed to 
reach significance. 
Effects of perceived identification accuracy. 
Ratings of the perceived use of hedges and questioning forms 
differed as a function of observers’ judgments of perceived identification 
accuracy, both Fs(1, 44) > 4.45, both ps < .041 (see Table 3). For perceived 
speech rate there also was a significant interaction between perceived 
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identification accuracy and type of decision protocol, F(1, 44) = 4.05, p = 
.050, partial eta2 = .084. When think-aloud protocols were used ratings were 
higher for perceived correct (M = 3.59, SD = 0.71) than for perceived 
incorrect identifications (M = 3.05, SD = 0.54), F(1, 44) = 4.97, p = .031, gu = 
0.78, 95% CI [-0.10, 1.65]. With retrospective reasoning protocols perceived 
speech rate did not differ (ID judged as correct: M = 3.59, SD = 0.31 vs. ID 
judged as incorrect: M = 3.70, SD = 0.40), F(1, 44) = 0.29, p = .592, gu = -
0.32, 95% CI [-1.10, 0.46]. There were no significant interactions between 
perceived identification accuracy and description presence. 
Main effects of description presence. 
Six speech ratings (i.e., intensifiers, questioning forms, gestures, 
long, indirect and evasive answers, speech rate and voice loudness) differed 
due to description presence, all Fs > 6.69, ps < .019, gus ranging from -0.41 
to -0.75, showing higher ratings when identifications were presented without 
descriptions compared to ratings when descriptions were added. 
Brunswikian lens model analyses for speech style ratings. 
Due to the reported interactions between objective identification 
accuracy and description presence, regression analyses were conducted 
separately for evaluations based solely on the identification statements and 
for evaluations that were based on both, the identification statement and the 
descriptions. 
In the identification-only condition, ratings showed somewhat greater 
predictive value for the objective (R2 = .38, p = .038) than for the perceived 
identification accuracy (R2 = .26, p = .285). Two of ten zero-order 
correlations demonstrated significant relationships with objective 
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identification accuracy (i.e., long, indirect and evasive answers and speech 
rate), whereas observers primarily used two speech style characteristics 
(i.e., hedges and questioning forms) to make their judgments (Figure 2). In 
sum, the two sets of zero-order correlations between ratings and objective 
and perceived identification accuracy were moderately related by ICC = .64, 
demonstrating correspondence between ecological validities and subjective 
utilities, but also discrepancies. 
When identification statements were presented along with 
descriptions predictive value of observer ratings was R2 = .32 (p = .113) for 
the objective identification accuracy compared to R2 = .18 (p = .604) for the 
perceived identification accuracy. Two of ten zero-order correlations 
demonstrated significant relationships with objective identification accuracy 
(i.e., intensifiers and gestures; Figure 3). However, none of the perceived 
speech characteristics was significantly correlated with observers’ judgments 
of identification accuracy. The two sets of correlation coefficients were not 
related (ICC = -.11). Thus, essential non-correspondence in the validity of 
the perceived cues (ecological validities) and the use of these cues 
(subjective utilities) is reflected. 
Observer Ratings of Description Qualities 
First, description ratings were averaged to yield general rating scales 
of quality of person (Cronbachs’s alpha = .85) and of event and scene 
descriptions (Cronbachs’s alpha = .91). Due to low (and even negative) 
corrected item-total correlations (CITCs < .40) person description items 12 
and 13 (see Appendix A) as well as event and crime scene description items 
3, 8, 17 and 18 (see Appendix B) were excluded. To build the scales ratings 
of description difficulty and response latency were reversed. 
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Two 2 x 2 analyses of variance were conducted to compare 
description ratings for (1) objectively and (2) perceived correct and incorrect 
identifications with type of decision protocol (retrospective reasoning vs. 
think-aloud) as between-participant factor. There were no significant effects 
of objective identification accuracy, type of identification decision protocol, 
nor any significant interactions, all Fs < 2.08, all ps > .157. In contrast, for 
both rating scales, there was a significant main effect of perceived 
identification accuracy. When identifications were judged as correct person 
description quality was rated higher (M = 4.64, SD = 0.81) compared to 
identifications judged as incorrect (M = 3.86, SD = 0.78), F(1, 44) = 10.91, p 
= .002, gu = 0.98, 95% CI [0.39, 1.57], rpb = 0.45 . Similarly, event and scene 
description quality was rated higher when identifications were perceived as 
correct (M = 5.42, SD = 0.77) than incorrect (M = 4.59, SD = 0.95), F(1, 44) 
= 10.58, p = .002, gu = 0.93, 95% CI [0.35, 1.52], rpb = 0.44. 
Brunswikian lens model analyses for perceived description 
characteristics. 
To test which of the different description characteristics observers 
used to make their judgments, Brunswikian lens model analyses were 
conducted with the single description ratings.  
Ratings of person description qualities showed greater predictive 
value for perceived (R2 = .42, p = .074) than for objective identification 
accuracy (R2 = .17, p = .898). There were significant positive correlations 
between perceived identification accuracy and perceived description 
accuracy, description congruence, witness confidence and the witness’s 
picture in mind (Figure 4). However, none of the ratings was a valid indicator 
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of objective identification accuracy. The two sets of zero-order correlations 
were moderately related by ICC = .64, reflecting moderate correspondence 
between ecological validities and subjective utilities. 
Ratings of event and scene description qualities also showed greater 
predictive value for perceived (R2 = .55, p = .055) than for objective 
identification accuracy (R2 = .26, p = .889). For seven ratings there were 
significant correlations with observer judgments; however none of the 
variables was related to objective identification accuracy (Figure 5). 
Correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities was 
low (ICC = .37). 
Discussion 
The present study aimed at investigating the persuasive impact of 
different indirect measures on observers’ judgments of perceived 
identification accuracy. Applying the Brunswikian lens model, it was 
examined (1) if these measures were related to objective identification 
accuracy (ecological validities) and (2) if observers used these measures to 
make their judgments (subjective utilities) and how they weighted them. 
Perceived Witness Traits: Subjective Utilities vs. Ecological Validities 
Observer ratings mainly supported the factor structure of the Witness 
Credibility Scale, which was developed to measure expert witness credibility 
(Brodsky et al., 2010). As expected, observers heavily relied on the 
perceived witness confidence to judge the accuracy of an identification 
decision (rpb = .43). Note that witnesses’ explicit confidence ratings had been 
edited out from the videotapes so they would not influence observers’ 
judgments. Moreover, observers also tended to use perceived 
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trustworthiness (rpb = .21) and perceived witness knowledge (rpb = .24) to 
make their judgments. Although the effect sizes were moderate in size, 
these effects failed to reach significance.  
In contrast, none of the perceived traits discriminated between 
objectively correct and incorrect identifications (all rpb < .11; Figure 1). 
However, when think-aloud protocols were presented, confidence ratings 
were higher for correct than for incorrect identifications (rpb = .46). In 
contrast, with retrospective reasoning statements confidence was no 
indicator of identification accuracy. 
A comparison of subjective utilities and ecological validities revealed 
that observers tended to give an inappropriate high weight to cues that were 
not indicative of objective identification accuracy at all (except for confidence 
ratings in the think-aloud condition). 
Former studies using the WCS with expert witnesses found positive 
relationships between the four subscales and attributed expert witness 
credibility (e.g., Cramer et al., 2014; Neal, Guadagno, et al., 2012). 
However, applied to the evaluation of non-expert witnesses’ identification 
decisions only the confidence scale was related to observers’ judgments. 
Several other studies also demonstrated that observers heavily relied on 
witness confidence (e.g., Beaudry et al., 2015; Kaminski & Sporer, 2016; 
Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). However, as the witnesses’ explicit 
numerical confidence statement was edited out from the videotapes in the 
present study, observers had to form a general impression of the witness’s 
confidence based on other peripheral cues like nonverbal and paraverbal 
witness behaviors. Apparently, this impression formation is facilitated when 
witnesses were instructed to think-aloud while identifying the target, which is 
Experiment 3: Indirect Measures 187 
supposed to make the witness’s cognitive processes (e.g., doubts or a faded 
memory) more visible for observers (cf. Kaminski & Sporer, 2016). Thus, 
only when think-aloud protocols were used this subjective impression of 
confidence discriminated between correct and incorrect identifications. 
Similarly, Kaminski and Sporer (2016) demonstrated that asking observers 
to explicitly judge the witness’s confidence regarding his/her identification 
decision resulted in appropriate confidence ratings that were moderately 
related to objective identification accuracy only when think-aloud protocols 
were used, but not with retrospective reasoning protocols.  
However, as the use of think-aloud protocols is no common police 
practice, it is recommended to ask witnesses to explicitly state their post-
identification confidence to protect fact finders from relying on invalid 
confidence inferences. Many studies have shown that self-reported witness 
confidence at the time of the original identification is strongly positively 
related to choosers’ identification accuracy (mean weighted r = .37: Sporer, 
Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). However, this is the case only when 
confidence is asked for directly after the identification decision which should 
be videotaped for further investigations (National Academy of Sciences, 
2014; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & 
Brimacombe, 1998; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015). 
In sum, persuasive influences of witness traits on observer judgments 
of identification accuracy were only partially supported by the present 
results. 
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Perceived Speech Style Characteristics 
Subjective utilities. 
O’Barr and colleagues distinguished between a powerless and 
powerful speech style dimension that has been shown to be associated with 
observers’ evaluations of the speaker and his or her communicated 
message (e.g., Erickson et al., 1978; Hosman et al., 2002; Hosman & 
Wright, 1987; Jules & McQuiston, 2013). In the present study, relationships 
between rated power of speech and objective as well as perceived 
identification accuracy depended on the type of material presented 
(identification statement only vs. identification plus descriptions). Only in the 
identification-only condition were hedges (rpb = -.30) and questioning forms 
(rpb = -.41) associated with observer judgments. In contrast, when additional 
descriptions were presented none of the ten speech style ratings differed 
due to perceived identification accuracy. Moreover, perceived speech rate 
was positively related with observer judgments when think-aloud protocols 
were used (rpb = .36), but not with retrospective reasoning statements (cf. 
findings by Miller et al., 1976). 
Consequently, the persuasive impact of special speech style 
characteristics was not independent of the presented message content and 
the number of presented arguments. Ratings served as persuasive cues 
only when testimony was short, and thus, only a few arguments were 
available to be processed. Similarly, Hosman, Huebner and Siltanen (2002) 
demonstrated that a powerless speech style produced more negative 
thoughts about a message than a powerful speech style only when 
argument strength was weak. When arguments were strong, speech power 
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was not influential. Moreover, Sparks and Areni (2008) demonstrated that 
observers relied on language markers especially when their ability to 
carefully process the message was low. They concluded that when 
observers are unable to process message content, they tend to elaborate 
speaker qualities instead. Additionally, we assume that the descriptions 
themselves may have served as a strong persuasive cue that affected 
observer judgments in a way that speech style effects probably were 
masked. In sum, a persuasive effect of certain linguistic features may 
emerge only when identification protocols are presented in isolation. 
Ecological validities. 
Considering ecological validities, there were different speech 
characteristics in each description condition that discriminated between 
correct and incorrect identifications. In the identification-only condition, 
correct identifications were moderately associated with fewer long, indirect 
and evasive answers (rpb = -.30), a higher speech rate (rpb = .34) and with 
less perceived hesitations (rpb = -.28; however, the effect was only 
marginally significant) than incorrect ones. 
These results are in line with the reality monitoring approach 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 2004) which 
suggests that correct memories are accompanied by less cognitive 
processes compared to incorrect or generated memories, which might be 
also reflected in a witness’s speech style (cf. Schooler et al., 1986). Several 
studies have shown that correct identifications are often made faster (e.g., 
Sauerland & Sporer, 2007, 2009; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994) and more 
automatically, that is, with fewer deliberations and with less eliminative 
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thought processes than incorrect ones (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Wells, 
1984). 
In contrast, when identifications were presented with descriptions, 
intensifiers (rpb = .32) and gestures (rpb = .34) were significantly related with 
objective identification accuracy. Interestingly, intensifiers and gestures 
originally were supposed to reflect a powerless speech style used by 
uncertain and incompetent, low status witnesses (Erickson et al., 1978). 
However, our results suggest an opposite interpretation. Here, accurate 
witnesses used intensifiers and gestures, presumably to emphasize the 
strength of their memory. 
Did observers use speech style characteristics appropriately? 
Although results differed for the two description conditions, in both 
conditions speech style ratings explained more variance of objective than of 
perceived identification accuracy. Thus, observers did not use speech style 
cues as extensively to make their judgments as suggested by the observed 
ecological validities (Figure 2 and 3). In both conditions observers were not 
sensitive to objectively valid indicators of identification accuracy 
underestimating their discriminative value. 
In the identification-only condition, there was an overall moderate 
correlation (ICC = .64) between ecological validities and subjective utilities. 
Although observers underestimated cue discriminability of valid indicators 
(i.e., speech rate and long, indirect and evasive answers) most of the 
correlations between ratings and objective and perceived identification 
accuracy were in same direction. In particular, observers realized that some 
cues were not postdictive of identification accuracy (i.e., intensifiers, 
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gestures, polite forms and voice loudness), and thus they did not weight 
them, respectively. 
In the identification-plus-description condition there was an overall 
non-correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities 
(ICC = -.11). Observers were not sensitive to discriminating speech 
characteristics (i.e., intensifiers and gestures), and thus did not use them to 
make their judgments. Although, they tended to use some other speech 
characteristics in line with our theoretical assumptions (e.g., hedges, 
hesitations, questioning forms, long, indirect evasive answers and voice 
loudness), the observed relationships between these ratings and objective 
identification accuracy were in the opposite direction or not present at all.  
In sum, observers’ utilization of speech style characteristics was more 
appropriate when identification statements were presented without additional 
descriptions. When descriptions, and hence more persuasive content 
arguments were present, speech style was not used to judge identification 
accuracy at all. In line with these findings, Hosman et al. (2002) concluded 
that the effects of speech style are assumed to be generally small, 
particularly in comparison to the persuasive effects of argument strength. 
These findings are in line with Reinhard and colleagues’ dual process theory 
accounts of detecting deception (e.g., Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & 
Marksteiner, 2011). 
Perceived Description Qualities 
As only less is known about ratings of person, event and crime scene 
descriptions and their persuasive impact on observers’ judgments of 
identification accuracy, different ratings of description quality were collected 
in the present study. It was expected that observers would heavily rely on 
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easily accessible qualities like the perceived description detailedness, the 
perceived cognitive effort to make a description (cf. interpersonal reality 
monitoring approach: Mitchell & Johnson, 2000) as well as on different 
aspects reflecting witness confidence. 
In line with these expectations, description qualities were rated much 
more favorable when identifications were perceived as correct compared to 
identifications perceived as incorrect (person descriptions: rpb = 0.45; event 
and crime scene descriptions: rpb = 0.44).  
However, there was no effect of description presence on observers’ 
judgment accuracy suggesting that perceived description qualities did not 
seem to help observers to correctly discriminate between correct and 
incorrect identifications. 
Ratings of person descriptions. 
Although ratings of person description qualities explained 42% of the 
variance in observers’ judgments, only 17% of the variance in objective 
identification accuracy was explained (Figure 4). Observers heavily relied on 
the perceived accuracy (rpb = .49), the perceived congruence (rpb = .46; cf. 
results by Bradfield & Wells, 2000), the perceived witness confidence (rpb = 
.34) as well as the perceived quality of the witness’s picture in mind (rpb = 
.33). Although not significant, all further description characteristics (except 
the ratings of the witness’s admission of memory gaps) were moderately 
weighted by observers. 
In contrast, none of the ratings were valid indicators of objective 
identification accuracy. Nevertheless, there were nonsignificant tendencies 
for perceived congruence (rpb = .23), perceived description difficulty (rpb = -
.19) as well as perceived witness’s response latency (rpb = -.20) to 
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discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications. High 
correspondences between ecological validities and subjective utilities were 
observed for the perceived description difficulty and the witness’s response 
latency only. Consequently, correspondence between ecological validates 
and subjective utilities was still moderate (ICC = .64). 
In sum, observers overestimated the discriminative value of the 
investigated person description qualities. An attributed good memory for the 
perpetrator combined with a high witness confidence was intuitively 
associated with good identification performance (cf. Bell & Loftus, 1988, 
1989; Wells & Leippe, 1981). However, objective relationships between 
these ratings and identification accuracy could not be shown in the present 
study. Thus, the US Supreme court’s recommendation (Neil vs. Biggers, 
1972) to use the perceived person description’s accuracy to evaluate an 
identification decision is only partially supported by the present results. 
Ratings of event and crime scene descriptions. 
Ratings explained 55% of the variance in observers’ judgments, 
whereas only 26% of the variance in objective identification accuracy was 
explained (Figure 5). Correspondence between ecological validities and 
subjective validities (ICC = .37) was low. Although none of the individual 
ratings significantly discriminated between correct and incorrect 
identifications (all rpbs between -.16 and .19), observers overestimated the 
discriminative value of perceived event and crime scene description 
qualities, and used several description qualities to make their judgments. 
Observers used cues as indicators of a good memory, that is, 
perceived usefulness (rpb = .44) and perceived accuracy of the event (rpb = 
.33) and crime scene descriptions (rpb = .42), to infer a good identification 
Experiment 3: Indirect Measures 194 
performance. Especially description consistency (rpb = .41) and the 
reconstructability of the event (rpb = .43), that is, the absence of 
contradictions and a logical structure, seemed to be persuasive (cf. Berman 
& Cutler, 1996; Berman et al., 1995). 
As expected, the perceived number of details was higher for 
identifications judged as correct than for those judged as incorrect (rpb = .46). 
However, this held true only for relevant event details. Scene details and 
irrelevant details were not persuasive, which contradicts the results by Wells 
and Leippe (1981) and Bell and Loftus (1988, 1989). Thus, the simple 
decision rule “the more arguments the better” which was derived from the 
ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), as well as suggestions from the 
interpersonal reality monitoring approach (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 
2004) found only partial support. Instead, more content related description 
aspects (e.g., consistency) seem to affect observers’ judgments more 
heavily 
Moreover, short response latencies were associated with higher 
perceived identification accuracy (rpb = -.38), which is in line with the 
interpersonal reality monitoring approach (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 
in press). Witnesses responding fast convey the impression that they do not 
need to search their memory for the correct answer or have to engage in 
extensive deliberations or other reflective processes. Thus, they seem 
confident and credible regarding their own memory. Similarly, Kaminski and 
Sporer (2016) showed that observers used ratings of identification response 
time and identification difficulty as well as perceived presence of 
deliberations as indicators of incorrect identifications. 
Experiment 3: Indirect Measures 195 
Conclusions and Practical Implications 
To sum up, observer judgments of perceived accuracy of an 
identification decision indeed seem to be affected by certain peripheral cues. 
However, observers tend to overestimate the discriminative value of these 
cues (except for speech style ratings). Observers’ subjective impression of a 
witness demonstrating a good memory for the event and the target as well 
as high confidence seem to be most powerful to affect observers’ judgments. 
Thus, observers do not only consider central, content related aspects of an 
eyewitness’s testimony, but also use some less valid heuristic decision rules 
to make their judgments. But only few of these peripheral measures were 
valid indicators of objective identification accuracy which resulted in low 
correspondences between ecological validities and subjective utilities. Taken 
together, this pattern explains fact finders’ low judgment accuracies 
observed in former studies (e.g., Wells & Lindsay, 1983).  
Based on the present and other studies, we recommend fact finders 
to concentrate on those aspects of a testimony that have been shown to be 
reliably related to identification accuracy (e.g., post-identification confidence, 
response latency, automatic and effortless decision processes: e.g., Brewer 
& Wells, 2006; Kaminski & Sporer, 2016; Sauerland & Sporer, 2007, 2009; ; 
Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004; Wells, 1984), and to ignore 
invalid aspects.  
Based on the present study, one fruitful peripheral indicator of 
identification accuracy is the subjective impression of the witness’s 
confidence that is formed by observers when think-aloud protocols were 
used. Moreover, certain witness’s speech style characteristics discriminated 
between correct and incorrect identifications. However, the effects of speech 
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style depended on the presence of person and event descriptions. The 
perceived congruence between the target description and the person 
identified should be considered as well, provided that future research 
corroborates this relationship. 
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 Tables 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings of Witness Traits for (1) 
Objectively and (2) Perceived Correct and Incorrect Identifications 
  Incorrect ID   Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD   M SD            gu [95% CI] 
Objective Identification Accuracy 
Likeability 4.79 0.47   4.76 0.63 -0.05 [-0.61, 0.50] 
Trustworthiness 4.98 0.56   5.00 0.69 0.03 [-0.53, 0.58] 
Knowledge 4.44 0.59   4.46 0.70 0.03 [-0.53, 0.59] 
Confidence 4.38 0.50   4.50 0.66 0.20 [-0.36, 0.76] 
Perceived Identification Accuracy 
Likeability 4.72 0.56   4.81 0.55 0.17 [-0.41, 0.74] 
Trustworthiness 4.82 0.66   5.09 0.59 0.43 [-0.16, 1.01] 
Knowledge 4.25 0.65   4.57 0.61 0.50 [-0.09, 1.08] 
Confidence 4.12 0.57   4.63 0.52 0.94 [0.33, 1.54]  
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence 
interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences (p < .05) and 
effect sizes. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Speech Style Ratings for Objectively Correct and Incorrect Identifications (N = 48) Presented Without 
(Identification Only) and With Descriptions (Identification and Descriptions) 
  Total   Identification only   Identification and descriptions 
  Incorrect ID   Correct ID     Incorrect ID   Correct ID     Incorrect ID   Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD   M SD gu [95% CI]   M SD   M SD gu [95% CI]   M SD   M SD gu [95% CI] 
Hedges 4.04 0.85   4.07 1.08 0.04 
[-0.52, 0.59] 
  4.45 0.99   3.96 1.35 -0.41 
[-0.97, 0.15] 
  3.63 1.05   4.19 1.01 0.54 
[-0.03, 1.10] 
Intensifiers 2.78 0.47   3.13 0.60 0.63 
[0.05, 1.20]  
  3.08 0.74   3.39 0.95 0.35 
[-0.21, 0.91] 
  2.48 0.53   2.86 0.64 0.64 
[0.07, 1.21]  
Hesitations 4.17 1.00   3.79 1.12 -0.35 
[-0.91, 0.21] 
  4.35 1.31   3.60 1.33 -0.56 
[-1.13, 0.01] 
  3.99 1.15   3.98 1.07 -0.01 
[-0.57, 0.55] 
Questioning 
forms 
3.11 0.72   3.04 0.88 -0.08 
[-0.64, 0.47] 
  3.40 1.06   3.14 1.10 -0.24 
[-0.80, 0.32] 
  2.82 0.69   2.95 0.83 0.16 
[-0.40, 0.72] 
Gestures 2.82 0.60   3.24 1.18 0.44 
[-0.12, 1.01] 
  3.28 0.82   3.42 1.34 0.12 
[-0.44, 0.68] 
  2.35 0.60   3.06 1.30 0.69 
[0.11, 1.26]  
Formal grammar 4.49 0.82   4.48 0.92 -0.01 
[-0.57, 0.54] 
  4.48 1.08   4.35 1.09 -0.11 
[-0.67, 0.44] 
  4.50 0.91   4.60 0.96 0.11 
[-0.45, 0.67] 
Polite forms 5.01 0.60   4.85 0.79 -0.23 
[-0.79, 0.33] 
  5.08 0.72   4.75 1.01 -0.37 
[-0.94, 0.19] 
  4.94 0.76   4.95 0.68 0.01 
[-0.54, 0.57] 
Long, indirect, 
evasive answers 
3.32 0.82   3.08 1.05 -0.24 
[-0.80, 0.31] 
  3.82 1.02   3.16 1.17 -0.60 
[-1.17, -0.03]  
  2.81 0.89   3.01 1.12 0.19 
[-0.37, 0.75] 
Speech rate 3.37 0.58   3.70 0.49 0.61 
[0.04, 1.18]  
  3.44 0.70   3.91 0.62 0.70 
[0.12, 1.27]  
  3.30 0.63   3.50 0.63 0.31 
[-0.25, 0.87] 
Voice Loudness 4.19 0.86   4.01 0.61 -0.25 
[-0.81, 0.31] 
  4.38 0.93   4.18 0.86 -0.22 
[-0.78, 0.34] 
  4.01 0.94   3.83 0.56 -0.23 
[-0.78, 0.33] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences (p < .05) and effect 
sizes.
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Observer Speech Style Ratings for Perceived Correct and Incorrect Identifications (N = 48) Presented Without 
(Identification Only) and With Descriptions (Identification and Descriptions) 
  Total   Identification only   Identification and descriptions 
  Perceived Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID     
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID     
Perceived 
Incorrect ID   
Perceived 
Correct ID   
Observer ratings M SD   M SD gu [95% CI]   M SD   M SD gu [95% CI]   M SD   M SD gu [95% CI] 
Hedges 4.44 0.99   3.82 0.88 -0.66 
[-1.25, -0.07]  
  4.65 1.22   3.93 1.11 -0.61 
[-1.20, -0.03]  
  4.24 1.04   3.71 1.04 -0.50 
[-1.08, 0.08] 
Intensifiers 2.90 0.53   2.99 0.59 0.16 
[-0.42, 0.73] 
  3.19 0.89   3.26 0.85 0.07 
[-0.50, 0.65] 
  2.60 0.61   2.72 0.63 0.19 
[-0.39, 0.77] 
Hesitations 4.22 0.77   3.84 1.21 -0.35 
[-0.93, 0.22] 
  4.21 1.21   3.84 1.45 -0.26 
[-0.84, 0.31] 
  4.24 0.89   3.83 1.20 -0.36 
[-0.94, 0.22] 
Questioning 
forms 
3.47 0.90   2.84 0.62 -0.83 
[-1.43, -0.23]  
  3.83 1.12   2.93 0.90 -0.90 
[-1.50, -0.30]  
  3.10 0.94   2.76 0.60 -0.45 
[-1.03, 0.13] 
Gestures 2.97 1.04   3.06 0.92 0.09 
[-0.48, 0.67] 
  3.32 1.06   3.37 1.14 0.04 
[-0.53, 0.62] 
  2.63 1.17   2.76 1.01 0.12 
[-0.45, 0.70] 
Formal grammar 4.21 0.90   4.65 0.82 0.51 
[-0.07, 1.10] 
  4.13 1.13   4.59 1.02 0.43 
[-0.15, 1.01] 
  4.29 0.89   4.71 0.93 0.45 
[-0.13, 1.03] 
Polite forms 4.79 0.79   5.01 0.63 0.31 
[-0.27, 0.89] 
  4.85 0.94   4.96 0.86 0.12 
[-0.45, 0.70] 
  4.74 0.81   5.07 0.63 0.46 
[-0.12, 1.05] 
Long, indirect, 
evasive answers 
3.42 0.85   3.07 0.99 -0.36 
[-0.94, 0.22] 
  3.69 1.03   3.37 1.19 -0.28 
[-0.86, 0.29] 
  3.14 0.97   2.78 1.02 -0.36 
[-0.94, 0.22] 
Speech rate 3.45 0.55   3.59 0.56 0.24 
[-0.34, 0.82] 
  3.61 0.80   3.71 0.64 0.14 
[-0.44, 0.71] 
  3.29 0.56   3.47 0.67 0.27 
[-0.30, 0.85] 
Voice Loudness 4.08 0.77   4.11 0.74 0.05 
[-0.53, 0.62] 
  4.29 0.90   4.27 0.90 -0.03 
[-0.60, 0.55] 
  3.86 0.81   3.96 0.76 0.12 
[-0.45, 0.70] 
Note. gu = corrected standardized mean difference [and 95% confidence interval]; Bold values represent significant mean differences (p < .05) and effect 
sizes. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of witness 
traits and objective and perceived identification accuracy (Pearson 
correlations). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 2. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of speech 
style and objective and perceived identification accuracy (Pearson 
correlations) in the identification-only condition. Bold values are significant at 
p < .05. 
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Figure 3. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between ratings of speech 
style and objective and perceived identification accuracy (Pearson 
correlations) in the identification plus description condition. Bold values are 
significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 4. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between person 
description ratings and objective and perceived identification accuracy 
(Pearson correlations). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 5. Brunswikian lens model of relationships between event and crime 
scene description ratings and objective and perceived identification accuracy 
(Pearson correlations). Bold values are significant at p < .05. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Ratings of Person Description Qualities (Only in the Description Condition) 
Rating variables Anchors 
(1) How accurate is the description? 1 = Not accurate at all;  
7 = Absolutely accurate 
(2) How many details are described? 1 = Very few; 7 = Many 
(3) How precise are the details described? 1 = Not precise at all;  
7 = Very precise 
(4) How informative is the description (i.e., is 
it possible to find a person in a crowd 
based on this description?) 
1 = Not informative at all;  
7 = Very informative 
(5) Did the description match the appearance 
of the  person identified in the lineup? 
1 = No match at all;  
7 = Perfect match 
(6) Was the description consistent? 1 = Not consistent at all;  
7 = Very consistent 
(7) How useful do you think the description is 
for the criminal investigation? 
1 = Not useful at all;  
7 = Very useful 
(8) How confident was the witness regarding 
his/her memory? 
1 = Not confident at all;  
7 = Very confident 
(9) How difficult was it for the witness to 
describe the perpetrator? 
1 = Very easy;  
7 = Very difficult 
(10) How much time did the witness need to 
answer the questions? 
1 = A very short time;  
7 = A very long time 
(11) Did the witness have a good picture of the 
perpetrator in mind? 
1 = No picture at all;  
7 = Very good picture 
(12) How often did the witness admit memory 
failures? 
1 = Never; 7 = Very often 
(13) How often did the witness explain his/her 
thoughts while describing the perpetrator? 
1 = Never; 7 = Very often 
 
Experiment 3: Indirect Measures 219 
Appendix B 
Ratings of Event and Crime Scene Description Qualities (Only in the 
Description Condition) 
Rating variables Anchors 
Ratings of event descriptions only 
(1) How accurate is the event description? 1 = Not accurate at all;  
7 = Absolutely accurate 
(2) How many relevant event details are described? 1 = Very few; 7 = Many 
(3) How many irrelevant event details are described? 1 = Very few; 7 = Many 
(4) How precise are the event details described? 1 = Not precise at all;  
7 = Very precise 
(5) To what extent is it possible to reconstruct the event? 1 = Very difficult;  
7 = Very easy 
Ratings of crime scene descriptions only 
(6) How accurate is the crime scene description? 1 = Not accurate at all;  
7 = absolutely accurate 
(7) How many relevant crime scene details are described? 1 = Very few; 7 = Many 
(8) How many irrelevant crime scene details are described? 1 = Very few; 7 = Many 
(9) How precise are the crime scene details described? 1 = Not precise at all;  
7 = Very precise 
(10) To what extent is it possible to reconstruct the crime 
scene? 
1 = Very difficult;  
7 = Very easy 
Ratings of both event and crime scene descriptions 
(11) Were the descriptions consistent? 1 = Not consistent at all;  
7 = Very consistent 
(12) How useful do you think the descriptions are for the 
criminal investigation? 
1 = Not useful at all;  
7 = Very useful 
(13) How confident was the witness regarding his/her 
memory? 
1 = Not confident at all;  
7 = Very confident 
(14) How difficult was it for the witness to describe the event 
and the crime scene? 
1 = Very easy;  
7 = Very difficult 
(15) How much time did the witness need to answer the 
questions? 
1 = A very short time;  
7 = A very long time 
(16) Did the witness have a good picture of the event and the 
crime scene in mind? 
1 = No picture at all;  
7 = Very good picture 
(17) How often did the witness admit memory failures? 1 = Never;  
7 = Very often 
(18) How often did the witness explain his/her thoughts while 
describing the event and the crime scene? 
1 = Never;  
7 = Very often 
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Appendix C 
Ratings of the Witness’s Speech Style  
 Rating variables 
(1)a The witness uses lots of hedges, that is, weakening words that do 
not allow a clear statement (e.g., "I think", "perhaps", "kind of"). 
(2)a The witness uses lots of intensifiers to emphasize what he/she said 
(e.g., "very", "definitely", "totally"). 
(3)a The witness uses lots of hesitations with or without filler words (e.g., 
"ok", "uh", "well"). 
(4)a The witness uses lots of questioning forms (i.e., the use of a rising, 
questioning intonation). 
(5)a The witness uses lots of gestures to emphasize what he/she said. 
(6)a The witness uses an especially formal grammar (e.g., complete and 
grammatically correct sentences). 
(7)a The witness uses lots of polite forms. 
(8) The witness gives lots of long, evasive and indirect answers. 
(9) The witness speaks very fast. 
(10) The witness speaks very loud. 
Note. a Items were adapted from Erickson et al. (1978) and O’Barr (1982); 
Endpoints of the scales were from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much. 
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Appendix D 
Ratings of Perceived Witness Traits 
 Rating variables 
The witness appears to be! 
(1)a Friendly (11)a Confident (21) Credible 
(2)a Respectful (12)a Well-spoken (22) Convinced 
(3)a Kind (13)a Relaxed (23) Extraverted 
(4)a Well-mannered (14)a Poised (24) Confused 
(5)a Pleasant (15)a Self-assured (25) Optimistic 
(6)a Trustworthy (16)a Informed (26) Reserved 
(7)a Truthful (17)a Logical (27) Spontaneous 
(8)a Dependable (18)a Educated (28) Attractive 
(9)a Honest (19)a Wise (29)b Calm 
(10)a Reliable (20)a Scientific (30)b Nervous 
The witness seemed to! 
(31)b ... control his/her behavior. 
(32)b ... feel comfortable. 
(33)b ... organize his/her thoughts. 
(34)b ... admit memory failures. 
(35)b ... act natural. 
(36)b ... think hard. 
(37) ... be prepared for the interrogation. 
Note. a Items 1 to 20 were adapted from the Witness Credibility Scale 
(Brodsky et al., 2010); b Items 29 to 36 were adapted from the Observed 
Witness Efficacy Scale (Cramer et al., 2013); Endpoints of the scales were 
from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much. 
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Appendix E 
Means, Standard Deviations and Internal Consistencies (Cronbach's alpha) of 
Observer Rating Scales (Likeability, Trustworthiness, Knowledge and 
Confidence) as well as Corrected Item-Total Correlations (CITC) of the 
Original Items 
 Identification only  Identification and descriptions 
Scales and items M SD CITC  M SD CITC 
Likeability 4.78 0.63 alpha = .89  4.78 0.59 alpha = .91 
 Friendlya 5.15 0.68 .90  5.18 0.64 .84 
 Respectfula 5.23 0.69 .70  4.99 0.56 .72 
 Kinda 4.46 0.68 .77  4.54 0.61 .85 
 Well-mannereda 5.17 0.76 .70  5.15 0.68 .79 
 Pleasanta 4.86 0.76 .91  4.80 0.71 .85 
 Attractive 3.80 1.02 .48  4.01 0.98 .60 
Trustworthiness 
 
4.98 0.68 alpha = .95  4.99 0.72 alpha = .97 
 Trustworthya 4.82 0.79 .86  4.86 0.78 .93 
 Truthfula 5.21 0.63 .82  5.11 0.75 .83 
 Dependablea 4.70 0.83 .88  4.76 0.78 .91 
 Honesta 5.51 0.56 .78  5.47 0.72 .86 
 Reliablea 4.77 0.83 .91  4.76 0.87 .92 
 Credible 4.89 0.88 .88  4.99 0.73 .91 
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Appendix E (continued) 
 Identification only  Identification and descriptions 
Scales and items M SD CITC  M SD CITC 
Knowledge 4.47 0.75 alpha = .95  4.43 0.69 alpha = .95 
 Informeda 4.24 0.90 .85  4.35 0.77 .79 
 Logicala 4.71 0.89 .89  4.72 0.72 .88 
 Educateda 5.02 0.69 .77  4.89 0.70 .83 
 Wisea 4.97 0.71 .81  5.10 0.76 .82 
 Scientifica 3.95 0.94 .83  3.94 0.91 .81 
 Well-spokenb 4.42 0.80 .70  4.53 0.95 .83 
 Organized thoughts 4.56 0.95 .86  4.63 0.83 .91 
 Prepared for interrogation 3.84 1.10 .81  3.31 0.75 .63 
Confidence 4.44 0.70 alpha = .93  4.44 0.59 alpha = .92 
 Confidenta 4.51 0.89 .90  4.36 0.77 .81 
 Relaxeda 4.10 0.85 .82  4.16 0.74 .87 
 Poiseda 4.48 0.72 .67  4.45 0.67 .84 
 Self-assureda 4.63 0.88 .81  4.58 0.71 .77 
 Calm 4.59 0.85 .49  4.61 0.83 .40 
 Feeling 
comfortable 4.11 0.79 .69  3.82 0.72 .87 
 Nervous (-) 4.53 0.95 .73  4.58 0.93 .73 
 Confused (-) 4.87 1.21 .76  5.54 0.86 .64 
 Convinced 4.35 1.25 .74  4.36 0.93 .75 
 Extraverted 4.03 0.68 .47  3.95 0.71 .38 
 Optimistic 4.68 0.87 .83  4.38 0.72 .68 
Note. a These items were also part of this scale in Brodsky et al. (2010), the 
other items were added by us; b In Brodsky et al. (2010) this item was part of 
the Confidence scale; (-) The item was recoded to build the scale. 
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 DISCUSSION 
This dissertation reported three experiments investigating how to 
increase eyewitness identification accuracy and how to explain fact finders’ 
judgmental processes when evaluating eyewitness identification decisions. 
In Experiment 1, re-reading one’s own person description prior to the 
identification task (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler, Penrod, 
O’Rourke, & Martens, 1986; Sporer, 2007) has been shown to be a 
promising system variable to increase correct identification decisions. 
Challenging former research on the verbal overshadowing effect (VOE: 
Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) the present results 
suggest beneficial effects of describing the perpetrator on identification 
accuracy.  
Experiment 2 and 3 shed light on fact finders’ judgmental processes 
when evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision. Subjective utilities 
(i.e., which cues do observers use to make their judgments and how do they 
interpret and weight them) and ecological validities (i.e., which cues are 
objectively related to identification accuracy; Brunswikian lens model: 
Brunswik 1956, 1965) of different eyewitness characteristics were 
contrasted. Experiment 2 focused on observers' ratings of several meta-
memory variables and suggested the use of videotaped think-aloud 
protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) as a fruitful method to make objectively 
valid indicators of identification accuracy more salient, and thus more 
perceivable and usable by observers. Experiment 3 demonstrated that 
observer judgments were also affected by indirect and more peripheral 
eyewitness characteristics (i.e., the subjective impression of certain witness 
traits, the attributed power of the witness’s speech style as well as different 
Discussion 225 
 description qualities). However, almost none of these indirect measures 
have been shown to be diagnostic of identification accuracy. 
In the following sections the main results of each experiment are 
discussed. Practical recommendations to improve identification accuracy as 
well as to improve fact finders’ judgment accuracy when evaluating 
identification decisions are derived. For a more detailed discussion see the 
discussion section of each experiment. 
How to Increase Identification Accuracy: Beneficial Effects of Person 
Descriptions 
Experiment 1 was aimed to investigate potentially beneficial effects of 
describing the perpetrator on subsequent identification performance. 
Especially, re-reading one’s own person descriptions was investigated as a 
system variable to increase identification accuracy (cf. Cutler et al., 1987; 
Cutler et al., 1986; Sporer, 2007). Therefore, a no description control group, 
a description only group and a description plus re-reading group had to 
identify the perpetrator in a target-absent [TA] or a target-present [TP] lineup 
after a delay of two days or five weeks.  
Results are in line with Anderson’ s (1983) theory of an associative 
memory network, assuming that re-reading one’s own descriptions re-
activates the encoding context in which the target face is embedded 
resulting in better identification performance. A significant identification 
advantage for re-readers compared to the no description control group was 
observed, with the odds for re-readers to make a correct identification 
decision being more than three times as high as the odds for the control 
group. Especially, in TA lineups the odds of making a correct rejection were 
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 eight times higher for re-readers than for the control group. The robustness 
of these results was corroborated by meta-analytical findings demonstrating 
a significant mean weighted effect size (OR = 2.15, 95% CI [1.34, 3.44], k = 
4; cf. Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) for correct identification decisions (i.e., hits and 
correct rejections), as well as for correct rejections in TA lineups (OR = 2.74, 
95% CI [1.27, 5.92], k = 4).  
In contrast to former research on the verbal overshadowing effect 
(Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990), the present 
results demonstrated that describing a perpetrator does not impair 
identification performance when a delay of more than two days was included 
which is more representative of real crime situations (cf. findings in Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001; Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2015) and when conservative 
description instructions were used that do not encourage the witness to 
generate false description details. No traditional VOE was found. Instead, 
the effect tended to be annihilated and even reversed. The odds of a correct 
identification decision were almost three times larger when witnesses were 
asked to give a description (i.e., both description groups were joined) 
compared to the control group, demonstrating a beneficial effect of 
verbalizing the perpetrator’s physical appearance. As an explanation 
memory advantages due to early first retrieval attempts are assumed (cf. the 
testing effect: McDermott, Arnold, & Nelson, 2014; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006), which have been shown to be effective especially after long delays 
(Butler & Roediger, 2007). 
In sum, the present results clearly contradict the instructions of the 
British Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Code D, p. 53), to prevent 
eyewitnesses to “be reminded of any photograph or description of the 
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 suspect or any given other indication as to the suspect’s identity” prior to the 
identification procedure. Instead, based on the present findings 
eyewitnesses explicitly should be reminded of their prior description by re-
reading it to activate the associative memory network in which the original 
target face is embedded (cf. Anderson, 1983). Moreover, it should be noted, 
that describing the perpetrator--as it is an indispensable police practice 
anyway--does not impair identification performance. However, practitioners 
should be warned not to encourage witnesses to guess or generate false 
description details. To conclude, the re-reading procedure is an easily 
applicable and useful police practice to increase identification accuracy that 
does not require special trainings or any additional resources. 
How to Increase Observers’ Judgment Accuracy: The Use of 
Videotaped Think-Aloud Protocols 
As not only misidentifications per se, but also erroneous evaluations 
of identification decision have been shown to lead to judicial errors (cf. 
Garrett, 2011; www.innocenceproject.org), the following experiments asked 
for a deeper understanding of fact finders’ judgment processes to explain 
their judgment accuracy. 
Experiment 2 focused on observers’ perception, interpretation and 
use of several meta-cognitive variables that have been shown to be related 
to identification accuracy in former studies using witnesses’ self-reports 
(e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 
2007; Wells, 1984; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015). 
Thus, observer-participants rated several variables measuring the perceived 
confidence, decision time, identification difficulty and perceptual basis as 
well as perceived decision processes of 48 choosers’ identification 
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 decisions. It was examined if these variables as perceived by observers 
discriminate between correct and incorrect identification decisions and if 
observers use these cues appropriately to make their judgments. According 
to Leippe’s (1994) validity-intuition model, judgment accuracy should 
increase if observers intuitively use highly valid cues and ignore invalid cues. 
It was demonstrated that eyewitness identification protocols, either 
presented as written transcripts (Study 1) or videotapes (Study 2), contain 
valid indicators of identification accuracy that were perceivable for observers 
only when think-aloud protocols (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993) were used in 
contrast to retrospective reasoning statements. In particular, when 
videotaped think-aloud protocols were presented to observers (Study 2) 
ratings of perceived perceptual basis, perceived confidence, perceived 
automatic as well as perceived absolute decision processes were higher for 
correct than for incorrect identifications. In contrast, ratings of perceived 
decision time and difficulty and perceived deliberate and effortful decision 
processes were lower for correct than for incorrect identifications.  
Similar results have been shown in former research on the 
“postdictive” value of these variables since many years, however focusing on 
witnesses’ self-reports (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 
2007, 2009; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 
1995). The present results show, that videotaped think-aloud protocols allow 
observers to appropriately assess these variables inasmuch as they 
discriminate between correct and incorrect identifications even without 
asking eyewitnesses to retrospectively evaluate their identification decision. 
In line with Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) claim that people are unable to 
correctly explain causes for their decision afterwards as well as to the extent 
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 that witness self-reports are often biased (e.g., Steblay, Wells, Bradfield 
Douglass, 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), think-aloud procedures seem to 
serve as an useful alternative to make discriminating cues more salient for 
observers. In the present experiment, videotaped think-aloud protocols have 
been shown to help observers to detect witnesses who are beating around 
the bush (i.e., witnesses who make effortful, deliberative and time-
consuming decisions) and to distinguish them from those who rely on their 
memory and make absolute and automatic decisions.  
As these effects are mainly restricted to the use of videotaped think-
aloud protocols, it is assumed that videotapes of eyewitnesses verbalizing 
their thoughts during the identification task facilitate the perception of 
discriminating cues by displaying additional nonverbal and paraverbal cues 
(e.g., speech style characteristics, response latencies and facial 
expressions) that are not contained in literally transcribed think-aloud 
protocols. However, it is noteworthy that the present studies did not allow 
statistical comparisons of both conditions. Thus, effects of presentation 
medium have to be treated with caution. 
However, the presence of valid indicators of identification accuracy 
alone is not sufficient to increase judgment accuracy. Instead, observers 
also have to be sensitive to these discriminative cues and have to interpret 
and use them appropriately. In both studies, observers used almost all of the 
investigated cues to make their judgments and interpreted them as 
theoretically expected. For example, in line with the interpersonal reality 
monitoring approach (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sporer, 2004) an increased 
number of cognitive operations (i.e., deliberations, which are reflected in 
high response latencies and a perceived high difficulty to make a choice) 
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 was perceived as an indicator of an erroneous memory, whereas automatic 
decisions were more likely to be perceived as correct.  
However, the Brunswikian analyses revealed that correspondence 
between ecological validities and subjective utilities, that is, an appropriate 
usage and weighting of valid and invalid cues, differed due to type of 
decision protocol. In the retrospective reasoning conditions of both studies 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective utilities was 
poor. Although observers heavily relied on almost all cues to make their 
judgments, cues were non-diagnostic of identification accuracy (except for 
automatic and eliminative decision processes). Thus, with retrospective 
reasoning protocols, which usually are used to ask witnesses to explain their 
identification decision afterwards, an appropriate assessment of valid 
indicators of identification accuracy is problematic and thus correct observer 
judgments are unlikely. 
In contrast, in the think-aloud conditions of both studies, 
correspondence between ecological validities and subjective validities was 
moderate to high. Especially when videotaped think-aloud protocols were 
used were there several cues that discriminated between correct and 
incorrect identifications, which were appropriately used and weighted by 
observers. As a result, in the videotaped think-aloud condition a marginal 
increase in observers’ judgment accuracy (70.8%) was observed compared 
to the videotaped retrospective reasoning condition (56.3%). However, the 
difference did not reach statistical significance, which is probably due to the 
small sample size in Study 2. Unfortunately, when literally transcribed think-
aloud protocols were used judgment accuracy was relatively poor (58.3% 
compared to 51.4% in the retrospective-reasoning condition). This finding is 
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 attributed to the overall low discriminative value of the investigated cues in 
this condition. Thus, even a theoretically appropriate use of these cues was 
not sufficient to increase observers’ judgment accuracy.  
In sum, videotaped think-aloud protocols of the original identification 
decision may serve as a promising method to increase fact finders’ judgment 
accuracies by making valid indicators of identification accuracy more salient 
and thus more perceivable and usable by observers. Importantly, the 
present results demonstrate that witness self-report measures could be 
replaced by observer ratings to prevent fact finders’ from relying on biased 
witness statements at trial (e.g., inflated confidence statements due to post-
identification feedback effects: Steblay, Wells, & Bradfield Douglass, 2014; 
Bradfield Douglass & Jones, 2013). Future researchers are encouraged to 
replicate these findings and to optimize think-aloud instructions to be used 
with identification decisions. Perhaps improving think-aloud instructions 
would increase judgment accuracy not only when videotapes are used but 
also when transcripts are presented.  
Finally, the present results support the common recommendation to 
videotape a witness’s original identification decision (e.g., Sporer, 1992, 
1993; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe 1998). In line 
with the present findings, videotapes are needed to record the witnesses’ 
nonverbal and paraverbal behavior during the identification, which has been 
shown to expose valid markers of identification accuracy. Additionally, 
videotapes are needed to record the lineup instructions given to the 
eyewitness, to preserve the actual appearance of the lineup as well as to 
uncover any suggestive police officers’ behaviors (cf. Garrett, 2011; Sporer, 
1992, 1993; Wells et al., 1998). 
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 Persuasive Effects of Indirect Measures on Observer Judgments 
In Experiment 2, it was assumed that videotapes of a witness’s 
identification decision display several peripheral witness aspects (i.e., 
nonverbal and paraverbal behaviors) that contribute to affect observer 
judgments. This assumption is in line with typical two-process models of 
persuasion (e.g., Elaboration Likelihood Model: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that 
distinguish between persuasive effects of central and content-related 
message aspects on the one hand and peripheral message characteristics 
and heuristic decision rules on the other hand (e.g., length of the testimony, 
message delivery style, perceived witness credibility). As Experiment 2 
primarily focused on content-related aspects of an identification decision, 
Experiment 3 investigated the persuasive impact of more peripheral aspects 
and simple heuristics of a witness’s testimony on observer judgments of 
identification accuracy. In particular, observer ratings of certain witness 
traits, speech style characteristics and different easily accessible description 
qualities were examined. 
Results demonstrated that observers heavily relied on their subjective 
impression of the overall witness’s confidence (cf. Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 
1988; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979) and slightly tended to be affected 
by the perceived witness’s trustworthiness and knowledge (cf. Witness 
Credibility Scale: Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010). However, none of these 
ratings was related to objective identification accuracy, except for confidence 
ratings in the think-aloud condition (i.e., in this condition higher perceived 
confidence was an indicator of a correct identification). This finding is 
comparable to the results of Experiment 2 and supports the assumption that 
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 think-aloud protocols seem to facilitate the assessment of valid indicators of 
identification accuracy. 
Persuasive effects of witness speech style characteristics were only 
weak and depended on the presence of additional person and event 
descriptions. When additional descriptions were presented to observers, 
speech characteristics did not affect observer judgments at all, presumably 
due to the large persuasive effects, which were observed for several 
description qualities. In contrast, when identification statements were 
presented without descriptions, two characteristics of a powerless speech 
style (i.e., hedges and questioning forms: Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 
1978; O’Barr, 1982) have been shown to be influential. As former studies 
demonstrated that a powerless speech style is likely to be associated with 
an impression of a less credible and less competent witness (e.g., Hosman 
& Wright, 1987; Jules & McQuiston, 2013; Ruva & Bryant, 2004), observers 
intuitively associated a frequent use of hedges and questioning forms with 
an incorrect identification. 
Although not used by observers, two ecologically valid speech 
characteristics could be found in identification protocols (i.e., few long, 
indirect and evasive answers and a high speech rate were related with a 
correct identification). Former research findings also showed that correct 
identifications are made faster (e.g., Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994) and more 
automatically, that is, with fewer deliberations and with less eliminative 
thought processes (e.g., Dunning & Stern, 1994). Thus, witnesses’ decision 
processes, which have been shown to be valid indicators of identification 
accuracy in Experiment 2, seem to be revealed in the witness’s speech style 
as well. This supports the assumption that videotapes contribute to facilitate 
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 the assessment of some valid indicators of identification accuracy (i.e., 
decision processes and response latency and difficulty) by exposing 
additional peripheral cues (i.e., the witness’s speech style). 
Finally, large persuasive effects of several description qualities were 
observed, although none of these ratings discriminated between correct and 
incorrect identifications. Regarding person description qualities, an attributed 
good memory for the perpetrator as well as a perceived high confidence 
were intuitively associated with a good identification performance (cf. 
conclusions from Bell & Loftus, 1988, 1989; Wells & Leippe, 1981). Although 
courts often recommend to rely on person description quality when 
evaluating the accuracy of an identification decision (cf. Neil vs. Biggers, 
1972; Sporer & Cutler, 2003), present results suggest that observer ratings 
of these qualities do not have any discriminative value.  
In sum, Experiment 3 demonstrated that several peripheral aspects of 
an eyewitness’s testimony that are not directly linked to the identification 
decision affect observers’ judgments. However, observer ratings of these 
characteristics were non-diagnostic of identification accuracy (except for 
some speech style characteristics). Although Experiment 2 suggested the 
use of videotaped identification decisions to facilitate the perception of valid 
indicators of identification accuracy, Experiment 3 showed that many invalid 
aspects become visible as well. Thus, an inappropriately high weighting of 
those peripheral aspects might contribute to explain fact finders’ low abilities 
to correctly evaluate identification performance (e.g., Beaudry, Lindsay, 
Leach, Mansour, Bertrand, Kalmet, 2015; Wells & Lindsay, 1983). Perhaps 
informing fact finders about these obstructive influences might help to 
increase the accuracy of their evaluations. 
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 Limitations and Practical Implications 
Based on this dissertation practical recommendations can be derived 
to increase eyewitness identification accuracy and to facilitate its evaluation. 
However, it should be noted, that the present findings are solely based on 
experimental laboratory data and online surveys. Thus, generalization to real 
cases is supposed to be limited. Therefore, the replication of the present 
findings in field studies and with real identification decisions is highly 
recommended. 
Conclusions. 
(1) Witnesses should be asked to re-read their own person description prior 
to the identification task. 
(2) Think-aloud instructions should be optimized for their use in identification 
procedures to make valid indicators of identification accuracy more 
salient to observers and thus to increase their judgment accuracy. As a 
result, valid observer ratings could replace error-prone witness self-
reports to judge identification accuracy. 
(3) Identification decisions should always be videotaped for later evaluations. 
(4) Fact finders should be made aware of factors that validly discriminate 
between correct and incorrect identifications. For these factors weighting 
guidelines should be developed and pilot-tested for their effectiveness. 
Moreover, fact finders should be informed about invalid markers of 
identification decisions that should ideally be ignored.  
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DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wird eine Person Zeuge oder Opfer einer Straftat und berichtet diese 
der Polizei, ist es üblich, dass zunächst nach einer Beschreibung des 
Tathergangs sowie einer detaillierten Täterbeschreibung gefragt wird. Nach 
der Ermittlung eines Tatverdächtigen folgt häufig ein 
Identifizierungsverfahren. Hierzu wird der/die Zeuge/in zu einer 
Wahlgegenüberstellung gebeten oder es wird ihm/ihr eine Lichtbildvorlage 
präsentiert, die das Foto des/der Tatverdächtigen neben einer Reihe von 
Fotos ähnlich aussehender Personen zeigt. Aufgabe des/der Zeugen/in ist 
es anzugeben, ob sich der/die Täter/in unter den gezeigten Personen 
befindet oder nicht.  
Häufig sind genau diese Identifizierungsentscheidungen von 
Zeugen/innen fehlerhaft. Basierend auf Angaben des „Innocence Projects“ 
(www.innocenceproject.org), einer amerikanischen Organisation, die 
Wiederaufnahmeverfahren von fälschlich verurteilten Personen anstrebt, um 
diese durch DNA-Analysen zu entlasten, haben falsche 
Identifizierungsentscheidungen in einer Mehrzahl von Fällen zu 
Justizirrtümern beigetragen (vgl. auch Garrett, 2011, 2012). Die 
rechtspsychologische Forschung versucht daher seit vielen Jahren Faktoren 
zu ermitteln, die die Richtigkeit einer Identifizierungsentscheidung 
bedeutsam beeinflussen (z.B. National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells & 
Olson, 2003). Es lassen sich hierbei Schätz- und Systemvariablen 
unterscheiden (Wells, 1978). Diese wirken auf einem zeitlichen Kontinuum, 
beginnend bei der Wahrnehmung und dem Behalten bis hin zum Abruf der 
Information, auf die Erinnerungsleistung eines/r Zeugen/in ein und stehen 
somit mit der Identifizierungsleistung in Zusammenhang (Sporer, 2008; 
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Sporer & Sauerland, 2008). Schätzvariablen sind solche Faktoren, die sich 
nur nachträglich einschätzen lassen und sich auf die situativen Bedingungen 
während der Tat (z.B. Sichtverhältnisse, Dauer des Verbrechens, Distanz 
zum Täter) sowie auf Merkmale des Täters/der Täterin (z.B. Alter, ethnische 
Zugehörigkeit) und des/der Zeugen/in selbst (z.B. Aufmerksamkeit) 
beziehen. Im Gegensatz dazu umfassen Systemvariablen alle Faktoren, die 
vom Rechtssystem kontrollierbar und somit im Rahmen des Strafprozesses 
modifizierbar sind, um die Identifizierungsrichtigkeit zu erhöhen (z.B. Art und 
Durchführung der Gegenüberstellung). In der vorliegenden Dissertation wird 
das erneute Lesen der eigenen Personenbeschreibung vor einem 
Identifizierungsverfahren als eine Systemvariable untersucht, um die 
Richtigkeit der Identifizierungsentscheidung zu erhöhen (Experiment 1). 
Es sind jedoch nicht allein Falschidentifizierungen, die als Ursache für 
Justizirrtümer herangezogen werden müssen, sondern auch die fälschlichen 
Beurteilungen von Identifizierungsentscheidungen durch Richter und 
Laienrichter (sowie im adversarischen Rechtssystem durch Geschworene; 
vgl. Garrett, 2011). Auf dieser Beurteilungsebene (vgl. Sporer, 2007a) ergibt 
sich die Frage nach validen Kriterien, die zur Bewertung einer 
Identifizierungsaussage herangezogen werden können und daher 
Aufschluss über die Richtigkeit der Identifizierung geben (sog. 
Beurteilungsvariablen: Sporer, 1993; Sporer & Sauerland, 2008).  
In den verschiedenen Rechtssystemen existieren teils 
unterschiedliche Empfehlungen darüber, welche Faktoren bei der 
Beurteilung einer Identifizierungsaussage Beachtung finden sollten (vgl. Neil 
vs. Biggers, 1972; Meurer, Sporer, & Rennig, 1990; Semmler, Brewer, & 
Bradfield Douglass, 2012; Sporer & Cutler, 2003). Auf Forschungsebene 
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wurde die Validität dieser Faktoren häufig untersucht, wobei 
Zusammenhänge zwischen verschiedenen meta-kognitiven Aspekten einer 
Zeugenaussage und der Identifizierungsrichtigkeit festgestellt werden 
konnten (z.B. subjektive Sicherheit eines/r Zeugen/in nach der 
Identifizierung: Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; 
Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015; berichtete 
Entscheidungsprozesse: Dunning & Stern, 1994; Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; 
Wells, 1984). Ebenso stehen nonverbale Aussageaspekte wie 
Entscheidungszeiten (z.B. Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Smith, Lindsay, Pryke, 
2000; Sporer, 1992, 1993, 1994), aber auch objektive Maße der Quantität 
und Qualität von Personenbeschreibungen (z.B. Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, 
2008; Sporer, 1992) mit der Identifizierungsleistung im Zusammenhang und 
können zur Beurteilung herangezogen werden. 
Einige wenige Studien untersuchten auch die Beurteilung von 
Identifizierungsaussagen selbst. Diese konzentrierten sich auf die Fähigkeit 
von Urteilern/innen, zwischen richtigen und falschen Identifizierungen zu 
unterscheiden, wobei die berichteten Urteilsrichtigkeiten meist bei einem 
Zufallsniveau von 50% lagen (z.B. Beaudry, Lindsay, Leach, Mansour, 
Bertrand, & Kalmet, 2015; Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Reardon & Fisher, 
2011; Wells & Lindsay, 1983). Zudem zeigte sich, dass Urteiler/innen sich 
vor allem auf die subjektive Sicherheit von Zeugen/innen stützen (z.B. Wells, 
Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979) und insgesamt nur über ein begrenztes Wissen 
über Faktoren verfügen, welche die Richtigkeit einer 
Identifizierungsentscheidung beeinflussen (z.B. Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, 
Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; Desmarais & Read, 2011). 
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Als mögliche Erklärung für die beobachteten geringen 
Urteilsrichtigkeiten liegt es daher nahe, dass Urteiler/innen bei der 
Bewertung von Identifizierungsaussagen invalide Kriterien heranziehen, 
während sie die Bedeutung tatsächlich valider Indikatoren unterschätzen 
(Leippe, 1994; Lindsay, 1994; Semmler et al., 2012). Um die 
Urteilsrichtigkeit bei der Bewertung von Identifizierungsaussagen zu 
erhöhen, beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Dissertation daher mit der Frage, 
welche Kriterien von Urteilern/innen zur Bewertung einer 
Identifizierungsaussage herangezogen werden, wie diese von ihnen 
interpretiert und gewichtet werden und ob diese Merkmale tatsächlich valide 
Indikatoren für eine korrekte Identifizierungsentscheidung darstellen. 
Experiment 2 konzentriert sich dabei auf meta-kognitive Aussageaspekte, 
die in Identifizierungsprotokollen enthalten sind und sich auf die 
Identifizierungsentscheidung des/der Zeugen/in beziehen. In Experiment 3 
werden hingegen indirekte Aussageaspekte (z.B. das non- und paraverbale 
Verhalten des/der Zeugen/in sowie bestimmte Merkmale von Personen- und 
Tathergangsbeschreibungen) untersucht, die in keinem direkten 
Zusammenhang mit der Identifizierungsentscheidung stehen.  
Experiment 1: Das erneute Lesen von Personenbeschreibungen als 
Systemvariable zur Erhöhung der Identifizierungsrichtigkeit 
In Experiment 1 wurde untersucht, inwiefern 
Personenbeschreibungen gezielt als Systemvariable (Wells, 1978) 
eingesetzt werden können, um die Identifizierungsrichtigkeit eines/r 
Zeugen/in zu erhöhen. Basierend auf Andersons (1983) assoziativer 
Netzwerktheorie des Gedächtnisses wird ein Stimulus (z.B. das Gesicht des 
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Täters/der Täterin) nie alleine im Gedächtnis gespeichert, sondern stets 
zusammen mit externalen (z.B. Umgebung) und internalen (z.B. Emotionen 
des/der Zeugen/in) Kontextinformationen enkodiert und verarbeitet. Es wird 
angenommen, dass die enkodierten Informationen in Form eines 
assoziativen Netzwerks im Gedächtnis vorliegen und daher über beliebige 
Pfade miteinander verbunden sind und über diese auch aktiviert und 
abgerufen werden können. Kann die Erinnerung an das Gesicht des 
Täters/der Täterin beispielsweise nicht direkt abgerufen werden, sollte diese 
jedoch über assoziierte Kontextinformationen aktiviert werden können. 
Basierend auf ersten vielversprechenden Befunden von Cutler, Penrod, 
O’Rourke und Martens (1996) und Sporer (2007b) wird das erneute Lesen 
der eigenen, zuvor angefertigten Personenbeschreibung vor dem 
Identifizierungsverfahren in diesem Experiment als eine Form der 
Kontextwiederherstellung eingesetzt, um die Erinnerung an das Gesicht des 
Täters/der Täterin zu aktivieren und somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer 
richtigen Identifizierungsentscheidung zu erhöhen. 
Insgesamt steht die Annahme eines solchen positiven 
Beschreibungseffekts im Gegensatz zu früheren Forschungsarbeiten zum 
verbalen Überlagerungseffekt („verbal overshadowing effect“: Alogna et al., 
2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990), in denen ein negativer Effekt der 
Anfertigung einer Personenbeschreibung auf die nachfolgende 
Identifizierungsleistung postuliert wurde. Jedoch scheint das Auftreten des 
verbalen Überlagerungseffekts an bestimmte experimentelle Bedingungen 
geknüpft zu sein. Er tritt demnach vor allem dann auf, wenn ein kurzes 
Zeitintervall von nur wenigen Minuten zwischen Beschreibung und 
Identifizierung liegt und wenn Personen gebeten werden, eine sehr 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 248 
ausführliche Beschreibung des Täters/der Täterin (über 5 Minuten) 
abzugeben, was das Nennen falscher Personendetails offensichtlich 
provoziert. Werden hingegen realistischere Behaltensintervalle (d.h. 
mehrere Stunden bis Tage) verwendet, so zeigt sich, dass sich der Effekt 
verringert, verschwindet oder gar in einen gegenteiligen Effekt, den so 
genannten verbalen Erleichterungseffekt („verbal facilitation effect“), umkehrt 
(Alogna et al., 2014; Finger & Pezdek, 1999; Meissner & Brigham, 2001).  
Erklärungen für den verbalen Erleichterungseffekt lassen sich aus 
Craik und Lockharts (1972) Theorie der Verarbeitungstiefe ableiten, die eine 
bessere Erinnerungsleistung postuliert, je tiefer ein Stimulus enkodiert wurde 
(z.B. durch das Hinzufügen selbst generierter semantischer Assoziationen 
während des Beschreibens). Zudem sollte ein zeitnaher erster Abruf der zu 
erinnernden Information diese im Gedächtnis konsolidieren und somit den 
späteren Abruf erleichtern (vgl. McDermott, Arnold, & Nelson, 2014; 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).  
Unter der Verwendung realistischer Behaltensintervalle sowie 
angemessener Beschreibungsinstruktionen wurde in der vorliegenden 
Studie daher ein positiver Effekt der Anfertigung einer 
Personenbeschreibung auf die Identifizierungsleistung angenommen. 
Insgesamt wurden 208 Teilnehmer/innen in zwei Experimenten mit 
unterschiedlichen Behaltensintervallen (Experiment 1: 2 Tage; Experiment 2: 
5 Wochen) untersucht. Unter Verwendung von Lichtbildvorlagen mit 
Täterabsenz (TA) und Täterpräsenz (TP) wurde die Identifizierungsleistung 
einer Kontrollgruppe, die keine Täterbeschreibung abgab, einer reinen 
Beschreibungsgruppe und einer Beschreibungsgruppe, die ihre 
Beschreibung vor der Identifizierung erneut lesen durfte, verglichen. 
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Übereinstimmend mit den Hypothesen, zeigten sich mehr korrekte 
Identifizierungsentscheidungen in der Gruppe, die ihre Beschreibung vor der 
Identifizierung erneut lesen durfte, als in der Kontrollgruppe (OR = 3.40). 
Besonders bei der Verwendung von TA-Lichtbildvorlagen war die Zahl 
korrekter Zurückweisungen in der Experimentalgruppe deutlich höher als in 
der Kontrollgruppe (OR = 8.14). Die Robustheit des Effekts ließ sich durch 
mehrere kleine Metaanalysen (korrekte Identifizierungsentscheidungen bei 
TA- und TP-Lichtbildvorlagen: OR = 2.15, k = 4; korrekte Zurückweisungen 
bei TA-Lichtbildvorlagen: OR = 2.74, k = 4) sowie durch eine Replikation des 
Effekts mit einer anderen Zielperson stützen. Folglich scheint das erneute 
Lesen der zuvor selbst angefertigten Personenbeschreibung als nützlicher 
Abrufreiz zu fungieren, der entsprechende Gedächtnispfade aktiviert, um die 
Erinnerung an den/die Täter/in abrufen zu können (vgl. Theorie eines 
assoziativen Gedächtnisnetzwerks: Anderson, 1983). 
Wie erwartet, ließ sich ein traditioneller verbaler Überlagerungseffekt 
(Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) in der 
vorliegenden Studie nicht nachweisen. Stattdessen konnte eine 
Überlegenheit der beiden Beschreibungsgruppen gegenüber der 
Kontrollgruppe in Form einer erhöhten Zahl an korrekten 
Identifizierungsentscheidungen beobachtet werden (OR = 2.89). Dies spricht 
dafür, dass der verbale Überlagerungseffekt bei realistischen 
Behaltensintervallen nicht auftritt und sich sogar umkehrt. 
Zusammenfassend ist anzunehmen, dass Personenbeschreibungen 
in der polizeilichen Praxis, in der das Zeitintervall zwischen Beschreibung 
und Identifizierung in der Regel 13 bis 14 Tage beträgt (vgl. Feldstudie von 
Wells, Steblay, & Dysart, 2015), keinen negativen Effekt auf die 
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Identifizierungsleistung eines/r Zeugen/in ausüben und diese stattdessen 
sogar tendenziell erhöhen. Zudem können Personenbeschreibungen gezielt 
eingesetzt werden, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer richtigen 
Identifizierungsentscheidung zu steigern, ohne zusätzliche polizeiliche 
Ressourcen oder Training erforderlich zu machen. 
Experiment 2: Beurteilung von Identifizierungsaussagen: Werden 
angemessene Kriterien verwendet? 
Die bisherige Forschung hat gezeigt, dass Urteiler/innen nur begrenzt 
in der Lage sind, die Richtigkeit von Identifizierungsaussagen korrekt 
einzuschätzen (z.B. Wells & Lindsay, 1983). Um mögliche Empfehlungen 
zur Erhöhung der Urteilsrichtigkeit ableiten zu können, ist es daher 
notwendig, eine umfassende Einsicht in die zugrundeliegenden 
Urteilsprozesse zu gewinnen. 
In Experiment 2 wurde im Rahmen des Brunswikschen Linsenmodells 
(Brunswik, 1956, 1965) untersucht, welche Kriterien Urteiler/innen zur 
Bewertung der Richtigkeit einer Identifizierungsaussage heranziehen 
(„Benutzte Hinweisreize“), und ob diese Kriterien valide Indikatoren für die 
Richtigkeit der Identifizierung darstellen („Ökologische Validität“). Um die 
beobachtete Urteilsrichtigkeit zu erklären, wurde analysiert, inwiefern eine 
Übereinstimmung zwischen den verwendeten Kriterien und deren Validität 
vorliegt. Eine hohe Übereinstimmung sollte auftreten, wenn Urteiler/innen 
valide Indikatoren entsprechend interpretieren und angemessen gewichten, 
invalide Indikatoren hingegen vernachlässigen (Leippe, 1994; Semmler et 
al., 2012). Je höher diese Übereinstimmung ausfällt, desto höher ist die zu 
erwartende Urteilsrichtigkeit. 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 251 
Um zu vermeiden, dass Urteiler/innen sich lediglich auf 
Selbstauskünfte von Zeugen/innen stützen, die häufig fehleranfällig sind 
(z.B. durch Feedbackeffekte: Steblay, Wells, & Bradfield Douglass, 2014; 
Wells & Bradfield, 1998), wurden die Teilnehmer/innen in der vorliegenden 
Studie gebeten, verschiedene Aussageaspekte, die sich in der 
Vergangenheit als valide Beurteilungsvariablen herausgestellt haben (z.B. 
subjektive Sicherheit, Entscheidungsprozesse, Entscheidungszeit und 
Schwierigkeit) basierend auf dem Identifizierungsprotokoll eines/r Zeugen/in 
selbst einzuschätzen.  
Um die Entscheidungsprozesse und Gedanken eines/r Zeugen/in 
während der Identifizierung für die Urteiler/innen deutlicher sichtbar zu 
machen, wurden Protokolle des lauten Denkens (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) 
verwendet und mit üblicherweise verwendeten retrospektiven 
Urteilsbegründungen der Zeugen/innen verglichen. Basierend auf Nisbett 
und Wilsons (1977) Annahme, dass Personen nicht in der Lage seien, ihre 
Entscheidungen nachträglich angemessen zu begründen und diese lediglich 
rechtfertigen, wird angenommen, dass Protokolle des lauten Denkens die 
Erfassung und folglich den Gebrauch valider Beurteilungskriterien 
erleichtern sollten. 
In zwei Studien wurden N = 288 (Studie 1) und N = 96 (Studie 2) 
Teilnehmer/innen je eins von insgesamt 48 Identifizierungsprotokollen zur 
Beurteilung präsentiert. Die verwendeten Identifizierungsprotokolle wurden 
in einer Pilotstudie erstellt und enthielten entweder eine korrekte Wahl der 
Täterin aus einer TP-Lichtbildvorlage oder eine falsche Wahl aus einer TA-
Lichtbildvorlage. Die Identifizierungsentscheidungen der Zeugen/innen 
wurden in Form von Protokollen des lauten Denkens oder mit einem 
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Protokoll der nachträglichen Entscheidungsbegründung präsentiert. In 
Studie 1 wurden wörtliche Transkripte der Identifizierungsentscheidung 
verwendet, wohingegen in Studie 2 das entsprechende Videomaterial 
gezeigt wurde. Es wurde angenommen, dass Videos im Vergleich zu 
wörtlichen Transkripten zusätzliche non- und paraverbale Hinweisreize 
liefern würden (z.B. Zögern, Mimik, Sprachstil), die Aufschluss über die zu 
beurteilenden Kriterien sowie die Richtigkeit der Identifizierung geben. Somit 
wurde erwartet, dass valide Beurteilungskriterien in Studie 2 deutlicher für 
die Urteiler/innen sichtbar werden sollten als in Studie 1. 
Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass basierend auf den Ratings der 
Urteiler/innen eine Reihe valider Indikatoren in den 
Identifizierungsprotokollen nachzuweisen waren, ohne dass die 
Zeugen/innen explizit nach ihrer Einschätzung gefragt wurden. Dies zeigte 
sich vor allem dann, wenn Videos der Protokolle des lauten Denkens 
verwendet wurden. Wie in bisherigen Forschungsarbeiten mit 
Selbstauskünften von Zeugen/innen berichtet wurde, gingen korrekte 
Identifizierungen im Vergleich zu falschen Identifizierungen mit einer 
höheren wahrgenommenen subjektiven Sicherheit des/der Zeugen/in (vgl. 
Sporer et al., 1995), einer geringeren Entscheidungszeit und Schwierigkeit 
(vgl. Dunning & Perretta, 2002) und einer wahrgenommenen besseren 
Wahrnehmungsbasis einher. Ebenso wurden die kognitiven Prozesse 
des/der Zeugen/in bei einer korrekten Identifizierungsentscheidung als 
automatischer und absoluter sowie als weniger abwägend und aufwändig 
eingeschätzt (vgl. Dunning & Stern, 1994; Wells, 1984). Wurden hingegen 
Protokolle einer nachträglichen Entscheidungsbegründung präsentiert, 
konnten unabhängig vom Präsentationsmedium nahezu keine signifikanten 
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Zusammenhänge zwischen den wahrgenommenen Aussageaspekten und 
der Identifizierungsrichtigkeit festgestellt werden. 
Hinsichtlich der benutzten Hinweisreize, stützen sich die 
Urteiler/innen in beiden Studien unabhängig von der Art des verwendeten 
Protokolls stark auf fast alle der untersuchten Kriterien, um die Richtigkeit 
der Identifizierung zu beurteilen, und interpretierten diese übereinstimmend 
mit den aufgestellten theoretischen Annahmen (z.B. dem interpersonalen 
Realitätsüberwachungsansatz: Johnson & Raye, 1981; Mitchell & Johnson; 
Sporer, 2004). Eine adäquate Gewichtung der verwendeten Kriterien konnte 
jedoch nicht in allen Bedingungen gezeigt werden. In beiden Bedingungen, 
in denen Protokolle einer nachträglichen Entscheidungsbegründung 
verwendet wurden, überschätzten die Urteiler/innen die ökologische Validität 
der Kriterien stark. Folglich gaben sie den Kriterien, die tatsächlich keine 
Indikatoren für die Richtigkeit der Identifizierung darstellten, ein zu großes 
Gewicht, was sich in geringen Urteilrichtigkeiten von 51.4% (Studie 1) und 
56.3% (Studie 2) niederschlug.  
Wurden hingegen Protokolle des lauten Denkens verwendet, ergab 
sich eine vergleichsweise hohe Übereinstimmung zwischen den 
verwendeten Kriterien und deren ökologischer Validität. Besonders in Studie 
2, in der Videos der Protokolle des lauten Denkens präsentiert wurden, 
diskriminierten die genutzten Kriterien zwischen korrekten und inkorrekten 
Identifizierungen und wurden von den Urteilern/innen entsprechend 
gewichtet. Folglich zeigte sich hier eine tendenziell höhere Urteilsrichtigkeit 
von 70.8%. 
Zusammenfassend scheint die Verwendung von Videos von 
Protokollen des lauten Denkens ein vielversprechender Ansatz zu sein, um 
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die Urteilsrichtigkeit bei der Bewertung von Identifizierungsaussagen zu 
erhöhen. Valide Indikatoren zur Beurteilung einer Identifizierungssaussage 
werden für Urteiler/innen sichtbar und somit nutzbar und interpretierbar 
gemacht. Somit könnten Videos von Protokollen des lauten Denkens eine 
Alternative zu der Verwendung potentiell verfälschter meta-kognitiver 
Selbsteinschätzungen von Zeugen/innen bei der Bewertung von 
Identifizierungsaussagen bieten. 
Experiment 3: Die Verwendung indirekter Maße zur Beurteilung von 
Identifizierungsaussagen 
Basierend auf typischen Zwei-Prozess-Theorien der Persuasion (z.B. 
Modell der Elaborationswahrscheinlichkeit: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) kann 
angenommen werden, dass nicht nur inhaltliche Aussageaspekte die 
Beurteilung einer Identifizierungsaussage beeinflussen, sondern auch 
einfache Heuristiken und periphere, indirekte Merkmale einen Einfluss 
ausüben, die nicht direkt mit der Identifizierungsentscheidung eines/r 
Zeugen/in in Verbindung stehen (z.B. Aussehen, non- und paraverbales 
Verhalten des/der Zeugen/in). 
Frühere Studien haben gezeigt, dass Zeugen/innen, deren Sprachstil 
als besonders überzeugungskräftig wahrgenommen wurde, insgesamt auch 
positivere Eigenschaften (z.B. Intelligenz, Kompetenz, subjektive Sicherheit 
und Glaubwürdigkeit) zugesprochen wurden als Zeugen/innen, deren 
Sprachstil als schwach eingestuft wurde (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, & O’Barr, 
1978; Hosman & Wright, 1987; O’Barr, 1982; Ruva & Bryant, 2004; 
Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986). Zudem scheint die Wahrnehmung 
bestimmter Personeneigenschaften untereinander stark korreliert zu sein 
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und mit sozialen Urteilen (z.B. Glaubwürdigkeitsurteile, Strafzumessung) 
zusammenzuhängen (z.B. Garcia & Griffitt, 1978; Pryor & Buchanan, 1984; 
Zebrowitz, Hall, Murphy, & Rhodes, 1996). In Experiment 3 wurde daher 
untersucht, inwiefern der wahrgenommene Sprachstil eines/r Zeugen/in (vgl. 
„powerful speech“: Erickson et al., 1978; O’Barr, 1982) sowie der subjektive 
Gesamteindruck, den sich Urteiler/innen von einem/r Zeugen/in bilden (vgl. 
„Witness Credibility Scale“: Brodsky, Griffin, & Cramer, 2010), die 
Beurteilung einer Identifizierungsaussage beeinflussen. 
Zusätzlich wurden Zusammenhänge zwischen verschiedenen 
Aspekten der eingeschätzten Quantität und Qualität von Personen- und 
Tathergangsbeschreibungen und der Beurteilung der 
Identifizierungsrichtigkeit betrachtet. In Übereinstimmung mit Annahmen des 
interpersonalen Realitätsüberwachungsansatzes (Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; 
Sporer, 2004) legen frühere Studienergebnisse nahe, dass Urteiler/innen 
sich bevorzugt auf einfache heuristische Merkmale wie die Anzahl an 
nebensächlichen Beschreibungsdetails stützen, um auf die 
Erinnerungsleistung des/der Zeugen/in und somit auf die Richtigkeit der 
Identifizierung zu schließen (Bell & Loftus, 1988, 1989; Wells & Leippe, 
1981). 
Parallel zu Experiment 2 wurde im Rahmen des Brunswikschen 
Linsenmodells (Brunswik, 1956, 1965) getestet, ob die untersuchten 
indirekten Merkmale zwischen korrekten und inkorrekten Identifizierungen 
diskriminieren, welche dieser Merkmale von den Urteilern/innen verwendet 
und wie diese im Beurteilungsprozess interpretiert und gewichtet werden. 
Insgesamt zeigten die Ergebnisse, dass die Urteiler/innen sich bei der 
Bewertung der Identifizierungsrichtigkeit auf eine Reihe indirekter 
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Aussagemerkmale bezogen. Jedoch diskriminierten die verwendeten 
Merkmale nicht zwischen korrekten und inkorrekten Identifizierungen und 
wurden somit unangemessen stark gewichtet. Valide Aussagemerkmale 
ließen sich lediglich im wahrgenommenen Sprachstil eines/r Zeugen/in 
finden, wurden jedoch von den Urteilern/innen nicht als solche erkannt und 
daher nicht zur Urteilsfindung herangezogen. 
Eine Identifizierungsentscheidung wurde schließlich eher dann als 
korrekt eingestuft, wenn Urteiler/innen den/die Zeugen/in als besonders 
selbstsicher wahrnahmen (vgl. Brodsky et al., 2010; Wells et al., 1979). 
Ebenso stützten sich die Urteiler/innen stark auf eine Reihe von 
Beschreibungsmerkmalen, die ein gutes Gedächtnis für den/die Täterin 
sowie eine hohe Sicherheit bezüglich der eigenen Erinnerung 
widerspiegelten. Im Gegensatz zu Befunden von Bell und Loftus (1988, 
1989) und Wells und Leippe (1981) war jedoch nicht die reine Anzahl an 
erinnerten Details entscheidend, sondern vielmehr inhaltliche Aspekte wie 
eine konsistente und nachvollziehbare Schilderung der Tat. Persuasive 
Effekte vereinzelter wahrgenommener Sprachcharakteristika konnten nur 
dann beobachtet werden, wenn die Identifizierungsaussage alleine, d.h. 
ohne zusätzliche Personen- und Tathergangsbeschreibungen präsentiert 
wurde. Eine wahrgenommene fragende Betonung sowie die Verwendung 
von relativierenden Ausdrücken (z.B. „ich vermute“ oder „vielleicht“) wurden 
dabei als Merkmale eines schwachen Sprachstils interpretiert und somit als 
Indikatoren für eine falsche Identifizierung herangezogen (vgl. Erickson et 
al., 1978; Jules & McQuiston, 2013; O’Barr, 1982). Tatsächlich fanden sich 
jedoch für keine der von den Urteilern/innen verwendeten Merkmale 
Zusammenhänge mit der Richtigkeit der Identifizierung. 
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Zwar hat Experiment 2 gezeigt, dass die Präsentation von Videos 
einer Identifizierungsaussage die Wahrnehmung valider Aussagemerkmale 
scheinbar erleichtert, jedoch sprechen die Ergebnisse aus Experiment 3 
dafür, dass unabhängig von der Art des präsentierten 
Entscheidungsprotokolls zusätzlich invalide periphere Aussagemerkmale 
sichtbar gemacht werden, die die Urteilsfindung ebenso beeinflussen. Eine 
unangemessene Gewichtung invalider peripherer Aussagemerkmale kann 
daher zur Erklärung der allgemein eher niedrigen Urteilsrichtigkeit bei der 
Bewertung von Identifizierungsaussagen herangezogen werden.  
Praktische Implikationen 
Zusammenfassend lassen sich anhand der vorliegenden Dissertation 
Anregungen für weitere Forschungsarbeiten sowie verschiedene praktische 
Empfehlungen ableiten, um die Identifizierungsrichtigkeit eines/r Zeugen/in 
zu erhöhen, sowie die Urteilsrichtigkeit bei der Bewertung von 
Identifizierungsaussagen zu verbessern: 
(1) Zeugen/innen sollten gebeten werden, vor dem Identifizierungsverfahren 
ihre zuvor angefertigte Beschreibung des Täters/der Täterin erneut zu 
lesen. 
(2) Instruktionen zum lauten Denken sollten für den polizeilichen Gebrauch 
optimiert und evaluiert werden. 
(3) Zeugen/innen sollten während ihrer Identifizierungsentscheidung „laut 
denken“ und dabei gefilmt werden, um valide Beurteilungskriterien für 
Urteiler/innen sichtbar und somit nutzbar zu machen. 
(4) Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der verschiedenen Brunswikschen 
Linsenmodelle können Richtlinien zur Gewichtung valider 
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Beurteilungskriterien entwickelt und getestet werden. Ebenso sollten 
Urteiler/innen über invalide Beurteilungskriterien informiert werden. 
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